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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

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So completely was the military situation in South Africa controlled, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, by political considerations, and so seriously have they affected our strategy since then, that it is absolutely necessary to refer to them in the first place.

Broadly speaking, from a British point of view, the state of things which existed in the summer of 1899 in the South African Republic was as follows:

A great number of the subjects of our Empire, both from Great Britain and her self-governing colonies, had been attracted to the Transvaal by the starting of a great gold-mining industry there and by the commercial enterprises following in its train. They had so increased that they practically outnumbered the Boer inhabitants. By the investment of their capital, by their enterprise, skill and labor, all of which were heavily taxed, the revenue of the Republic had been prodigiously augmented. They constituted a busy, useful and, on the whole, a highly civilized community and had created a great commercial city, Johannesburg.

But, although they contributed the greatest portion of the State revenue, they were allowed no voice in its expenditure. They were practically deprived of voting rights (though the conventions of 1881 and 1884 guaranteed all civil rights), nor even

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allowed to constitute a municipality for carrying out necessary work in the city they had created. They were prevented from educating their children in their own tongue in State-aided schools and were continually treated with much contumely. Scant justice was obtained by them, the Boer judges, magistrates and juries being usually prejudiced against them, and very flagrant cases of injustice often occurred. The "Uitlanders," as they were termed, were treated, in many ways, as mere helots.

The Boer officials and the Pretorian Government itself had notoriously become more and more corrupt, and, while immense sums out of the revenue were spent for other purposes, the streets of Johannesburg were allowed to become a danger and a disgrace to any civilized State, an indication of what was meted out of the revenue to the despised Uitlanders.

Her subjects had constantly appealed to the Government of Great Britain for redress of their wrongs, and our ministers had addressed frequent expostulations to the Government of Pretoria and carried out negotiations for making their position more tolerable. But, hampered as we were by the effects of the ill-starred Jameson Raid, in 1894, these had not for several years been pressed home with much force. In 1899, however, the raid seemed sufficiently expiated, and the murder in that year of a harmless British subject by a Boer policeman (who got off scot-free), and further petitions made in consequence, brought matters to a head. Our High Commissioner and the Home Government became convinced of the immediate necessity for entering into serious negotiations and for insisting upon justice and redress. No great Empire could longer brook, with any self-respect, such continuous ill treatment of a large number of her subjects by a small and but partially civilized Republic. It was evident that the only permanent remedy was to endow the Uitlanders with sufficient voting power to protect themselves and their interests constitutionally, by representation in the Volksraad, in some such manner as in the Cape Colony, Natal, and the Orange Free State, where Afrikander (Dutch and English) and Uitlander alike had equal rights. At the same time it was quite recognized that the voting power should be so arranged, in the first place, as not to overpower the Burgher vote. On these bases negotiations were commenced.

The people of Great Britain and her Colonies had, by this

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time, as the truth came out, become more thoroughly aroused to their countrymen's wrongs and were determined that these should be redressed, but they were neither anxious for war nor did they expect it, believing that, if sufficient political pressure were exercised, the Pretorian Government would yield. Nor was it generally supposed that the Orange Free State, although sympathizing with the Transvaal Boers, being closely allied to them by blood, was otherwise than friendly to us.

Public opinion, usually not well informed, remained doubtful on many points, until President Krüger showed his real hand toward the end of the negotiations. There was, and is still, much sympathy in England with those Boers who deem they are fighting for their country alone. And at first the British public took somewhat negligently the despicable tyranny of the Pretorian Oligarchy, so far away, and its ambitious hopes of destroying the British domination in South Africa—both of which are now sufficiently patent—viewing them with a good-natured but mistaken contempt.

Had the British Government sent out sufficient forces to South Africa to secure our own territory against attack, or if it had in the early part of these negotiations made the military preparations necessary, they would have been accused, it is alleged, of putting an unfair and unjustifiable pressure on the Boer Government, and their difficulties in arriving at a satisfactory solution, which they hoped to secure by diplomatic pressure, would have been much increased.

Political considerations thus prevented the necessary military preparations, on a large scale, being made against the possible contingency of our being forced into war; and, when that contingency suddenly arose, the military situation was, in consequence, most seriously jeopardized. Whether the political reasons mentioned were sufficiently valid reasons for such neglect, whether there were other more urgent ones, or whether, in reality, mistaken motives of economy had to do with it, are not matters for discussion here. We have merely to observe how they affected the military situation in fact.

The British Government had been fully aware that, for many years past, a great portion of the large revenue, mainly drawn from the pockets of the Uitlanders, had been spent by the Transvaal Government in building forts, in providing arms and mili-

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tary equipment, in payment of mercenaries, and, generally, in preparing for war—nominally, for the purpose of defense against such a raid as Jameson's or against an Uitlander rising, but in reality on a very much greater scale than could possibly be necessary for such a purpose.

The actual number of available Burghers and of their mercenaries was known, and the nature and amount of the armament. It was also known that a great reserve of rifles and ammunition had been bought—beyond those required for the whole of the Transvaal and Free State Burghers—for the purpose of arming Afrikander sympathizers in our own Colonies, and that immense sums (as much as £3,000,000 in a single year) had been spent in pushing forward a Boer propaganda in those Colonies and elsewhere. Our Government was further well acquainted with the treaty between the two Republics. Yet, knowing all this, if they had plainly stated, to begin with, that the Pretorian Government was preparing, at a convenient season, with the aid of the Orange Free State (which had always been regarded as most friendly to us), and with the assistance of rebel sympathizers in our Colonies, to overturn British supremacy in South Africa, and to replace it by a Boer dominion, they would have been laughed at as alarmists raising a cry to cover political ends.

From time to time, within the last few years, the handful of our troops in Cape Colony and Natal had been sparingly increased, but only in a sort of tentative way. The Afrikander Bund party was in power in Cape Colony, and was inimical even to the small increase. It was not desired to offend their susceptibilities; and for political reasons, therefore, the imperial forces in South Africa were so few in number as to be totally insufficient to protect our Colonies from attack of anything but a small force. In Cape Colony there were 4,000, in Natal 8,000, not to mention small bodies of armed police spread over the great areas of Rhodesia and Bechuanaland, or a total of about 12,000, with some 5,000 Colonial troops, to be relied upon as immediately available.

The political conditions in Natal were different from those in Cape Colony. There was no Bund Ministry there, and the inhabitants were for the most part thoroughly loyal. Fearing a sudden raid, her Ministers urgently requested that our forces there should be so increased as to safeguard Natal from an attack, unless made in great force. In consequence, a body of 8,000 British troops

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was in August ordered from India, under Brigadier-General Symons. This force brought up the number of troops in Natal to about 16,000 regular and some 4,000 of the local colonial forces. A few battalions of infantry from our coaling stations were also ordered to Natal, and General Sir G. White was sent out to assume command, arriving there early in October.

President Krüger first made fair promises and proposals and then drew back with the usual Boer shiftiness, taking away with one hand what he apparently gave with the other; until, at last, it became so evident that he had no real intention of granting substantial voting power to the Uitlanders, nor of redressing their manifest wrongs, that the negotiations were broken off. The President was informed that the English Government would formulate its own proposals. Tardy preparations were made by our Government for the arbitrament of arms, if it should come to that; and, shortly afterward, the world was astonished by the rude and imperious ultimatum issued from Pretoria.

President Krüger's ultimatum of the 9th of October (its term to expire on the 11th) was received in London on the 10th, and on the latter date President Steyn threw the Free State into the balance against us. But it was only on the 7th of October that our Army Reserves were called out, to the number of 25,000, and that the definite organization for the field of an army corps of 52,000* men was set in action. On the 18th further steps were taken as to the embodiment of militia and calling out of Militia Reserves, but the embarkation of the army corps did not commence until the 20th. As the voyage of the transports would occupy approximately twenty days, and as it was proposed that the troops should embark at the rate of 9,000 a day, the whole of the army corps could not arrive at Cape Town until the middle of November, thus giving the Boers, who were mobilized and at or over the border on the 11th of October, a long start, of at least five weeks, before our reinforcements were even landed. As a matter of fact, the whole of our army corps was not landed until December.

The military situation when hostilities actually began, on the 11th of October, was as follows:

*The dates and numbers of troops given must be taken generally as only approximate, though sufficiently so for practical purposes. Nor does the number of troops mentioned, in any case, necessarily denote the number available for the fighting line; a very large proportion must usually be deducted for men employed on lines of communication in supply, transport, medical aid, etc., for meeting the thousand needs of large bodies of troops in the field. A percentage also must be deducted for men temporarily sick.

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To the east in Natal we held Ladysmith, with a force of about 9,000 men, having a detached post of 3,000 at Glencoe Junction, 42 miles to the right front, covering Dundee. At Pietermaritzburg and at the base at Durban were small bodies of troops, while a few posts, feebly garrisoned, existed on the line of railway communication.

The "Bund Ministry," in power in Cape Colony, showed themselves very lukewarm in making provisions for defense, and they did not call out for service any of the volunteer force until the 26th of October, and then only a small portion. Nor were the Cape Mounted Rifles, their permanently organized military force, permitted to take any active share in the defense of the Colony until long afterward. The regular forces available were sent up to the most important strategic points covering the three main railway lines and the branches connecting them.

Into Kimberley (647 miles from Cape Town and 486 from Port Elizabeth) were thrown about 400 regulars. Various local corps and small bodies of Protectorate Police and others brought up the total garrison to some 2,000. This place offered great facilities for defense, the great mounds of rubbish from the mine workings giving good positions for guns and earthworks. Mr. Rhodes had thrown in his lot with the town he is so thoroughly identified with, and his presence made the Boers doubly anxious to take it.

Mafeking, over 220 miles north of Kimberley (870 miles from Cape Town by rail), was garrisoned by Protectorate and other armed police, and by colonial corps to the number of about 600, under Colonel Baden-Powell, assisted by a few other British officers.

Far away in Rhodesia, a small force of mounted police at Fort Tuli protected the borders on the north of the Transvaal.

Altogether, with the exception of Sir G. White's small army, our forces in South Africa consisted of mere handfuls of men scattered over a vast area, in posts and unfortified towns hastily prepared for defense.

The first military operations of much importance after hostilities began took place in Natal, and were intimately connected with Ladysmith, which is a small town, with a railway station, lying on the northern bank of the Klip River, 189 miles from our sea base at Durban. It lies on high ground (3,200 feet), and the

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situation is a very healthy one. For many years past our troops in Natal had carried out their training and exercises on a large area of land in its immediate neighborhood, which was very suitable for the purpose. Musketry and artillery ranges had been established, barracks built and considerable depots of military stores collected there. Strategically, the position is an excellent one, covering, as it does, the junction of the two railway lines leading into Natal, from the Free State and from Pretoria, respectively. But, unless held by a very large force, it was not tactically a good position for defense, there being many high, isolated hills, at from 4,000 to 8,000 yards' distance, commanding Ladysmith in every direction. Unless the whole perimeter of these hills could be held, they offered excellent positions to the enemy, as we know to our cost. The communication by rail was a long one, passing through a country intersected by rivers, broken by mountains, and much more adapted to the movements of mobile mounted Boers than to those of our troops. Forty-two miles to the northeast lay the coal fields of Dundee, with a short branch to the main line at Glencoe Junction. Their possession was of much value to Natal.

The Government of Natal was anxious that as small a portion as possible of the Colony should be overrun by the enemy, and supposing that, should the Boers invade, they would not dare to advance south with a strong British force left in their rear, it seemed most desirable that Ladysmith should be held in force, with a strong post at Dundee in front. These considerations seem to have finally determined the holding of Ladysmith as our main strategic position for the defense of Natal.*

When Sir G. White arrived, even had political considerations permitted his retiring his force to a better position more to the south, he was already committed to Ladysmith, for the Boer advance was developing rapidly and the difficulties of withdrawing the great stores of ammunition, provisions, etc., were quite insuperable. The Boers, who were on their borders on the 11th of October, advanced into Natal slowly at first, the Transvaalers from the north through Newcastle, and the Free Staters through the passes of the Drakenbergs on the west. Our advanced post at Glencoe, under General Symons, was considerably strengthened (to some 3,000 men in all), Sir G. White having about 9,000 at Ladysmith.

* The weakness of lengthy communications by a single line of railway does not seem to have been sufficiently considered.

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On the 19th the enemy cut the communications between the two forces and established themselves at Elandslaagte Station, fifteen miles north of Ladysmith. General Joubert had arranged for a combined attack on Symons on the 20th, a commando of 4,000 men, under Lucas Meyer, coming from the eastward, to be met by one of 9,000 under Erasmus from the north. Meyer's commando took up position on the night of the 19th on Talana Hill, overlooking General Symons's position, and commenced the attack at daybreak. After a fierce combat, General Symons succeeded in driving the Boers headlong from their strong position just as Erasmus's commando was approaching, too late, apparently, to render any assistance—it retired, indeed, as soon as its advance guard came under fire of our artillery. Meyer's flying commando was pursued, but in the pursuit a portion of our cavalry and mounted troops were drawn on too far in the dark and were captured. General Symons had been mortally wounded in the afternoon. The loss on both sides was considerable; Meyer's commando was completely broken up.

Joubert's arrangements were excellent, though there is always a danger of such a combination as he had devised failing, as it did in this case. If Erasmus had carried out his instructions, it seems that nothing could have saved our small force from destruction or capture.

To re-establish communication, Sir G. White ordered an attack on the enemy at Elandslaagte on the 21st. This was most successfully carried out by General French, with about 4,000 men; the Boer position was stormed and a number of prisoners taken. But the situation of our force at Glencoe was so perilous that General Yule, who had assumed command, left his camp in the early morning of the 23d, and, marching by road, reached Ladysmith on the 26th. To cover Yule's retreat Sir G. White engaged the enemy, threatening his flank from the west, on the 24th, at Rietfontein, and achieved that object without coming to close quarters.

The Boers closed in on the north and east of Ladysmith, gradually increasing in numbers and establishing guns in position on the neighboring hills. On the 29th Sir G. White made a strong attempt to destroy new batteries that were being established to the north at Farquhar's Farm, with the view, also, if an action were brought on, of piercing the enemy's centre. The night before a small force, a mountain battery and two battalions, was sent some

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miles westward to Nicholson's Nek to protect his left flank. Sir G. White did not succeed in his main engagement, the Boers retiring their right and centre and so strengthening their left as to enfilade his right flank, and he was forced to retire. The detachment at Nicholson's Nek was attacked in force and captured, the mules, with guns and rifle ammunition, having been stampeded during the night march.

On the 2d of November the Boers closed in on the west and south of Ladysmith, cutting the communications and completely investing it. Just before this was done reinforcements had arrived, among them, fortunately, a naval brigade with some heavy naval guns capable of coping with the Boer guns of position. The total force was then about 8,000 men, with supplies of food and ammunition sufficient for three months.

General Sir Redvers Buller, who had been selected as Commander-in-Chief of our Army, landed at the Cape on the 31st of October. Before he left England the strategical plan of campaign had been decided on, the main feature being, no doubt, an advance of his army corps into the Orange Free State, three separate columns starting from the several sea bases—Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London—using the railways running northward from those ports, and converging on the southern border (the Orange River) of the Free State, Sir G. White's field force in Natal, to the east, and the garrisons of Kimberley and Mafeking being left to take care of themselves for the time.

This seems sound strategy—to strike at the heart of the enemy's country, and to trust to the effect of the blow for the relief of our far-away flanks, already committed, by the enforced withdrawal of the enemy's commandoes attacking them. How far it would have succeeded must ever remain in doubt, for it was not carried out.

The supposed Boer plan of campaign is said to have been drawn up by a strategist of European reputation.

Offensive measures were to be adopted in Natal, and the Boers were to proceed by successive stages of enveloping (by cutting into its line of communication) the inferior British force, until they had driven it into the sea. In the Orange Free State they were to adopt a defensive policy based on the strategical advantage derived from its position on the flank of the railway north of De Aar Junction. It was assumed that—its bridges having been blown

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up and the railway line beyond it to Bloemfontein destroyed—the obstacle of the Orange River would so retard a direct attack from the Dordrecht–Middelburg base, that the invaders, to save time, would transfer their base to Kimberley for an advance on Bloemfontein, or further north still to Mafeking, to move against Pretoria.

In neither case were the Boers to oppose the movement in its earlier stages, but to operate on the long line of communications, De Aar to Kimberley (150 miles) and Kimberley to Mafeking (250 miles), as the case might be.

The forces presumed to be at their disposal were 27,000 Transvaal Boers and 20,000 Free Staters, a total of 47,000, of which number about 22,000 would be available in Natal. These numbers are no doubt approximately correct; but, unfortunately, we must add to them a large number, probably several thousand, of rebel sympathizers from parts of Cape Colony, and some even from Natal.

Whether the statement as to its origin is true or not, some such strategical plan the Boers have, with few exceptions, carried out, so far as applicable to our strategical moves, and up to this time with much success.

Between the date of Sir R. Buller's departure from England and his arrival at Cape Town the momentous events described had occurred in Natal; Mafeking and Kimberley had been invested, and, by the 2d of November, Sir G. White and his field force had been shut up in Ladysmith. The first phase of the war had ended with this event.

After spending some days in Cape Colony in visiting the three sea bases and the advanced posts which had been arranged for our strategic advance, and in learning exactly how matters stood there and in Natal, Sir R. Buller took a new departure and abandoned, at least for the time, the original plan of campaign. Whether he did this on his own initiative as Commander-in-Chief, looking to the new conditions existing and to difficulties in carrying out that plan, or from political pressure, or moved by instructions from higher authorities, we cannot yet tell.

The new plan adopted was to carry out the relief of our beleaguered garrisons at Ladysmith and Kimberley directly, by separate forces, instead of by the pressure of a single army of great strength entering the enemy's country. The line of ad-

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vanced posts in Cape Colony already described was, however, still to be held and preparations continued at the several sea bases.

With the adoption of the new plan the second phase of the war was commenced. On the 9th of November the troops of the First Division of Buller's army corps began to move by sea from Cape Colony to Natal. Lieutenant-General Sir F. Clery was sent there, and shortly afterward Sir Redvers Buller himself arrived and took command. By the 22d of November our forces in Natal had been increased by about 15,000 men, principally of the First Division.*

A large force began also to assemble about the 10th of November on our extreme left strategic flank, under Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen, at Orange River Station, the most westerly of our advanced posts, for the relief of Kimberley, and by the 22d of November he had there a column of about 8,000 men.

Orders were given in England on the 9th of November for the mobilization of a fifth infantry division, apparently then meant to replace in Cape Colony the division diverted to Natal.

We will follow briefly the fortunes of the two separate campaigns, the theatres of which are some 300 miles apart. It may be remarked that both our armies consisted principally of infantry, both were singularly short of cavalry and artillery and so weak in transport as to be practically tied to their railway communications, which, in each case, consisted of a single line. In Natal the Boers, advancing south of Ladysmith and establishing a heavy battery north of Colenso (sixteen miles south of Ladysmith), drove out our garrison, which retired to Estcourt, seventeen miles southward, on the 7th of November. The Boers then occupied Frere, thirty-one miles south of Ladysmith, where the railway crosses the Blaauwkranz River. Our garrison at Estcourt had been increased to about 2,000, with two naval guns and six field guns. But the Boers, continuing their advance, gradually enveloped it, and established themselves on the 19th at Highlands, on the railway line, twenty-three miles south of Estcourt, isolating it from Mooi River, our next post, thirty-one miles south. About the 20th the Boers were on the long line, Courton on the west to Weenen on the east, and rapidly advancing south, on both flanks of the railway, threatening to envelop Mooi River and then Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal, to which they approached within twen-

* Reasons of detail, as to where the several units were when the new plan was adoped, necessitated many changes in the Army Corps in its organization and distribution.

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ty-five miles, looting the country as they advanced and enlisting rebel sympathizers.

On the 23d and 24th our advanced brigade, cut off at Estcourt, engaged the enemy in their rear, and cleared the way for our main body, which moved to Estcourt on the 29th, the advanced guard going on to Frere, thirty-two miles south of Ladysmith and seventeen miles from Colenso. There Buller began organizing his relief column, and by the 10th of December he had at his disposal in Natal some 22,000 regulars and probably 3,000 to 4,000 irregulars and colonial troops. Seeing our rapidly increasing strength and fearing for their communications, the Boers had hurriedly retired, carrying with them their loot, and concentrated to the north of the Tugela, where they now are, extending and strengthening the formidable positions there.

On the 14th of December Buller established a brigade in advance at Chieveley, five miles north of Frere, and on the 15th attacked the Boers, who held the north bank of the Tugela and also an entrenched position on our right flank upon its south side. His movement was apparently meant as a reconnaissance in force. As frequently happens, however, a portion of his troops, attempting the passage of the Tugela, committed him to a general action, in which our forces were repulsed, with much loss. Ten guns of our artillery supporting the fighting line and brought incautiously too near the Boers under cover were captured. The troops of the Fifth Division, under Sir C. Warren, commenced to reach Cape Town on the 16th, but, in view of this reverse, they were, excepting one or two infantry battalions, diverted to Natal, where they have all now arrived. More colonial irregulars have also been raised and Buller's forces in Natal must now amount to about 30,000 fighting men, with sixty to seventy guns, including those of the Naval Brigade. But in mounted troops and transport he is still sadly deficient. A cavalry regiment and two batteries of the Royal Horse Artillery (twelve guns), from India, should reach him within a few days' time, and also other reinforcements. If the position of things at Ladysmith will allow, he may well wait for these and form a strong flying column for a wide turning movement to coincide with his next attack.

At Ladysmith the enemy have attempted two assaults—on the 9th of November, when they were repulsed with much loss, and on the 6th of January, 1900, when, after a fierce struggle, during

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which portions of our defenses were taken and retaken, the Boers were eventually repulsed, with severe loss, the fighting commencing about 2.30 in the morning and continuing until 7.30 in the evening. Sir Redvers Buller was, during part of the struggle, in communication by heliograph and made a demonstration in force against the enemy in his front, but found them too much on the alert to permit of an attack.* Small sorties have been made by our force, and recently two of the Boer heavy guns in position were taken and destroyed. The investment lines are not very close, nor has the continual bombardment inflicted severe loss. Provisions and ammunition exist for at least a month to come, and the garrison are much elated at their recent success.

Lord Methuen advanced from Orange River Station on the 22d of November with about 8,000 men. On the 23d he attacked the Boers in position at Belmont, twenty-one miles north, and drove them out with loss. Pushing on seven miles to Enslin, where the Boers had again entrenched themselves on broken hills, he was once more victorious. Advancing twenty-eight miles further to Modder River (twenty-five miles south of Kimberley), where the Boers were strongly entrenched, he fought on the 28th a fierce and prolonged battle for the passage of the river. This was so far indecisive that the troops remained on the field that evening, but during the night the Boers withdrew to a new position, about ten miles to the north, on a range of hills at Magersfontein. Lord Methuen's losses were heavy, but he had been previously reinforced and had still some 10,000 fighting men available after the battle. He remained at Modder River until the 9th of December to recruit his men (who had fought three actions in five days), to replenish supplies and to repair the railway bridge over the river. During this period he received considerable reinforcements, and his force, from Orange River northward, was brought up to about 12,000 men, with thirty or forty guns, a certain number being, however, taken up in the protection of his communications to Orange River. On the 9th a reconnaisance was made of the Boer position, and on the 10th it was severely bombarded. On the night of the 10th Methuen moved out his troops, who bivouacked near the Boer position, and in the dark the next morning attacked it.

The Highland Brigade, which was to have delivered the main

*** The attack on Ladysmith was largely reinforced during the fight from the Boer force in front of Buller.**

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assault, was caught in close column by the enemy's fire, having got close to their trenches without being aware of it. They suffered terrible loss, and their surprise probably sealed the fate of the day. Though the attack was hotly pressed while daylight lasted and our troops slept on the field of battle, the enemy showed so bold a front the next morning that Lord Methuen retired to Modder River, where he still remains.

He has been further reinforced, and probably has with him some 10,000 fighting men, but he is exceedingly weak in cavalry (though his mounted troops have been increased by Australian and Canadian contingents), and the transport is still tied very much to the railway line. Though in communication, by searchlight, with Kimberley and only twenty-five miles from that town, he is unable at present to relieve it. His railway communications seem secure, but, unless able to become more mobile, his army must either remain inert, attack directly a position stronger than ever or retire along the railway line, which he cannot leave. A curious "*impasse*" for the present! The Boers also have been largely reinforced, and are supposed now to number 13,000; they are entrenching more and more on the flanks, which tend toward enveloping Methuen's position. Until our new plan of campaign was entered upon, the Free State Boers, expecting our attack on the Orange River side, contented themselves with destroying the bridges over the river, or preparing them for destruction, and also the railway line south of Bloemfontein; but, seeing our weakness, they became bolder and have encroached some fifty miles upon Cape Colony territory—apparently to the number of 6,000 to 8,000, including rebels joining them locally. About half the number oppose Gatacre, and the remainder are opposite French.

The advanced line of base, under the original plan, is held to the east by Lieutenant-General Gatacre, with about 3,000 men, about Sterkstrom. This officer attempted a surprise by night of the position of the Boers opposing him at Stormberg, but his force was attacked on the march, being itself surprised, suffered severely and lost three guns. The country he has to work in is a difficult one, and without a large increase, especially in mounted men, he cannot do more than hold his own.

Naauwpoort, more to the west, covering the Port Elizabeth line, is held by General French, with a small body of troops, well supplied with cavalry, horse artillery and mounted infantry, for

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the movement of which arms the country in front is fairly adapted. By constantly threatening their communications, he is gradually driving back to the Orange River the commandoes opposed to him. If he completes his operations successfully, the remaining Boers south of the border will be awkwardly situated.

Kimberley is closely invested, but the proximity of Methuen's force probably relieves the pressure of the enemy.

Mafeking, after its long investment, is, it is feared, in bad straits. All that soldiers could do has been done by the garrison and its skillful commander, Colonel Baden-Powell.

As to our troops in the field and further provisions made for carrying on the war, Natal was reinforced in August. A day or two before Krüger's ultimatum was received (on the 10th of October) steps were taken to mobilize an army corps (52,000 men), but their embarkation only began on the 20th of October, nor was their landing in South Africa completed until December, the transports on the whole making slow passage. Offers of contingents from Canada and Australia of some 2,000 men were also accepted. On the 9th of November, when it was determined to change our plan of campaign, the Government decided to mobilize a fifth infantry division (say, 10,000 men); troops were also forwarded to replace those captured at Nicholson's Nek on the 30th of October, and authority was given to hasten on the recruiting and arming of irregular mounted corps in Natal and Cape Colony. Preliminary arrangements were ordered for the mobilization of a second army corps. The Fifth Division commenced to embark in November; the whole had reached Africa by the 30th of December and were diverted to Natal.

About the 4th of December, after Methuen had sustained serious losses, the mobilization of a sixth division (say, 10,000 men) was ordered. Its embarkation commenced about the 16th of December. Its troops are now beginning to arrive at Cape Town and they should all be landed there by the end of this month.

When the news was received of Sir Redvers Buller's serious reverse at the Tugela River, following closely upon Lord Methuen's repulse on the 11th and on the reverse experienced by General Gatacre in Cape Colony, public opinion was deeply stirred, and the Government took energetic steps, some of which constitute a complete and serious departure from our Organization for National Defense up to this time.

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A new Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, was appointed, (Sir Redvers Buller retaining command in Natal), with Lord Kitchener as Chief of Staff. A seventh infantry division (say, 10,000) was ordered to mobilize. The further contingents offered by Canada and Australasia (this time all mounted) were accepted. And it was decided, further, to form, from our yeomanry, an imperial force of horse of some 8,000 men, to send seven militia battalions volunteering for active service (about 5,000 men), and a large body of our volunteer force—300 mounted infantry, a battery of artillery (four guns) and about 6,000 infantry, all picked rifle-shots, volunteering for active service—so that a portion of our forces, never before used in actual war, will soon embark to take part in the campaign. This step will have results of a far-reaching nature in the future of our Empire and on the organization of our forces.

Including the seventh division, which commenced to embark on the 1st, about 33,000 men will be shipped by the 20th and reach South Africa before the end of February, when (exclusive of the garrisons now beleaguered) we should have about 120,000 men for the fighting line (including South African Colonists) under the British flag in the theatre of war. An eighth division is prepared for mobilization, a large number of batteries and artillery (about 100 guns, including guns of position), will be shortly sent on, and other measures taken.

To take the place of our regular troops in garrisons at home and abroad, where required, a sufficient number of militia battalions have been embodied. It will be seen how the military situation stands to-day and what efforts Great Britain has made, relying entirely upon her own subjects. Considering that men, horses and material have, for the most part, to be transported 4,600 miles and more by sea from the real base, our own shores or those of our Colonies,* the task is really a prodigious one. Should more strenuous efforts still be required, however, the shoulders of the British Empire will be found broad enough to bear their strain.

Having rapidly reviewed the sequence of events and the military situation of to-day, what conclusions are we to draw as to British and Boer strategy, tactics and troops, and how is the British ill-success so far to be accounted for? What will be the effects

* Curiously enough, Australia, Canada and England are approximately equidistant from the Cape of Good Hope.

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of the war, when terminated, on the organization of the British military forces—now ruled at our War Office by a civil head, responsible, under the Government, for the national defense—and what will be the result upon the British Empire, from a military point of view?

The Boer strategy has been excellent, carrying out, on the whole, the plan of campaign described. Their advanace into Natal, after the complete investment of Ladysmith, lacked dash and determination and little was gained by it. Fortunately for us, they also departed from their plan when Methuen advanced; had they carried it out, his column might have been dangerously compromised. Based, as their strategy has been, on their extreme mobility, as an army of horsemen, able easily to outflank us and to cut our communications—our want of mounted troops debars us from preventing them from doing so, or from threatening their communications—it has succeeded admirably. In military intelligence they have shown first-rate organization. They have been greatly aided by the sympathizers of their kin in our Colonies and by lavish expenditure in organizing it elsewhere.

Tactically, their mobility—and our want of it—has given them immense advantage. When driven from entrenched positions, they have been able to retreat with impunity and usually without pursuit. On the field of battle, as at Farquhar's Farm, they could rapidly retire one flank and reinforce the other and baffle our infantry on foot. In field entrenchments they have shown themselves masters, under skilled alien instruction. Intimately acquainted with the terrain, their leaders have shown much skill in choosing positions. Their ordinary mode of life makes them inimitable scouts. Excellent shots and furnished with long-range, rapid-firing rifles, of the most modern pattern (with smokeless powder), their rifle-fire is most formidable. Their guns, of the usual type employed in the field, are very good, outranging our own. They have taught us a lesson in the use of heavy guns of position, which they move with comparative rapidity in the field. Rapid-firing guns of small calibre, of most recent pattern, are largely used, often with terrible effect. Their artillery has been well handled, mostly by their mercenaries, but the ammunition used has been very defective.

In attack they are very cautious, always taking advantage of their mobility in the field to outflank us. Against entrenched

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positions they are equally prudent, employing a long artillery preparation and making most skillful use of cover. Fighting, as individual citizens, they are very careful of their lives.* No bonds of discipline, as with regular troops, tend to make them face death almost carelessly. They are certainly better in defense than in attack, partly, no doubt, for that reason.

It is difficult to judge of our strategy (as to the plan of campaign) without knowing the exact reasons dictating departure from the original plan; but it seems to us, not knowing them, that it would have been better to have carried out the first plan at all costs, though one Army Corps would not have sufficed.

Otherwise, our strategy in the several theatres of war has been much dominated by that of the enemy, owing to their long start in time, and dreadfully hampered by our immense inferiority to them in mounted troops, by the distance to our bases and by our lack of transport, which compels our generals to advance along the railway lines to which they are of necessity glued, and has prevented them from threatening the enemy's lines of communication. General French, in the minor operations about Colesburg, having a mobile force, with many mounted troops, has been able to strike at the enemy's communications with excellent results. If our larger columns had had the same proportions as he has, their strategy would have been very different. As it is, they have been compelled to undertake frontal attacks whether they would or not, from want of mobility and of mounted troops.

Our Intelligence Department in South Africa has not been successful, and our commanders have been led on, at times, by false information and treacherous guides into dangerous positions, but their difficulties have been great from the number of Boer sympathizers in our Colonies; and the Kafirs, fearing more the summary treatment of the Boers than our milder methods, serve them better, and will continue to do so until they are certain that ours will be the winning side. Our tactics have been in many ways indifferent, but in them, as in our strategy, our paucity of mobile troops in the face of an enemy, for the most part mounted, must be considered, as must the nature of the country so eminently suited for defense.

Such mounted troops as we have, have been very well employed;

* They would not concur in the truth of the lines:

"Theirs not to reason why;
Theirs but to do and die."

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but, except the colonial contingents,* their scouting has been defective. Our field artillery has been admirably served, but our guns are outranged by those of the enemy. Our infantry rifles are inferior to those of the enemy in range, accuracy and rapidity of fire. Our infantry do not shoot as well as the enemy, though their shooting has been much improved of recent years, while the conditions of the clear air and peculiarities of color and form of country new to them have told against their shooting; their fire discipline has proved very good; when opportunity allowed of their using the bayonet, they have shown the *élan* and stubborn determination not to be denied, which have always distinguished the British soldier; they are not skillful in taking advantage of cover, but as they get more used to a country and conditions strange to them, they show, in that way, a rapid improvement. Taking them individually, as fighting men, they have proved splendid material, cool, brave and dashing when necessary; they have nobly sustained the best traditions of the British Army.

Our tactical formations, suitable for contending with ordinary troops, are, when approaching the present enemy, probably much too close. Direct attack, tactically, has been forced upon us in general by the same conditions, already explained, as have compelled us, strategically, to have recourse to it. Serious errors have been committed in the attack, in not taking the proper precautions as to scouting ahead and the use of advanced patrols, the cause of disasters at Stormberg, Magersfontein (to the Highlanders), and apparently also when we lost our guns at the Tugela.

It is evident that the new conditions introduced recently, and which we have first encountered here in war, of a long range, rapid-firing rifles and artillery, of much accuracy, using smokeless powder, and of heavy guns to back up in the field the lighter calibres, have revolutionized the relations of the defence to the attack, making the former so much more formidable that the ratio of numbers necessary may be roughly estimated as three for attack to one for defence.

The difference in mobility between our troops, mostly infantry, and the Boers, almost all mounted, was one for which our commanders in the field are not responsible; they had to do their

* Our Australian, New Zealand, Canadian and South African soldiers have shown themselves excellent material. Their mode of life and their horsemanship fit them admirably for this war, to which they are more adaptable than the English soldiers in many ways.

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best with the material provided for them, but it has terribly handicapped their tactical work.

The Boers have proved themselves brave and formidable foes on the field of their own choosing, and their commanders most capable leaders. Tactically they have shown themselves superior to the ordinary British soldier, from the possession of the many advantages already mentioned, from their being accustomed to the climate and the country, fighting in their own land, with sympathizers to aid them in every direction. When deprived, however, to some extent, of these advantages, and fighting the British soldier on a more equal footing, man to man, the latter has proved himself the better of the two, whether in bold assault of almost impregnable positions, or in determined defence of weak ones; the British officer is, as always, brave almost to recklessness, active and energetic, but the conditions have been altogether so new to him, in many ways, that he is only now beginning to understand them fully and to meet them as they should be met. Our commanders have labored under the many disadvantages, strategical and tactical, already mentioned, and have also been often obliged to take action, against their better military judgment, for political reasons, local and otherwise. It is not possible at present to criticise them fairly.

So far, the Boers may pride themselves upon having had the best of the game. The British losses have certainly been greater than theirs; they hold as prisoners a large number of our officers and men; they have invaded our Colonies and forced us to fight them there, on ground of their own choosing, and they hold closely invested some 10,000 of our troops. Strategically and tactically, they have had the best of it, on the whole.

The causes are easy to perceive. For political reasons which the British Government considered sufficiently cogent, no steps, except reinforcing Natal on a small scale, had been taken by them for years past to increase our permanent garrisons in South Africa to meet a coming danger—nor when war was imminent, to make preparations for it on a large scale until so late in the day that the enemy (looking also to our distance from South Africa) had a clear start of some six weeks, which he made good use of.

When preparations on a large scale were begun, they were quite insufficient both as to the magnitude of the force to be sent and as to its nature; they included far too small a proportion of artil-

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lery and mounted troops; the preparations were made but slowly and the greatness of the emergency was not understood. When at last this was forced on the Government and the nation it could only be met by quite abnormal steps; our army organization as such was not able to meet it.

There is no doubt, however wise one may be after the event, that we were all surprised, Government and nation, in many ways. It was not seriously expected, for instance, that the Orange Free State would act as it has done and join the Transvaal in an aggressive* war against us. The Boers were not credited with the powers of resistance they have shown. The marvellous increase in the power of the defense due to the immense improvement in arms—magazine rifles, long-range artillery, smokeless powder, etc.—was not duly appreciated, notwithstanding M. Bloch's predictions, most of which this war has amply justified; nor was it foreseen by us—perhaps not even by our present Continental critics—what it would be to contend against large forces consisting almost entirely of mounted troops, possessing from their very nature a wonderful mobility.

We have not, of recent years, been a military nation, and we have unfortunately rather prided ourselves upon the fact; and though individually of the best stuff for soldiers, and of combative and determined idiosyncrasy, we have preferred to utilize these qualities in pushing our commercial supremacy, and have troubled ourselves but indifferently as to national defense, save as represented by our Navy. Large expenditure upon the Army and its armament has always been begrudged. When in this instance the real strain came and our War Office organization failed, scapegoats are naturally sought for. But the nation itself is responsible. It has, through its representatives in Parliament, not only condoned but encouraged the neglect of many administrations to ensure sufficient expenditure on the Army and its armament. The same causes underlie the fact that our rifles and artillery are becoming obsolete, and that the Boers were ahead of us in having the latest arms out. For Great Britain to re-arm herself with either is a big business, meaning a very heavy expenditure, and we have always dallied long ere making the plunge, perhaps wisely so unless caught in such an emergency as this.

* For aggressive it certainly is. What better proofs of this than the annexations of British Territory coolly proclaimed by the President of either Republic.

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We have experienced so rude a shock, and the weak points in our armor are so plain to us, that the nation, thoroughly awakened, will insist on a complete reorganization of our War Office, which has worked too long in ancient grooves, and of our Army, to meet new conditions.

It seems probable that we shall again become more of a military nation, as of yore, and that some system will be devised also, as in olden times, by which every able-bodied man will be obliged to take a personal share in the national defense.

Not only that, but even broader lines will be followed, and the military foundations of our Empire made doubly strong. Our great Colonies, who so loyally stand by us now, will rightly have a voice in the matter. A practical organization, including their forces for imperial defense, will grow out of it, and the British Empire will stand more secure than ever, through the sacrifices her sons have made and their blood shed for her greatness.

As to the war itself, it is taken for granted that British arms will win, probably after much further loss. But win we must, if but by the process of attrition.

Should Ladysmith be relieved—as now seems more probable—it will either be by the Boers raising the investment voluntarily to prevent worse things happening to them, or by Buller's succeeding in turning his adversary's flank with a mobile column, which he is no doubt organizing. In the latter case, the Boers may fare badly. If the town is relieved in either way, it is presumed that we shall leave a sufficient force to hold Ladysmith against any possible attack, strengthen our central force in Cape Colony by the remainder of our troops in Natal, and invade the Orange Free State, when the second act of the drama will commence. Should Ladysmith fall, we should probably hold the line of the Tugela in Natal, but otherwise proceed as above.

Three words spell the principal Boer advantages and our disadvantages, "Mounted Men" and the consequent "Mobility." We shall gradually become possessed of the same, and though we know that every preparation has been made for a prolonged and determined defense of the Republics, we shall show ourselves as stubborn and stiff-necked as our enemy and in time subdue them. It is not unlikely, however, that, when the Free State has been invaded, her people will no longer care to be dragged at the wheels of Krüger's chariot.

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The British nation is firmly convinced that in this struggle it is fighting the battle of civilization, real freedom and individual liberty. Its enemy is a brave and in many ways a noble peasantry, misled by an ignorant and presumptuous Oligarchy who would keep civilization far from them, save where it meets their selfish ends, and who, much in the hands of alien intriguers, have crushed individual liberty as far as lay in their power. Firm in this conviction, we shall eventually win in the struggle—nor in the meantime allow any outside interference from great or small; and, as conquerors, we shall show the brave Boers that their individual liberty is as sacred to us as our own, but that their petty despots must disappear from the scene, and the peace of our Empire be disturbed no more from within.

JOHN F. OWEN.

London, Jan. 9, 1900.

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STRATEGICAL PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

BY FRITZ HOENIG, FORMERLY CAPTAIN IN THE GERMAN ARMY, AUTHOR OF "THE TACTICS OF THE FUTURE," "TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF MOLTKE'S STRATEGY," ETC.

"MISTAKES in strategical deployment cannot as a rule be corrected later on; but the space and positions required for this operation can generally be determined beforehand in time of peace." Thus wrote Moltke. But it is not sufficient to make sure in advance of the most suitable strategical positions to be taken up by troops in the event of war; preliminary strategy demands that the exact number of the active force required should be calculated, and that their timely arrival at their respective positions should be assured. Moreover, the question has to be considered whether the war is one of a defensive or of an offensive nature. This question in its turn will largely depend upon the political conditions and the amount of resistance which may be expected from the enemy.

A satisfactory answer to these questions is by no means as easy as is generally supposed; and, in addition, there are other so-called "imponderable" forces, according to the nature of the struggle, which have to be taken into account, the moral and political bearings of which are often only recognized and appreciated later on, after the struggle has already begun.

Now, there can be no doubt that, since the well-known Jameson Raid, England—in a political sense—has been the offensive* party, inasmuch as, ever since that event, the English Government has cherished the idea of securing an increased political influence in the Transvaal. The Transvaal Republic did not oppose the English aim in principle; but it did not give way to

* The terms "offensive" and "defensive" are hereafter generally employed in the technical sense of strategy and tactics.

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the extent which England believed herself entitled to demand, and thus the Transvaal remained in a defensive political attitude. As England did not renounce her political design of gaining an increase of influence in the representative bodies of the South African Republic, and as the latter stood out in her determination to decline to admit of such, only two issues were left: England might have resigned her pretensions for a time and awaited a more propitious moment for their realization, or she might have adhered to her demands. In the latter case she should have seen that her offensive policy was at once followed up by the military offensive—namely, the declaration of war to be succeeded by offensive military operations. This England failed to do; probably for reasons of two distinct kinds. By a declaration of war, England would have become, in the eyes of the world, the attacking party in a military sense, as she already was in a political sense, and she was evidently determined to avoid creating this impression. Moreover, a declaration of war would not have harmonized with the conception of suzerainty which England, rightly or wrongly, asserted that she possessed over the Transvaal. On the other hand, by leaving the declaration of war to her antagonist, she was unable to hide her political offensive from the world, or her desire to enlarge her sphere of power in South Africa; and to-day there can no longer be any doubt that, although England managed to throw upon her enemy the *onus* of declaring war upon her, she has neither gained the sympathy of foreign Powers nor succeeded in creating for herself a favorable military situation.

After the failure of the political negotiations, the enemy assumed the offensive; and it then became evident that England was not ready with her military preparations.

Thus, England's first mistake consisted in the fact that her political and military action, which were evidently both intended to bear an offensive character, did not keep pace with each other. At the same time, her policy had been in so far successful as to keep foreign Powers from attempting to interfere in South African affairs. This, indeed, narrowed the war down to a struggle between the Boers and the English; but, on the other hand, England has not been able to gain the moral or political support of any Power whatever. The English Government probably held, however, that this in itself constituted a sufficient

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political success, in the expectation of being soon able to get the better of the obstinate Boer Republic by force of arms. For England, thoroughly wrapped up in her belief in a professional soldiery, has always been inclined to underestimate the military strength of an opponent whose force consists of a volunteer militia. The English military profession is even prone to believe that every army with universal conscription, and with a system of more or less short service with the colors, belongs to a somewhat inferior category. In this underrating of the enemy lies the source of many of the mistakes of the English method of waging war, from the requirements of preparatory strategy down to the details of tactical conflict.

The Transvaal Republic saw an act of predatory incursion in the Jameson Raid, whereas, in the subsequent political negotiations with England, the Suzerain State, she recognized a carefully planned procedure on the part of England to gradually absorb the Republic. As France in 1870 thoroughly failed to recognize the national sentiment in Germany, and even based her war plan upon the assistance she expected to find in south Germany against Prussia, so has England blinded herself to the national movement which, since the Jameson Raid, sprang up first of all among the Transvaal Boers, and then, from a variety of reasons, spread silently throughout Cape Colony and Natal, and, at the last moment, led to an alliance between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The anti-English movement originated as far back as the first Transvaal war, and it is due, in large measure, to the obstinate aversion of the Dutch element toward the tutorial imperiousness of the English section of the community. English politicians underrated this Afrikander movement, just as the English military authorities, like those of the French in 1870, entered upon the war with an entirely erroneous estimate of their enemy, and built up their plan of campaign upon false suppositions. The English further blundered in the choice of the region for deploying their forces in Natal, and made no preparations for the eventuality of the war's extending south to Cape Colony. Neither, when the alliance between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State became known, did England alter her plan of strategical deployment in Natal, although there would have been ample time to do so, and although the alliance entirely altered the military situation of the English in Natal.

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The troops of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State had no sooner taken the strategical offensive, than the imminent danger of the situation must have come home to the English in Natal. Yet their plan of campaign seemed to remain the same as it had been at a time when it was understood to be directed against the Transvaal alone; beyond a small addition to the forces which were now supposed to cover Natal against the united power of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

Thus all the mistakes of the English strategical deployment of their forces, as well as most of the subsequent blunders in carrying on the campaign, are to be explained by their misjudgment of the political conditions and by their military underrating of the enemy. The English gave their opponents credit neither for the strength nor the aptitude necessary for assuming the strategical offensive, and just here they were destined to be sadly deceived. They underestimated the preparedness and the rapidity of action of both Republics, because the latter only disposed of volunteer militia. They reckoned on the proverbial want of discipline of the Boers; they misjudged and underestimated their mobile, tactical defensive qualities—that is to say, the method of fighting of their opponent. They also misjudged his strength and his ability to draw the war out at length, and, finally, they were surprised by the Afrikander movement in Cape Colony and the number of the troops arrayed against them.

Instead of having one area of deployment in Natal, the English were obliged to establish a second one near the Orange River; and this one again, in consequence of the character of the railway system, they were forced to divide up into two separate positions, so that three distinct seats of war came into being, upon which the comparatively weak separate corps were either unable —or only after complicated operations in a position—to support each other. But the western field of operations in the direction of Kimberley, as well as the southern toward Queenstown, Burghersdorp, Middelburg and Colesberg, lies in territory in which the Dutch element is largely represented, so that the entire length of the railways upon which the English depend may be threatened by hostile bodies of men. Therefore, the English army is obliged to detach considerable forces for the protection of these lines; which must necessarily weaken their strength for offensive purposes. Moreover, the very character of the country,

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combined with the mobility of the Boer forces, which are able to act swiftly in small bodies, all this is calculated to facilitate attacks on the English lines of communication in their rear. Besides, the need for unremitting alertness on the part of those to whom is confided the protection of their lines of communication is apt in the long run to put a severe strain upon the nerves even of the best of troops, and to impair their military value. It is here also necessary to bear in mind that the English laws of military service are not based upon the assumption that England may have to wage protracted foreign wars involving a great sacrifice of men. England's military reserve is limited, and she is not in a position to draw *ad libitum* upon human supplies, as is the case with States which have introduced universal conscription. Therefore, a long war will inevitably mean to her a gradual dwindling away of the force at her disposal.

These unfavorable limitations, however, apply to a certain extent to her opponents; inasmuch as the forces originally at the disposal of the Transvaal and Orange Free State Republics can scarcely be rated higher than fifty thousand men. Still, they have the advantage of being able to dispose of their total forces actively in the field, for they are not obliged to protect their communications. Also, every man of the Boers is thoroughly imbued with the feeling of the danger with which his country is threatened. It is, therefore, permissible in the present case to speak of a national war in which the "imponderable" elements play a great part. The Boers are also well conversant with the country and its inhabitants, and thoroughly inured to the climate which varies between cold and great heat; they are, one and all, mounted on hardy, home-bred horses, armed with Mauser rifles and are excellent shots; they are expert in seeking and utilizing strong defensive positions; and, finally, it may be said that warfare under such conditions is almost second nature to them.

Whereas the manifold tasks of this war are likely to use up unduly the English forces, their enemy has the advantage of seeing his forces increase in number as the war proceeds. For the additional forces which, since the beginning of the war, have joined the Boers from Cape Colony are estimated at twelve thousand men. Therefore, it is permissible to place the present number of the Boer forces at not far short of sixty thousand men, which are probably divided in two parts, one in Natal and

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Cape Colony, and the other part on the Orange River. And as the cardinal law of the Boer tactics is evidently to husband their forces—that is to say, not to attempt any sanguinary offensive movements—they will in all probability continue in their efforts to combine the strategical offensive with the tactical defensive. The English forces in the field must at the very least reach the total of one hundred and twenty thousand men if England is to drive back her antagonists by force of arms and dictate peace at Pretoria. In addition to this large force, about forty thousand men will be required in Natal and in Cape Colony for minor eventualities, as well as for the protection of the railway lines, etc. Besides these, at least eighty thousand men ought to be kept ready in England in the shape of reserve recruits. England will, therefore, be obliged to adopt extraordinary measures to meet the situation. It must be further borne in mind that, hitherto, every serious engagement has been of an exceptionally sanguinary character for the English. It is, therefore, only fair to draw the conclusion that the English method of fighting is an unsuitable one to the existing conditions, and that the training which the troops have received at home is not adequate to enable them to get the better of their antagonists. As it is impossible to remedy this effectually at short notice, the English must be prepared to expect further considerable losses in actual battle. This makes an immediate ready supply of reserves all the more imperative, and here we are met by the weakest feature of the English military system. To be economical with their troops is the principle of the Boers; to be lavish in the expenditure of theirs is the unavoidable result of the English method of waging this war; for the English cannot possibly gain their end by standing still. They will be obliged to attack their opponent and endeavor to drive him back. But even victorious onslaughts may lead to a draining of their forces, as long as the military authorities are not able to guarantee a sufficient and timely supply of reserves to fill up the gaps in the ranks.

The garrisons of the English in Natal and Cape Colony were small at the time the Boers decided to adopt the strategic offensive. All the same, there were about twelve thousand men in Natal with a comparatively large proportion of artillery. However much the English may have underestimated the value of the Boer militia, they must still have been conscious that these

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men had beaten them before. Besides, the wholesale arming of the Boers since the Jameson Raid could not possibly have escaped their notice. Therefore, from the moment it was known that the Orange Free State had joined the Boers, the English must have been prepared to meet an enemy of considerably increased strength. It is, therefore, evident that the English military leaders were guided from the first by the belief that they would be able to protect Natal from invasion with the forces at their disposal. They, therefore, pushed forward the Natal forces, which had been reinforced by a brigade from India, toward the frontiers of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and took up a position on the line Dundee-Glencoe-Ladysmith, in order to await under cover of these places the full army with which they intended to assume the offensive and march on Pretoria. For the moment, no steps were taken to protect the extensive line of the northern boundary of Cape Colony. This shows clearly that the English did not fear anything serious in that quarter, whereas, as a matter of fact, it was just here that subsequently the flame of revolt burst forth. Now, even if the English had thought ever so little of the possible danger from this quarter, from the moment that England decided to adopt the offensive, and more particularly since the Orange Free State had joined the Transvaal, the most elementary caution would have dictated the imperative necessity of securing this possibly necessary basis of operations in Cape Colony, as against Pretoria. That is to say, that they ought to have endeavored to retain control of the railway line to Molteno, Naauwpoort and De Aar to the Orange River, as well as the bridges between Hopetown and Aliwal North. The latter, however, was, of course, only possible after the declaration of war had taken place. In consonance herewith, as soon as war was declared, the English ought to have been prepared to seize the passes from Natal *viâ* Newcastle (Laing's Nek) in the direction of Pretoria, and from Ladysmith *viâ* Van Reenen to Harrismith. Both, or either, of these plans, however, would have involved the necessity of immediately pushing forward sufficient forces to enable them to seize the principal strategic points by one or, at most, two days' marching. But nothing of this was attempted or, indeed, seems to have been even considered. And yet the English military authorities are certainly not at liberty to plead in mitigation that there were not sufficient troops at hand in

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South Africa, at the time of the outbreak of the war, to allow of the execution of such a plan: for though such is indeed the case, the very fact that England was carrying out an offensive policy made it a matter of course to take timely preparations to follow it up by offensive military operations. Nor can it be argued that they had no time at their disposal for the purpose of getting the necessary force together. Inasmuch, however, as England showed herself to be unable to follow up an offensive policy by an offensive conduct of military affairs, she left the initiative of action to her better prepared opponents, and thereby gave up incalculable advantages to them. Now, as the allied Boer States were sufficiently prepared for action to be able to begin operations at once, they had the power to decide upon the exact theatre of war and were thus in a position to transfer it to English territory, while at the same time they made sure of the strong passes of Laing's Nek and Van Reenen, as well as of the railways connected with them.

And the Boer allies were indeed prepared!

On the 9th of October, 1899, the Transvaal Republic summoned the British Government to declare within forty-eight hours that it would withdraw its troops from the frontiers of the Republic. This the English Government declined to do. Simultaneously, the Boer field cornets received instructions to be ready to march on receipt of the simple watchword, *"Orlog"* (war). This word was despatched by telegraph from Pretoria, on the 11th of October, to every station throughout the country, and on the same day the Boer militia started according to a pre-concerted and well-considered plan, and began its march against Natal.

In several instances, the Boer forces covered as much as fifty kilometres (about thirty-one miles) in one day, and by the 12th of October they were all united in a concentric advance against the northwest corner of Natal. In the night from the 12th to the 13th of October, the allied Republican militia occupied all the mountain passes leading to Natal—the Laing's Nek, Botha, Müller, Van Reenen, Tintwa, and Bezuidenhout passes. Within the short space of two to three days, they had narrowed down their line of extension from an arc of the length of three hundred kilometres (about one hundred and eighty-seven miles) down to one of ninety (about fifty-six miles). They had traversed a difficult mountainous region, and cut off the English from

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all the available roads for invading their country! The Boers thus prescribed the theatre of war and brought the English under the influence of their decision, of their initiative. General Joubert held supreme command over the entire forces of the allied Republics, a proof in itself how carefully all the details of this operation must have been thought out and planned in advance. For not even a European standing army could suddenly be set in motion, let alone successfully carry out such an operation without the slightest hitch, as was done here, unless the operation had been carefully matured and planned out beforehand. This also speaks volumes for the reliable character of the information the allies must have possessed concerning the English, and it shows further that the allies must have a strategist of great ability—perhaps several such—at their disposal. By these measures, the allies insured themselves the possession of the railway line leading through the interior of their own country and created a basis for the continuation of the offensive. This took the English completely by surprise. Even before the alliance between the two Boer Republics had become known, the English supreme military command had caused General White to advance on the line Dundee-Glencoe-Ladysmith. This line was evidently originally intended to be the area for the strategic deployment of the English forces, and then to serve as the basis of operations. Hence, it was self-understood that General White would hold this line against the enemy. As the crow flies, it extends to a length of forty English miles, and it would thus correspond to an area for the proper deployment of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. On the 18th of October, however, General White only had an army of twelve thousand men at his disposal. Besides, this said line was only two days' march removed from the enemy's frontier; and, as all the connected lines of the allies converged toward Ladysmith, it might easily have been cut through by them between Glencoe and Ladysmith, thus exposing the English both ways to be surrounded and cut off.

This, indeed, was the original plan of the allies.

The only efficient line of communication of the English was this one of road and rail from Glencoe to Ladysmith. Obviously, this line of deployment ought only to have been chosen, and could only have been adhered to, under the supposition that General

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White would be strong enough to debar the approach of the advancing lines of the allies to within a distance of at least a day's march. This, however, poor White was not in a position to do. The English military authorities had thus given him a task the imposition of which would only have been justified if the enemy had been incapable of interfering in any way with its performance. General White kept about half his forces together at Ladysmith and occupied the position Dundee-Glencoe with the remainder. His forces were thus distributed at two wings without any prospect of mutual support or guarantee of united direction. Although without sufficient forces, yet General White, on the 13th of October, went with three thousand men to meet the Boers, but he was obliged to retire before their concentrated movement, and thus to give up the whole of the northwest corner of Natal to the Boers without so much as drawing a sword.

In order to understand the action of General White, it is necessary to bear in mind that the English had a strong motive for retaining Glencoe, for the sake of the coal-fields which supplied the fuel for the working of the railway and shipping. Nor can they have harbored any doubt as to the feasibility of their plan of deployment and subsequent operations, for they had accumulated an enormous amount of ammunition and food supplies at Glencoe-Dundee, and had selected Ladysmith as the headquarters of the army of operations. Since the Jameson Raid, an enormous amount of ammunition, said to represent a value of a million pounds sterling, had gradually been piled up at Ladysmith; the exact amount of the huge commissariat stores at Ladysmith is not accurately known. However, they are sufficient to relieve General White from fear of famine for the present.

The construction of these store magazines on the lines of deployment, within two days' march from the enemy's boundary, shows most clearly of all how thoroughly the English underestimated the military capacity of their opponent. It also affords a clear insight into the original plan of operations of the English; for, according to this, it could only have been based upon the assumption that the Boers would remain on the defensive in a military, as they had indeed done in a political, sense. Therefore, the English intended to deploy along the line Ladysmith-Dundee, and thence by way of Laing's Nek to march upon Pretoria, thus taking the shortest road to advance. But, even here,

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they must have terribly underestimated the tactical power of resistance of the Boers, which would have had to be expected and encountered in the projected advance through the passes—an operation which must have required several days. There can be no other explanation for the entertaining of such a plan. That the English, however, should still have adhered to it, when it was known that the two Republics had concluded an alliance, and that the Orange Free State Boers were able to threaten the English line of deployment on the left flank by the mere concentration of their forces; this can only be explained by the supposition that they were anxious concerning their political prestige in Natal, and that, above all things, they could not make up their minds to withdraw their valuable store magazines from Glencoe-Dundee, or, if this were no longer practicable, to abandon or destroy them. Had either of these courses been taken, General White would have been able to gather all his forces round Ladysmith and wait for the further development of events.

To be sure, in order to take this course it would have been absolutely necessary for him to have his road free across the Tugela to the coast. The English, however, were unable to make up their minds with regard to this course, and now proceeded to make one mistake after the other.

Thus we find the underrating of the opponent as the cause, first, of the unfortunate choice of the line Ladysmith-Dundee as an area of deployment; secondly, of the erection of magazines along this line at only two days' distance from the enemy's frontier; thirdly, of the disposal of insufficient forces to hold this line until the arrival of the army of operations; fourthly, of the presumable intention of taking the offensive along the shortest road to Pretoria, through a country easily to be defended, the forcing of which must have cost rivers of blood. It was a misconception of the political situation which led the English to a mistaken choice of the area of deployment, and allowed them to completely ignore the dangers which threatened them from the side of Cape Colony. This it is which has brought them into a political and military dilemma to which it would be difficult to find a parallel. All this is not calculated to do much credit to the foresight and judgment of the authorities responsible for the direction of England's military affairs.

Evidently, the allies were excellently informed about the in-

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tentions of the British; they also estimated correctly both the number, condition and capacity of the English troops. They knew besides that the British had erected store houses and exactly where they were situated. Thus, they were able to calculate approximately that the real army of operations would not arrive in Cape Colony or Natal before the middle of November. Before this army could begin operations, a further delay of a week or two must necessarily elapse; the allies had thus about six weeks' time at their disposal, which it was for them to turn to the best advantage. They, therefore, in the first place continued their offensive movement against Natal with all the forces at their disposal, attacked the English on the 20th of October at Glencoe, were in their turn attacked on the 21st of October, repulsed the English, drove them out of Glencoe and captured the stores which had been accumulated there, as well as the coal-fields which were so much needed for the service of their railways. The English troops, moreover, were now no longer able to reach Ladysmith by the direct road *viâ* Elandslaagte, and were obliged to take a wide circuitous route by the south. After a long march full of hardship, they at last joined General White at Ladysmith. The latter had recognized the dangerous position of the Glencoe column, and, fearing that the enemy might force his way past Elandslaagte in order to cut it off, advanced against the Boers on the 21st of October. After a bloody encounter the English retired toward Ladysmith, where White was defeated on the 30th of October and afterward blockaded. By the end of October the Boers had gained their primary object, carried the war into English territory, and secured all the passes in their rear. In addition to this, the Boers seized the railway bridge over the Tugela at Colenso and, with their front facing Maritzburg, took up a defensive position, while pushing forward an adequate body of troops toward Estcourt.

As the Boers destroyed the railway bridge over the Tugela, it was obviously their fixed intention to give up for the moment any further offensive movement in Natal, and to await the attack of the English on the Tugela River. This resolution on their part was a most judicious one. In the first place, they were obliged to be economical in the use of their forces; and to assume the offensive, unless they were prepared to follow it up with the tactical attack, would have led to no practical result. Whereas,

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the line of the Tugela formed a position of strategical importance and great tactical strength. Moreover, the tactical superiority of the Boers is never more strikingly manifest than when they are on the defensive. In this way, by taking up their position on the Tugela, they had realized all the expectations they could reasonably have entertained. The successes of the Boers in Natal had broken up the strategical lines of the English.

General White, in all probability, no longer disposed of sufficient strength to fight his way through the Boer forces; and even though he had, he would not have been warranted in risking the loss of the valuable stores at Ladysmith by making the attempt. The English had thoroughly lost the first game in the rubber in the campaign in Natal, and were obliged to start afresh on the arrival of the main body of the army of operations. The conditions were now much more unfavorable than they would have been if they had started with sufficient force from the beginning, and had chosen a suitable area of deployment. While the English were now obliged to remain on the strategic defensive, their opponents prepared to assume the offensive in the west as well.

Immediately after the commencement of the war, the allied Republics proceeded to invest the fortified towns at Mafeking and Kimberley. But their forces were insufficient to do more than cross the Orange River and seize the fords and bridges between Hopetown and Aliwal North. Their successes in Natal, however, were of great service to the Afrikander movement in the north of Cape Colony; comparatively large numbers of men flocked to the army under Cronje's command, and thus materially assisted him to assume the strategical offensive. It is thus evident how effectual the strategical offensive had become in Natal. For only thereby were the Boers able to gain the time necessary to organize their forces, and also in the west to compel the English to accept the consequences of their enemy's offensive movements. The Orange River makes a great bend here toward the south. This enabled the Boers to penetrate into Cape Colony along the railway line Queenstown-Middelburg, in order to seize the central railway junction of Molteno and Naauwpoort, and consequently to deprive the English of the use of the transversal line Molteno-Naauwpoort-De Aar, which might have become of great strategical importance to them. By adopting the offensive against Queenstown-Naauwpoort (and Aliwal North-Dordrecht), the Boers brought

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themselves into direct contact with the strongly represented Dutch element existing there, and thereby opened up the chances of attracting the considerable additions to their strength already referred to. This offensive movement had further untoward consequences for the English cause, inasmuch as it enabled the population of the districts south of the transversal railway line already mentioned to render direct or indirect assistance to the Boers, which they were prompt to avail themselves of. The important consequences of this offensive movement are as yet not fully to be realized. In every case, the political as well as the strategical gain to the allied Republics has already been great. For, while the Boers remained in control of the railway line Cape Town-Kimberley on the right bank of the Orange River, and thence on both sides of the railway to the south of Kimberley occupied the strong position of Spytfontein and Magersfontein—where they intended to await the attack of the English—they sent detachments forward toward the Orange River, thus compelling the English to attack them in case they wished to relieve Kimberley.

The Republicans drew their right wing back considerably and pushed with their centre and left wing forward against Queenstown and Middelburg. Thereby they were enabled to threaten the flank of any English force advancing to the relief of Kimberley, and to organize a guerilla war in their rear. Nor is it beyond the range of probability that here too the Boers might be able to throw themselves upon the English line of communications and cut them off in the same way as had already been done in Natal.

This plan gives evidence of the same careful preparation, mature forethought and clever utilization of the local military and political conditions as we have already witnessed in Natal, and it ought to be equally successful. Above all, the Boers have here again gained the object they evidently had in view: to draw the attack of the English to the very point at which they wished to be attacked, where they would be able to avail themselves to the fullest extent of their great advantages, namely, their exceeding mobility and their excellent marksmanship. The positions of Magersfontein and Stormberg fulfil these conditions.

In the meantime, England, by the incorporation of reserves, had mobilized three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, and given to General Buller the command of all forces in South Africa. The work of embarking and transporting this goodly mass of

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troops was accomplished between the 20th of October and the 20th of November, and, apart from the stranding of a solitary ship, without any noteworthy mishap. The punctual arrival of so many transports in the appointed South African seaports bears striking testimony to the administrative ability of the English military department; and, in view of this remarkable performance, it stands to reason that with clearer vision, greater energy, and truer measurement of the enemy's resources, the English leaders would have had a fair chance from the outset of conducting the campaign on correct principles of strategy. But an unlucky star overhung even this first brilliant achievement from the moment that an attempt was made to turn it to account.

Obviously, General Buller had complete liberty of action. It lay, by all accounts, in his absolute discretion in what manner and at what points he should distribute, with an eye to strike the enemy, the not inconsiderable forces under his orders. Having regard to the state of things that prevailed in the Colony at the time of his landing, Buller can have been under no illusions as to the faint remaining chance of bringing the war to a speedy termination. Undoubtedly, he knew that General White had stores of food and war material sufficient to last him for months, and, as the sequel has shown, that Kimberley likewise was as yet not menaced by famine. There was, accordingly, no good ground for hasty action. But what is matter of common experience befell in this as in so many other similar instances. Reaction against deep-rooted habits of carelessness and dilatoriness took the dangerous form of precipitancy. The promptest measures imaginable seemed to Buller's vision not prompt enough. The collected troops had been carefully organized as a military unity, and there was no adequate reason for breaking up the "order of battle" in which they had been arrayed. What may have induced Buller to take so hazardous and, in its disruptive effects, so disastrous a step, is matter of speculation. It is not probable that he underestimated the strength of the enemy. Very likely, his high estimate of that strength, together with misgivings as to the Afrikander movement, determined him to send forward, as fast as ever they could be entrained, reinforcements to Natal as well as to the north of Cape Colony. Buller was, however, not content with dividing his forces. He went on to disorganize them, with the result that he found himself ultimately unable to command,

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at any single point, the needful numerical superiority. Buller must have put to himself the question: On what battle ground, Natal or Cape Colony, did it behoove him to throw the bulk of his forces? In Natal, heavy blows had been dealt to England's military prestige. General White was shut up in Ladysmith. The English line of march to that point was shorter than any other line under present review. The railway ran from Durban to Estcourt. The easy distance to be covered, the feeding of the troops, the favorable climate, were so many good reasons for selecting Natal as the theatre of war. It must, however, be borne in mind that, without great numerical superiority, and without special topographical advantages to aid his tactics, Buller would have entertained no reasonable hope of gaining a victory so decisive as to enable him to liberate General White and save the rich stores of Ladysmith. The attainment of this object would at one stroke have afforded satisfaction to the military prestige of England, and Buller would thereafter have been free to consider whether he might venture to push on to Pretoria by way of Laing's Nek, by way of Harrismith or, peradventure, by both routes. Doubtless he would have decided to take that course only when he had succeeded in defeating the Boers so crushingly as to make further effective resistance on their part impossible, even behind their excellent mountain entrenchments with the formidable character of which Buller must have been more or less familiar. Such a consummation, however, he could not anticipate, much less rely on, as here again tactical conditions proved adverse to British aims. In view of these disappointments, Buller would have been warranted in striving after the deliverance of White only upon condition of his being able to confine himself to strategically defensive operations in Natal, while working for a decisive military success on a western battle ground. This idea was no doubt in Buller's mind when he determined to divide his forces. In provisionally keeping back his main army in Natal, while ordering Generals Methuen, Gatacre and French to invade the Orange Free State from the Cape, his calculation presumably was that the Boers in Natal, feeling themselves threatened in their rear, would transfer part of their forces from Natal to the western seat of war. But this proved to be a mistake on Buller's part. His adversaries had in the interval found leisure to organize their forces at the western seat of war and, stiffened by strong reinforcements

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drawn from the Republics and from northern Cape Colony, had found means to confront the British with thirty thousand men under Cronje. It is true that Buller could not by any possibility have foreseen all this. Thus the unsuitable line of deployment in Natal, in conjunction with the erection of store magazines at Ladysmith, were destined to be pregnant with bad results to the English during the further course of the war.

And yet Buller would have done better if he had left White and Ladysmith to work out their own salvation, and had sent to Natal a single brigade, whose exclusive duty should have been to undertake the defence of Durban and Maritzburg; while he himself had proceeded with his whole remaining force to the western seat of war and striven to decide the conflict victoriously on that ground. Let it be admitted that here also the difficulties were considerable. The climate is trying, necessaries to sustain an army are scarce and inaccessible; but, on the other hand, the English dispose of three lines of railway, from East London to Burghersdorp, from Prince Alfred and Port Elizabeth to Colesberg (this one has a branch line to Middelburg), and from Cape Town to Hopetown. The first is about 350 kilometres (about 218 miles) in length, the second 400 (about 250 miles), the third 750 (about 468 miles). By availing himself of these three lines, Buller ought to have pushed on the main army as far as possible into the heart of the Orange Free State. It is said that none of these railway lines are adapted for transport on a large scale. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Buller had at his disposal a line of rails for the conveyance of each division and its appurtenances, and that, with timely and proper arrangements, troops and stores might have been conveyed from the several ports of arrival within eight days at the outside, assuming that it was possible to detrain them at the Orange River—in six days, assuming that it was desirable to detrain them at Molteno, Naauwpoort and De Aar. This last performance has actually been surpassed by the column under Methuen. In any case, no pains or cost should have been spared to obtain control of such strategic points as Molteno, Naauwpoort and De Aar, and with them possession of the transversal line of De Aar-Molteno. This line, running nearly parallel with the Orange River, measures 300 kilometres (about 187 miles) in length, and it would have offered facilities for consolidating or contracting the line of deployment more or

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less effectually. For such a purpose, there can be little doubt that Buller's professional eye was directed to the tract lying north of the connecting railway line, which as a plan was well-advised. But in war the fruition of our schemes is always more or less dependent on the enemy's counter-schemes, and by the time that Buller had made up his mind to put his plan into execution, it was too late. The enemy's will had already circumvented his own. It was thus only at De Aar that the detraining could take place according to plan. On the two other lines the debarkation had to commence at Queenstown and Middelburg, respectively. From that moment it became a question of marching against time.

In the meantime, the Boers had made an offensive movement toward Molteno and Naauwpoort, but had not destroyed the bridges over the Orange River. While, on the line between Cape Town and Kimberley, they awaited the British relieving column to the north of the Modder River, they took up at Stormberg, north of Molteno on the East London and Burghersdorp line, a position of great natural strength, but still further strengthened by art. They did likewise to the north of Naauwpoort. In this manner, the Boers threatened the British connecting (transversal) lines, thereby compelling their opponents to attempt the assault of each of the several points mentioned.

Thus, likewise, on this western theatre of war, the Boers had strategically forestalled their adversary, and precisely as befell in Natal, proved themselves equal to reading him a tactical lesson on his own ground. This was a great triumph, political and military. If Buller had pushed forward his whole active force, with the exception of a small fraction, to the north of Cape Colony, while preserving the "order of battle" that had originally been given to it, he would have acted prudently and rightly. The average distance of the transversal line (connecting or loop line) to the Orange River is one hundred kilometres (about sixty-two miles), equivalent in an unfavorable case to five or six days' march. The question whether he should direct his forces toward Bloemfontein, or toward Kimberley-Mafeking depended upon many circumstances. But, whatever might have been his decision, it behooved him in any case to throw the bulk of his forces against the point selected for attack. This unfortunately he failed to do.

The divisions commanded by Methuen and Gatacre operated over a front of three hundred kilometres (about 167 miles)

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at the extreme wings against Burghersdorp (Bloemfontein) and against Kimberley; they had as a link between them only French's cavalry division on the Port Elizabeth and Colesburg railway line. As the population of that district joined hands with the enemy, the Boers received timely warning of the English offensive projects, and, thanks to the wonderful mobility of their mounted troops, they were enabled in every instance to oppose an adequate defending force to the several English attacking columns, and to compel these to deliver their assaults on the very ground that the defenders had chosen for the purpose of defense. Here again, unfortunately, the English in each several instance played into the hands of their enemies, and that after having committed the initial error of dividing their active armies at both seats of war, an error aggravated by the wilful severing of the links which held these armies together as organic unities. As a consequence they were left sadly weakened at both theatres of war; but, none the less, they persisted in carrying out their plan of relieving Kimberley and Ladysmith.

In order to reach Pretoria and dictate terms of peace there, the right course of action would presumptively have been to march thitherward with the main body of the army by way of Kimberley and Mafeking. Mafeking, once reached, there would have remained some two hundred and fifty kilometres (about one hundred and fifty-six miles) to cover. The route indicated is beyond a doubt the longest; yet, in spite of the labor, perplexity and loss that a forced passage thereof would entail, that route is for the advance of a compact army undoubtedly the safest. A detachment might have operated independently by way of Bloemfontein, best composed of a strong force of cavalry with sufficient artillery and backed by a small force of foot. If they had adopted this plan, the advancing English would have taken advantage of a well-regulated railway line, and would have had Mafeking behind them. The line would, of course, have required protection, and at some points actual reconstruction, before it could be turned to practical account. Yet, when the worst is said, here was a real prospect of eventually reaching the desired goal, though the path leading thither would have been irksome and stained with blood; whereas, the same object undertaken from the Natal side, unless fortuitous circumstances arose, would have proved most difficult of attainment, even at a heavy sacrifice of blood and treasure.

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At Ladysmith, General White has under his orders the Seventh and Eighth Brigades of infantry, the Third Brigade of cavalry, and one "irregular brigade," together with six field batteries and four naval guns. After the several unsuccessful actions in which they have been engaged, and the wearying exertions forced upon them as a consequence of their being closely invested, the effectiveness of those troops as a fighting body can no longer be very great. From the main body of his army General Buller detached "the Natal relieving force," and placed it under the orders of General Clery—who had originally commanded the Second Division—and this disposition was carried into effect by (1.) depriving the First Division (commanded by Methuen) of its Second Brigade under Hildyard, and (2.) by depriving the Third Division (commanded by Gatacre) of its Sixth Brigade under Barton. Of his own original Second Division, General Clery retained half of the Fourth Brigade, under Lyttelton. Lastly, Buller organized a new brigade under Hart, pieced together out of the Fourth and Third Brigades. Methuen's First Division was strengthened by adding to it the larger part of the Third Brigade under Wauchope, which originally had been attached to the Second Division. In this fashion, the whole original disposition of the forces was rent asunder, and General Buller, by proceeding to Natal in person and taking over the command in that colony, made Natal the principal theatre of war. To secure stations along the line of communication, no less than seven battalions were engaged, and to protect the line of deployment in the north of Cape Colony, five battalions with about eighteen guns. It is true that a Naval Brigade, landed for the purpose, was added to Methuen's force, so that he disposed of some three brigades in all.

Before General Buller had proceeded to Natal and undertaken the direction of affairs on the spot, the campaign had been opened in the northwest by Methuen, operating against Kimberley; by Gatacre, against Burghersdorp, and by French, against Colesberg. The total British force in South Africa at the end of December, 1899, including the Fifth Division under Warren, numbered in Natal, between 21,000 and 22,000 men, with 80 guns; in the Midlands of Cape Colony, where Gatacre held command, 16,000 men and 96 guns; in the west, where Methuen held command, 12,000 men and 20 guns. Warren's Fifth Division numbered 7,500 men with 18 guns. To these must be added, in

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Kimberley, 3,000 men; in Mafeking, 1,500 men; in Rhodesia, 2,000 men; Colonial troops and volunteers, 20,000 men. This total is considerable; but, if it is borne in mind that the enemy disposes at present of 30,000 men in Natal, and of an equal number in Cape Colony, it will be clear that even inclusive of Warren's Fifth Division, the British do not command the needful superiority in numbers at either of the two seats of war, for the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Divisions, since mobilized or mobilizing, do not come as yet under discussion.

The Boers were attacked by General Methuen on the 23d of November at Belmont; on the 25th at Graspan, on the 28th at the Modder, where they were driven across the river. The several actions were fruitful of loss for the British, and yet they are chronicled as victories. But the very fact that, after the last-named fight, Methuen remained inactive for nearly a fortnight, although he was separated from Kimberley by only two days' march, is in itself good evidence that the Boers had no other thought than to retire, in pursuance of a plan formed for the express purpose of luring on the British to attack them in their strongest entrenchments at Spytfontein and Magersfontein. On the 10th-11th of December, Methuen made up his mind to deliver this last assault, but he met with a bloody reverse. Again, on the 10th of December, the central column under Gatacre had likewise been repulsed at Stormberg, and lastly, General French with his division of cavalry was compelled to fall back. This disastrous chain of events wrecked the scheme for relieving Kimberley. The Boers now hold their position at Magersfontein, while continuing the siege of Kimberley. General Methuen has been compelled to withdraw toward Belmont and to entrench himself there. In their present quarters his troops, after a needful rest, may recover their tactical efficiency. But the British ought not to think of resuming the offensive in that region until they have been largely reinforced. For such a purpose, however, Warren's Fifth Division will not suffice. General Gatacre's columns are much in the same plight. As a result of the defeat of the two armies opposing them, the Boers now threaten the connecting line of De Aar-Naauwpoort-Molteno, as well as the rich British stores accumulated at De Aar. Finally, in Natal, General Buller, when he attacked the Boers with four brigades at the Tugela on the 15th of December, met with a serious reverse. Having lost

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twelve guns, he retired to Frere, whence he had sallied. The consequence here again was failure to relieve Ladysmith and to save the stores accumulated there.

Thus, at the end of 1899, the campaign, in its second phase, as in its first, has at nearly every point, both in Natal and in Cape Colony, shown results unpropitious to the British arms. Nor does there seem anything to be done for it, in the immediate future, but to remain on the strategical defensive. This, however, may demand some patience, as the mobilizing, transporting and landing of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Divisions stand little chance of being accomplished before at least six weeks have elapsed. In the interval, the Boers will take occasion to stir up the fires of Afrikander sedition in Cape Colony, to fill up their ranks by recruiting in the districts occupied, to perfect their organization, and to improve the martial training of their forces. By the time the campaign enters upon its third active phase, their numbers will presumably have grown, the individual fighter will have become tactically more expert, and in a certain sense the English have the prospect of a new war, the real war, before them. But even after the arrival of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Divisions, the situation can scarcely be deemed favorable from a British point of view. They have no option but to take the offensive, and they will find the Boers in occupation of strong positions. In Natal, the strategical defensive is at present the safest attitude for the British to adopt. Such an attitude would, of course, entail White's being left provisionally to his own devices. On the other hand, everything points to the advisability of sending to the western seat of war all fresh troops as they arrive. That the conflict must be decided in that region—whether in the direction of Bloemfontein or Kimberley-Mafeking—can no longer be doubted, at least by those who see justification for the main points of our argument. But offensive operations, even in that direction, must needs be bloody and protracted, seeing that the intentions of the British are not likely to remain unknown to the Republican commanders. The Boers might see their way to make use of the "inner line," and take advantage of the railway to despatch reinforcements wheresoever they might be wanted.

In pursuing this line of action, the Boers, while weakening themselves in Natal, would, perhaps, even thus weakened, yet prove sufficiently strong to repel British attacks on that side. In

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whatever way, accordingly, the British address themselves to the proximate third phase of the present campaign, they will be confronted by an enemy who grows day by day more fit for the purposes of war, who, thanks to his extreme mobility, is able to take full strategic advantage of the "inner line," and to forestall his enemies at any threatened point. Thus the prospect before the British is not particularly alluring. But, apart from other reasons, the political condition of the northern parts of Cape Colony is grave enough to leave them scarce a choice. Here, if anywhere, it behooves the British to strike with overwhelming force.

The trend of things hitherto bears out Moltke's expressed opinion, to the effect that England habitually underrates the military efficiency of her opponents, makes no adequate preparations, and chooses an unsuitable line of deployment. In the present instance, England could not, at the critical moment following the discovery of her initial error, bring herself to take so momentous a decision as to let White and Ladysmith work out their own salvation, and, while confining herself to strategically defensive operations in Natal, throw her whole might and weight upon the invaders of her western borders. England gave her enemies time to gather strength, to organize themselves, to carry the war out of their own territory into hers. Wavering between the policy of choosing one seat of war or the other as a basis of operations, she divided and disorganized her forces, and consequently was nowhere able to bring the requisite strength to bear. Her errors have borne bitter fruit—defeat, tactical, strategical, political. England has been the loser in this first campaign, and must now grapple with the difficult task of converting a, so far, losing campaign far from her base into a victorious one. Is she strong enough?

In consequence of England's military failure in two directions, Field Marshal Roberts has been appointed Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, with General Kitchener as chief of his staff. General Buller retains, under Roberts, his command in Natal. This change in the chief command is a necessity, since the operations of war no longer admit of being supervised and directed from Natal, where Buller's duties are onerous enough to take up all his time and attention. The state of affairs at the western theatre of war also demands the special services of a governing hand and head. Want of such may have contributed not a little to untoward events in that region. Generals Methuen, Gatacre and French originally

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commanded divisions, and, since General Buller's departure for Natal, have had no general-in-chief over them. In the circumstances, convergent unity of action between the three was barely practicable. As, furthermore, the new Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Divisions will, in all probability, be sent to the western seat of war, it is indispensable to create a new and separate command for the western army.

But the organizing and consolidating of the last two divisions will be a work of considerable difficulty, involving serious delays. Of infantry England possesses one hundred and fifty-three battalions, of cavalry thirty-one regiments, of artillery twenty-one horse, ninety-five field and ten mountain batteries. At the present moment, there are already in South Africa, or on the way thither, sixty-eight infantry battalions, fourteen cavalry regiments, seven horse, twenty-six field and two mountain batteries. In England there remain only twenty-one battalions of infantry, eleven regiments of cavalry, all other troops being stationed either in India or in the colonies. For the Seventh and Eighth Divisions now in process of mobilization, sixteen battalions are required, which will about exhaust the reserve infantry. It is, of course, not impracticable to substitute militia for some of the regular infantry battalions now stationed in the colonies, but this amounts to little more than a temporary makeshift. This militia, which has had but a superficial training, numbers 110,000 men, from which, however, 30,000, belonging to the so-called "Militia Reserve," have to be deducted, because, as a matter of fact, they are reckoned as part reserve of the regular army. Seeing that in order to complete the Seventh Division, now mobilizing, the militia reserve has already been broached, it must be concluded that the regular army has been practically drained of her infantry reserves. The immediate inference is that the Seventh and Eighth Divisions cannot be placed on a war footing without drawing heavily on the militia. Granted that later on England will want more men to fill up gaps in her South African expeditionary army—a contingency by no means remote—these would again have to be furnished by the militia; and the question is, whether these troops in point of numbers and efficiency are equal to the duties expected of them.

FRITZ HOENIG.

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MILITARY PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL O. O. HOWARD, U. S. A. (RETIRED).

IF we could get at the numbers of the different commands, as historians after the events are able to do, we could make more trustworthy statements of the present military situation in South Africa. Still, taking the number of Boers from General Joubert's estimate, and the number of British troops from the newspaper accounts, we may discuss the operations and battles which have thus far transpired, and arrive at some conclusions of interest, particularly to military readers.

Whatever may be the political conditions, the Boers, in my judgment, the instant they resolved to go to war with Great Britain and strike for absolute independence, acted wisely in doing as they did. The situation required (1.) that they should put their capital in a state of defense, fortifying it and using for armament the best procurable modern inventions; (2.) that they should prepare to defend their borders—the borders of the Transvaal or South African Republic and of the Orange Free State—along the three lines of approach, by every military means; (3.) that they should begin offensive operations before their opponents could strengthen their garrisons, and crush them in detail; and also they brought to battle column after column of their foes, before the garrisoned forts could be relieved.

The first requisite President Krüger and his governing assembly were able to comply with, because they began years ago to get ready. By a singular combination of circumstances, their enemies, the Uitlanders themselves, furnished millions to their treasury, and the quick declaration of war gave the Boers complete and absolute control of the gold mines within their domain. The nearness of Delagoa Bay kept them in prompt communication with all markets of the world till the last moment, and even now

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they are permitted to get food supplies across or from Portuguese possessions lying on Delagoa Bay and bounding their eastern side.

The second object, President Steyn helped the Transvaal people to secure, as well as that could be done with the men and means at his disposal. General Joubert, the Boer Commander-in-Chief, only needed enough men to put in strongest defense, with very little fortifying, the mountain passes of which Newcastle is the centre. Here a few brave men with modern arms can keep back the many. President Steyn within his State had more difficult problems to solve, because the Cape Town and Mafeking Railway ran for one hundred and fifty miles along and near his western border, and because his only natural obstacle on the south for two hundred miles, east and west line, was the Orange River, coursing in an apparently open country. These facts, evident enough to General Cronje, a Boer military leader of experience, carried the defense of all southern and western approaches to the two States beyond their own borders.

Cronje, who evidently had this important work assigned to him, has fulfilled, with more or less success, the third requisite. That is to say, he has done much, or he has had much done, beyond the western and southern boundaries, while General Joubert, besides reinforcing him, has done the same thing on the Durban and Pretoria Railway line, operating actively as far southeastward as Colenso.

Now with regard to the number of soldiers opposed to the British, General Joubert is said to estimate them as follows:

The first contingent of the Transvaal Boers, eighteen thousand; the first contingent of the Orange Free State, sixteen thousand; from Natal, Cape Colony, Bechuanaland and friends who are helping, sixteen thousand: total under arms or available, fifty thousand.

In extremity, by counting the old men and boys, there is a possible reinforcement of twenty thousand more. We have no certain information as to how the Boer forces were distributed at the beginning of the conflict. But we know that, besides his home guards and the necessary defensive garrisons in the Transvaal, numbering probably three thousand, Joubert had a movable column of nine thousand that he himself commanded on the Durban line in Natal. Taking into account all the different state-

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ments, there must have been of the Boer force, in the mountains south of the Orange River, near Stormberg, about five thousand; on the west, opposing Methuen directly, twenty-two thousand; and around Vryburg, Mafeking, etc., four thousand. Calling the total thus divided Cronje's command, he has available thirty-one thousand. Adding the eastern column, the garrisons and the home guards, we have twelve thousand, giving us actually on duty in the war a Boer force of forty-three thousand men. The other seven thousand may be regarded as a reserve, like our minute men of the Revolution, to be called out when necessity demands and for very short periods.

Among the Boers the mounted infantry prevails. The horses carry the men rapidly from place to place, then they fight as infantry and not as cavalry with carbines. Their artillery thus far keeps about abreast of the British, having modern pieces as well as older guns of large calibre, and abundant machine guns for close work in defense.

The English had several forts and garrisons within the field of prospective operations when war began; for example, five thousand at Ladysmith and one thousand two hundred at Dundee; three thousand at Kimberley, eight hundred at Vryburg and one thousand two hundred at Mafeking, with enough more at Durban, Cape Town and elsewhere to make up an aggregate of twenty-five thousand men—quite a force when concentrated, but very weak, when so far asunder, to hold such a vast region. Of course, it was only intended as a nucleus. The force at Kimberley, it is reported, now numbers about eight thousand for the defense of that important stronghold. Cecil Rhodes is there, and with his usual energy, has doubtless put every man able to bear arms on the line of defense.

What were the British officers to do last October, when the ultimatum passed and the Boers took the field for an offensive campaign? Plainly just what they did do, stand substantially on the defensive and wait for reinforcements from England and elsewhere. General White, with four-fifths of his garrison at Ladysmith, *i. e.*, four thousand men, was doing that very thing effectively at Glencoe on the 20th of October. Joubert had divided his nine thousand into three parts. Only one part, that coming from the west, did General White, aided by General Symons, have to meet and overcome on that day. The British loss in killed and

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wounded was about three hundred, and that of the Boers seven hundred. On October the 21st, Saturday, came the next combat, called the battle of Elandslaagte, between the same contestants. They fought all that day, and General White scored a second victory. Then Glencoe resisted another attack of the Boers, but General Yule, out at Dundee, failed to resist an assault; he lost the day and fell back to Glencoe with such of his one thousand two hundred as were not disabled. The next engagement was near Ladysmith. It was not called a victory for General White. His loss was this time about eight hundred killed, wounded and prisoners. The British losses were heavy, but the defenses of Ladysmith were maintained and secured by the British commander.

A little earlier, on the 17th of October, the Vryburg garrison (of eight hundred) was forced to surrender: but Colonel Baden-Powell held out against Cronje's attacks at Mafeking, inflicting a loss upon the Boer forces of over a hundred. Thus we see that the garrisons had done all that could be expected of them.

The troops for reinforcement were landed at Cape Town, East London and Durban (eight hundred miles up the coast from Cape Town). They were called "Relieving Troops." The British Navy added a wholesome contingent to each column. The work of relief must be done at once. By the 20th of November, there were fifteen thousand new men at Cape Town and fifteen thousand at Durban, soon increased to twenty thousand, and pushed forward toward Ladysmith, to meet the Boers already in force far south of that city.

General Lord Methuen, leaving Cape Town with the left column—small at first, but before long by Navy help, mounting up to five or six thousand—fought a successful battle against about an equal force at Belmont on Thursday, the 23d of November. Then followed a second victory on Saturday, the 25th of November. The fighting was severe enough, and the losses great: but with an energy like that of our Sheridan, Methuen pushed on to Modder River. With reinforcements which had come up by rail, he had at last nearly fifteen thousand soldiers, with considerable artillery. The Boers, some twenty-thousand strong, hardly realizing that they had been defeated at Belmont and Graspan, were well placed in defense along the Modder River, intrenched on both banks and on an island which was convenient. The fight this time was stub-

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born, lasting fourteen hours. Methuen's loss was four hundred killed (one thousand eight hundred wounded and missing). The Boer loss, as far as known, counted five hundred and thirty killed and wounded. Methuen secured his crossing of the Modder River, but was able to advance only in sight of the strongest kind of intrenchments at Magersfontein. When ready, Methuen made an assault with like results to ours at Kenesaw, straight against prepared works with barbed wires stretched along the Boer front. This battle ended in a terrible disaster, where over a thousand of his men fell, with small loss to his Boer adversary. Still, he communicates by heliograph and searchlight with the garrison at Kimberley.

The force under Gatacre and that under French, despatched, as I fancy, from East London, and intended to clear the cross railways to Middelburg and De Aar, were stopped and quite effectually debarred. On Saturday, November the 9th, Gatacre, with about four thousand men, made a night march, with guides who proved inefficient, to strike a Boer force at or near Stormberg. The Boers, superior in numbers, were in fine ambush, waited for his approach and repulsed his column with great loss and confusion to the British. Gatacre retreated to Molteno, and now, like Methuen and French, stands safely on the defensive.

General Buller, at Cape Town, the new Commander-in-Chief, seeing the greater immediate danger to General White at Ladysmith, hastened to Durban and to the front on that line. He threw his forces squarely against the entrenchments of the Boers, bringing up his splendid artillery to marvelous proximity to well-filled rifle pits. The repulse under the Boers' fire, steady and accurate in its aim, all along the well-hidden lines, was sudden and complete. Eleven British cannon were taken, and hundreds of officers and soldiers became wounded and prisoners or were slain. General Buller quickly brought back his battalions to the position they had left for the battle, that the useless destruction of life might cease. It would not do to let the Boers spring again that well-set trap, even if the British were mortified at the unprecedented loss of their artillery. It is probable that General Joubert had caused to be brought up all the home guards, the reserve, and, perhaps, considering the grim determination of the Boers, enough of the old men and boys, to make a frontage of at least twenty thousand against General Buller. The latter, like

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Gatacre and Methuen, has now been put completely on the defensive. Lord Roberts, the new Commander-in-Chief, has this military problem before him. He must choose one of the three lines of advance, as soon as he shall have men enough to work out a decisive movement.

(1.) Will he take the Durban line? It is the shortest; but it is intrinsically the most difficult to carry, and has the best Boer troops to defend it.

(2.) Will he choose the line through the Orange Free State? Possibly; but I think not. He will need, however, to clear those cross railways, and secure the country below to the Orange River, that he may have the connecting railways from Molteno *viâ* Middelburg to De Aar as a secondary base. That could be done promptly. Then he could go forward rapidly, repairing the western railroad above De Aar as he pushed on to join Methuen; then crush Cronje's force, relieve Kimberley and at once break across eastward to the central railroad, and use that road for a rapid advance upon Pretoria. Of course, Joubert would retire from Colenso and Ladysmith the instant he saw Lord Roberts's plan. Then Buller could pick up General White's force of five thousand and press along with vigor to keep as many Boer soldiers as possible there to oppose his threats against Johannesburg and Pretoria by that route. If, after the crushing defeat of Cronje, Joubert and his stalwart President did not make peace, probably there would be first a hard-fought battle near Kronstad, and another, the last one, at Johannesburg.

The British will be constantly reinforced, while the Boers are already at their best in numbers, in *morale* and in supplies. General Winfield Scott, in 1861, by opening his hand and slowly closing it, showed how the Confederacy was to be conquered. We tried to keep many armies going, all at the same time, from the outer to the inner circle, of which Richmond was the center; but ultimate success came to the Union forces by so combining armies as to greatly outnumber the enemy on some important line, and then defeat him in battle all along that line. Kimberley should be the Nashville, Kronstad the Atlanta, and Johannesburg the Appomattox of the South African war.

Would that it might all be settled without the waste and horrors of war!

O. O. HOWARD.

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THE DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA.

BY HENRY CUST.

THE material and political interests of South Africa have, during the last five years, been subjected to so much distraction, have been treated with such varying prejudices and passion, and have been confused by such divergent national bias, that it is hard to see in a white light exactly what they are, and how they stand to-day. English, Boer, German, French and Portuguese have all taken a more or less violent part in the struggle, each actuated by keen national sympathies and antipathies, each considering erroneously that his own interest is separate and opposed to that of any other, and that it must therefore be separately and aggressively promoted. The result of such a conduct of affairs is obvious. Instead of one united and continuous effort pressing toward a stable and united prosperity in politics, in finance and in industry, we have had that bitter and barren struggle which leads in any community to a crippled and a sterile life, and which has in this case ended in a hateful but inevitable war. Abuses grow or are created on the side of the one party, to be countered by some opposite abuse on that of the other. Corruption leads to bribes, and bribes to more corruption. To gratify the prejudice of one group the industry and property of another is oppressed, and the oppressors, in the blindness of their spite, do not see that they too share the general depreciation. Uncertainty, distraction and distrust impel the community to violence in thought, word and deed, and what should be the most prosperous country in the world has served merely as a cockpit for the very petty squabbles of very petty men.

The war we wage to-day directly concerns the British Empire alone. It is that Empire alone which pours out the blood and spends the treasure. But it should be impressed upon people of

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all nations—and that not merely on the millionaires, but on the middle classes and small investors, and even on the country tradesman and the thrifty peasant—that they have a great, a vital and a rapidly increasing interest in the question. On the original invitation of the Transvaal Government, a flood of gold has streamed into the country from Europe and America. It is clear that the nations of the world did not send out their hard-earned dollars, francs and sovereigns so far from home merely to brighten the eyes of President Krüger. The understanding which actuated all the operations of cosmopolitan investors was the establishment of a contract for mutual advantage. "Send your money to the Transvaal," said the Boer, "and we will give you the raw material which money alone can develop; the Transvaal will profit by the development of its resources and by the trade which will follow your enterprise, and you will profit by the harvest of riches which that enterprise will reap for you."

It was trusting the good faith of this proposal that America and England yielded up their men and their millions, millions supplied not only from the great banks and syndicates of London, Paris or New York, but ultimately, and often directly, from smaller country and provincial firms, and from the pockets of every man who has even a single share in the least of the innumerable South African companies. It is extremely important to remember—and it is this which I wish to bring home to the American nation—that, in a large measure, South African finance affects the finance of the world; that every blow struck at the industries of the gold fields is struck at the interests of I know not how many hundreds of millions of capital, and that every sovereign held back from the output of the Rand by the action of the Transvaal Government means so many sovereigns held back from the pockets of the European or American citizen.

If you are rightly to understand and justly to consider the South African question, it is necessary to have some coherent knowledge of the rise and development of the Boer nation. And, indeed, the story is interesting enough on its own merits; for it tells a tale of national life, apart and aloof and different in kind and character from the story of any other nation. The historical and racial factors in South Africa have combined to evolve organic, social and political types which are to be found nowhere else in the world.

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It is not necessary to linger at any length upon the foundations of the first Dutch settlement in South Africa. Interested as they were commercially and politically in their Eastern colonies, and in their trade to India, to Java, to Japan, a half-way house of call was necessary in those days of year-long voyages.

Accordingly, in 1652, the Dutch East India Company sent Jan van Riebeck and some two hundred men to form a port and a store and an arsenal at the Cape of Good Hope, and there for two hundred years the company remained. But what is far more important to us than any incidents of their parochial history, than the lions they hunted or the Hottentots they killed, is the gradual formation of the Boer character, a character different in nature, in tradition and in outlook from any other white man's that we know, the character with which we have to deal to-day.

From start to finish, from 1652 to 1900, the Dutch in South Africa have been narrow, strong, tyrannical and pious. Their faults have been born of their virtues, and their virtues of their faults, and both faults and virtues have resulted from the conditions of their life and the mixture of their blood. They have been narrow because of their utter separation for two hundred years from all the thoughts and influences of the modern world. No book, no art, no learning ever reached them. Indeed, for them such things did not exist. To give one instance of their remoteness even to-day: in the back country of the Transvaal not long ago a resolution was unanimously passed and forwarded to the Government in favor of an immediate invasion of England, although, as matter of fact, the Transvaal does not touch the sea at any point, and to ferry across their generally dry rivers the rowboat has usually to be found by the English.

Another reason for the extraordinary isolation of the Boers has been the language which they speak, which is called the Taal. This is not a *patois* of the Dutch, as is usually supposed, but is practically a separate speech. The Dutch of Holland is a rich and highly developed language, in which any thought can be expressed; the vocabulary of the Taal has shrunk to a few hundred words, which have been shorn of all their inflections and otherwise clipped and debased. The words from Kafir and Malay sources, the broken language spoken by the black slaves, the turns of phrase handed down from French and Portuguese immigrants, have all done their work. An additional "e" will turn

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any word into the plural, and the conjugation of verbs exists in the third person singular alone. No subtlety of thought or emotion can find expression in such a speech. No interchange of knowledge with the greater world could be gained through such a language, and no human intercourse could be held, except among themselves, by those who speak that language only.

But I have said that the Boers are strong. They are strong because of their lifelong struggle for existence against man and beast and country. Every mouthful had to be won from a burning sun and from an unknown soil. Every sheep had to be guarded from wild beasts. Every woman and child had to be protected from men worse and wilder than the beasts themselves. To be strong or to perish was the alternative before the Dutch; and the Dutch were strong. They were tyrannical partly because what they had gained by violence and severity could only be maintained by sternness and repression; partly because the policy of the East India Company—which set the national mode, and against which the Boers twice openly rebelled—was directed wholly and solely to favor its own commercial and financial interests, with little thought for the progress or prosperity of the colonists, who had no rights of land, of trade, of barter, or even of personal liberty, and with still less thought for the welfare of the native races; partly, too, because of their piety, for, as I have said, they were pious. But their piety was that of the Old Testament, not that of the New. Their fathers had fought for their faith through two generations in the bitterest religious wars of modern history. They had themselves seen all Europe torn through the long agonies of the Thirty Years' War in the defense of the Protestant cause. They were of the generation which produced the Puritans and the Ironsides, and Puritans and Ironsides they remained for two hundred years. Isolated in a strange but fruitful land, and girt about by danger and terror, with their Bible for their single book, they grew to regard themselves as the Chosen People of the latter days. South Africa was the Promised Land that God had granted, and the black races were the Amalekites and Hittites whom it was theirs to smite with the sword and to turn to hewers of wood and drawers of water.

Narrow, strong, tyrannical, pious—such were the Boers two hundred years ago, and such in all essentials (and this it is important to remember) are they to-day. For they are an in-

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stance of what is known as an "arrested development," similar to the civilizations of China or of Mexico. Up to a certain date, in this case the seventeenth century, they formed part and parcel of the world's onward and evolving stream of history and expansion. But, at a given moment, from causes and conditions of which they were themselves unconscious, they ceased, not to live, but to grow. As in a frozen river, or as in an electric engine with the current switched off, the raw matter is there, and the strength, but the movement, the swing, the development, the power of growth is gone. And in all our dealings with them, in business, politics or war, it must always be remembered, and emphatically remembered, as a key to many difficulties and uncertainties, that the Boers even of to-day are a people of the seventeenth century.

Some changes and chances without doubt made their influence felt. The introduction here and there of Portuguese families, with their Latin traditions and language, broke the solid completeness of Dutch life and habit. A growing intercourse arose with the English on their way to and from the East. But the chief among these new impulses was the introduction of French blood, of French traditions, of French industries, and for a time of the French language. The Edict of Nantes was repealed, and many of the best and the bravest of the French Protestants were driven from their country. The Dutch, with a keen eye to their own advantage, at once offered them an asylum in South Africa. Free passage was granted, and on their arrival, ground, implements, seeds, and tools of every trade were distributed among them. Perhaps the most noticeable of material gifts brought by the refugees was the knowledge and culture of the vine, and to-day the broad acres of Constantia and the Western Province tell us of the skill and industry of the Huguenot vine-growers. The Dutch, however, had no intention of allowing the foreign colonists to develop on their own lines, and the same pressure and even tyranny were used to suppress the French language and all visible manifestations of French tradition and custom as have been used against the Uitlander in the Transvaal of to-day. Nevertheless, the leaven was there, and did not cease to work, and the innumerable families of Therons, Du Toits, Faures, Jouberts, and a hundred others scattered throughout South Africa, still serve to remind the French of the struggles which their fathers made for freedom.

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And, further, one strong stream of influence of a less healthy nature flowed from the conditions under which the Boer existed: the influence, the inverse influence, so to speak, always exercised by conquered races upon the dominant power which controls them. The conquered tribes and nations with whom the Boers have had to deal have been uniformly savage. That is to say, they have never met with any community possessing any government or organization save despotism and militarism. A king, the punishment of death, and annual wars represent the highest stage of development reached by any South African race. In such a polity the only available weapons are force and cunning. It is against force and cunning that the Boers have had to fight, and it is in the long run the weapons of force and cunning that they have chosen for themselves. If a black man cannot enslave you he will kill you; if he cannot do either he will deceive you; if he cannot do anything at all he will run away. Of course, in such a case the influence of the black upon the white will be largely determined by the white man's individual character. There are some who will be roused to pity and a desire to help and educate. But to the larger number of rough frontier pioneers will come the lust of domination and tyranny; and their higher education will only produce a fiercer wish to win and a quicker catch to see and use the cunning, however unscrupulous, of their foe. Such, I think, has been the main effect of their influence upon the Boers. From the day when they enslaved or exterminated the Hottentots, from the day when they looted and destroyed the missionaries' houses and burnt their books, they have shown, when strong, no mercy; whenever they have been firmly faced by an equal or a superior force, they have shown more cunning and not much courage.

Let us now consider how this character has acted since England and South Africa became a common ground. The earlier history may be rapidly passed over. In 1795, England took the Cape of Good Hope, to save it from the clutches of Napoleon, who had conquered Holland. In 1802, by the peace of Amiens, she gave it back again. In 1805, at the outbreak of the war which ended with Waterloo, she took it again to hold it, as we believe and hope, forever. Was it a robbery and a crime, as some would have us think to-day? Hear what a Dutch judge and a Dutch historian says: "Some national feeling in favor of the fatherland

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may have lingered, but, substantially, every man in the colony, of every hue, was benefited when the incubus of the Dutch East India Company was removed."

And now, what of its result? I must admit that the history of the English in South Africa, or, to be more accurate, of the English Government—of the English Cabinet—in South Africa, makes about the most discreditable and unhappy reading that an Englishman can face in all the great history of his people. Time upon time, a continent has been at our feet; time upon time, we have refused it, spat upon it, despised it and rejected it. The first cause of vice lay, as is so common with us English, in our own act of virtue. Having encouraged slavery and imported slaves for many years, the English Government suddenly abolished slaves and slavery. They agreed to grant one-third of the value in compensation to the Boers, but one way and another the money, though paid, never reached the creditors. This was in 1834. Said the Boers: "We are weary of this Government; we will wander away." For, whether it be that the sailor habits of the old Dutch race found ease in endless voyages across the grassy oceans of the South African uplands, or whether it be that the habit of revolt and independence was so strong as not even to bear the restraint of a neighbor's presence, the fact remains that the Boers became a race of wanderers. And away they went and wandered, and among them President Krüger, a child of four. For years, for generations long, they wandered. Born in the wilderness, dead in the wilderness, a wagon between blue sky and yellow grass their only home from birth to death, born without a midwife on the sand, dead on the sand without a parson, they wandered on—shooting lions, fighting natives, drinking endless coffee, begetting endless children, always wandering on. They crossed the Orange River, and they crossed the Vaal River. They crossed the Drakensberg mountains, and founded Natal. There at last the English interfered. "No," they said, "the land may be ours or yours or anybody's, but the sea at least is ours." So the English took Natal and have it now, "the garden colony of the world," they call it, and free to all the world. And the Boers wandered onward, onward to the north, in growing isolation and discontent, with the hunger after land and loneliness waxing and gnawing in their hearts and souls and bodies.

And now we must come down nearer to our own days. By

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1850 the Dutch had built up two vaguely constituted pastoral communities, the one in the boundless prairie sea beyond the Orange River, the other still further north in the uplands beyond the Vaal. But though they loved their independence, they needed English aid both for their stores and in their wars against the Kafirs. A solid empire merging the two white races was the great ideal. But, with that inconceivable madness which marks the action of the English Government in South Africa, the English Government refused to accept it. Philosophic Radicals and Little Englanders were rampant in those sad days. "What good are the colonies?" they cried in their opacity. "We will have none of them." And so—and this must be remembered—against the wish of every wise Boer, against the wish of every loyal colonist, in spite of addresses, in spite even of deputations sent to London, the English Government insisted wantonly and wilfully in 1852-4 on founding two independent Boer States to mar the unity of our African dominion, and built up with deliberate carefulness all the pain, anxiety and danger that we have to face to-day.

Such was the beginning of trouble in South Africa. Let us see how that trouble has developed.

When more settled conditions were imposed upon the Boers, the character which I have endeavored to analyze remains, in new environment, indeed, but at the bottom essentially identical. Narrow, strong, tyrannical, pious, restless and keen, such are the Boers to-day. These qualities will be found to inspire the whole of their internal and external life; to them you may refer the raids and the conquests, the oppression and the self-righteousness, and the paramount selfishness, which actuate the Governments of the two Boer States. Democratic in principle, they are in fact limited oligarchies of Genoese and Venetian type.

So long, however, as the burghers wandered, uncared for, unknown, across their boundless plains, their shortcomings mattered not to the world; but to-day, when, by their invitation, the wealth, the industry, the fortunes of so many thousand English and other foreigners have been entrusted to their good faith, it was both just and necessary that the Boers should enlarge their scope of view and modify their inherited intolerance. For the hour was drawing near of the clash between that most modern of all modern communities, a gold-field population, and the most antique and intolerant government that exists in the world.

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For twenty years affairs in the Dutch States went from bad to worse. If the farmers were unwilling to obey the Queen of England, they declined point-blank to obey one another. Revolution followed revolution; dissension, dissension; at one time there were three separate Governments in the Transvaal. The burghers owned no authority, and declined to pay any taxes. The treasury was utterly bankrupt. The Zulus on one side and another great tribe, the Bapeli, threatened the Dutch with destruction. All South Africa was agitated and in danger. The Boer President himself said that federation under the English flag was the sole way out of the difficulty. At last England annexed the country, and found exactly twelve shillings and sixpence (a few cents over three dollars) in the treasury.

Of the bad and shameful years that followed I need not speak. Stupidity, shame and disaster were the Englishman's only fare. And when we had spent English blood and English treasure without end upon the country, and saved it, by Englishmen, from itself and from the Zulus, then came upon England the crowning dishonor of this generation in Mr. Gladstone's surrender of the country itself.

But meanwhile other things had happened.

In 1867 an event occurred which changed the history of South Africa. An Irish hunter named O'Reilly saw a white pebble in a farmhouse, and, liking the looks of it, put it in his pocket. He sold it for £500 (about $2,500). It was the first South African diamond. The farmer, hearing of this, bought another pebble like it from a Hottentot. This he sold to a Jew for £10,000 (about $50,000), and an English great lady gave £25,000 (about $125,000) to possess it. South Africa was made. Men and money flowed in like a racing tide. In twenty years, those diamond mines of Kimberley produced sixty-five millions of pounds sterling (about $325,000,000), and founded, in the heart of the wilderness and on the edge of the isolated Transvaal, a great town of newspapers, railways, money and millionaires, and all the apparatus of modern civilization. What would be the next step? The next step was even more curious. For some years there had been rumors now and again of the finding of gold in the Transvaal. At first, the Boers feared the consequences of such a discovery, but at last the appetite for gain proved too strong, and the Government invited prospectors and offered rewards to

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prospectors who succeeded. Here and there payable reefs were found, a certain interest was aroused, and a few men with a small amount of money went to work in the country.

Now, in the middle of the bare and desolate uplands of the Transvaal, the high veldt, as it is called, was a yet more bare and desolate ridge, some thirty miles long by about two or three broad. It was not of quartz or of any known gold-bearing rock. But in July, 1886, it was discovered that the reason it was not of gold-bearing rock was because it was almost of solid gold itself, for this you may practically say—all gold, for thirty miles by two or three, and one knows not how many thousand feet in depth. The report spread like wildfire. Farms of bare pasture, that ranged in value from £350 to £750 (about $1,750 to $3,750), were sold for £70,000 (about $350,000) apiece. In 1885, for £10,000 (about $50,000) you might have bought the entire ridge, until it was discovered in 1886 that it was worth about one thousand million pounds. You may guess what happened when the news was known. First from the diamond fields of Kimberley, then from the Colony, from England, France, America, Australia, all Europe, from all the world, poured in a feverish, hungry tide, to win wealth and take fortune by storm. What actually resulted may most briefly be indicated by a few simple figures. In 1886, the Transvaal was a thinly populated country, the Government was nearly bankrupt, and there were neither trades nor towns. In 1886, there were, perhaps, some 60,000 whites scattered over some 110,000 miles of country. In 1897, there were about 180,000 whites, of whom some 60,000 were Boers, including women and children, and the remainder foreigners, almost entirely men. In 1884, the revenue was £143,000 (about $700,000), and the expenditure £183,000 (about $900,000), leaving a deficit of £40,000, and a debt of nearly half a million (about two and a half million dollars); and not a soul would lend the Boers a shilling. In 1897, the revenue was five millions (about twenty-five million dollars), and the credit of the nation the best in the world; and a balance of £1,200,000 (about $6,000,000) was lying at the bank. In 1884, there was practically no trade in gold in the Transvaal. In 1896, the total output amounted to something like three million ounces, valued at about £9,000,000 (about $45,000,000), and there are probably some 450 millions (about 2,250 million dollars) left in the soil.

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And on that barren upland ridge, nearly six thousand feet above the sea, where, in 1884, there were perhaps some half-dozen Boer huts and a few wild beasts, there stood in 1899 a great city of houses, mills and warehouses, of churches, clubs and theatres, of railways and of electricity, and some sixty thousand of the keenest, eagerest, busiest men on earth, hustling and jostling in the offices and streets. You must have seen it to conceive it—the endless roar, the endless throb, the unceasing telegrams to and from every city in the world, the thirty miles of tall chimneys with their rushing, crushing, roaring stamps, tearing the pure yellow gold from its hiding-place and flinging it forth to do its part too in the sin and shame, in the charity and goodness, in the sorrow and delight, in the peace and war of all the born and even the unborn millions of the earth.

Or you must go to Pretoria, thirty miles off, the seat of this strange Government, and see the great Government buildings and Government banks and Government mint, all built out of the foreigner's money, and see the club and the rose-covered houses and the running water, and President Krüger in his wealthy, tyrannous Puritanism. And all that, too, is paid for out of the foreigner's money.

And then you will get some idea of what the foreigner or Uitlander has done for the Boers of the Transvaal. Remember, too, that the foreigners were invited by the Boers to come, that they have made the fortune of the Boers individually and nationally, and consider what has been their final fate!

Once more for a moment we must dip back into history. When Mr. Gladstone surrendered the Transvaal, at least even he made some terms for the future, though three years later he yielded a little more to the insistence of the Boers. But certain claims of common humanity and civilization were demanded, not for Englishmen only, but for all white races, and certain political obligations were reserved. Complete self-government was granted to the Boers, but they undertook in return to give free rights of entrance into, residence in and departure from the country to all men; to give freedom and protection to all commerce; to grant all legal rights and protection to all; not to try to increase their boundaries; to conclude no treaties without the permission of England, and to conduct in general a civilized government. You must remember that this was solemnly promised and guaran-

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teed by signed convention with England as paramount or suzerain power, in return for the internal independence of the Transvaal.

It was on the faith of these simple, yet solemn, promises that England and the world sent their men and money in peace. It is to insist on the observance of these promises that England sends to-day her men and money in war. From the very first, it would seem, President Krüger had leaned toward some sort of subterranean understanding with Germany, and to some hidden hope of one great Dutch Republic, with England and the English wiped away. Whatever expectations may have been based on German help have been obliterated by Germany's later and wider policy. But he was, indeed, to receive a reinforcement, both of rancor and effective strength, in the shape of a body of men known as the Hollanders.

And here, perhaps, I might explain who these much-hated Hollanders are. The Boers, as I have already pointed out, are a lazy, ignorant race, and after the great gold discovery they suddenly found themselves face to face with men and facts and circumstances with which they had neither enough knowledge nor enough energy to grapple. To meet this, Mr. Krüger imported from Holland a large number of somewhat low-class Dutch adventurers, to whom he entrusted almost every post of responsibility in the country. These Hollanders, as they are called, are perhaps the heaviest curse of all the curses in the Transvaal. Self-seeking, corrupt, tyrannous, spiteful, they robbed both Boer and Uitlander impartially, and, to forward their own bad ends, kept up a constant intrigue with Germany to thwart the interests of England. It is satisfactory to know that the true Boer hates them even more than the English. They quickly saw their line and took it. The Boers were idle and the Boers were ignorant. If by incessant and insidious intrigue the Hollanders could monopolize the machinery of government, if their hands were on the wires and their mouths at the speaking-tube of every department of civil organization, President Krüger might decree, but it would be their own leader who governed. To conduct such a campaign it was obvious that money was the first material necessity, money to bribe and money to buy. To this the Hollanders were more than equal. Monopolies, concessions, private arrangements, all played their part. Was it a railway? Was it a tariff? Was it some necessity of the mining industry? In each case, said

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the Hollanders, "let us give it to some chosen *concessionaire,* German or Dutch for choice, and let us ourselves stand in when the carcass is divided. Let us grow rich, and let us win or buy German support of some kind, and the interests of the country, and of the community, and of the vast body which makes our fortune, matter not at all." Such, roughly and crudely expressed, was the policy which has underlain the actions of the Transvaal Government since the day when the Transvaal Government became of importance to the world.

Thus stood the situation in general in the spring of 1899. To state it in full detail would require many pages more. The whole wide budget of abuses and corruptions which led to the Reform Movement, and indirectly to the indefensible Jameson's Raid and its further results, must need a book for telling. And the needed book has but now been presented in Mr. Fitzpatrick's admirable and accurate tale of "The Transvaal from Within." It seems already amazing, and will seem yet more wonderful hereafter, that, in a small community, a large majority of Anglo-Saxon blood could bear for so long a period so tyrannous a government, so corrupt an administration, so intolerable a condition of life. To some, perhaps, it will seem still stranger that the proud Empire, professing to be paramount, could endure a humiliation so protracted and profound. But history shows us that the deep, immutable foundations of Anglo-Saxon Empire are bedded in the strong stupidity and unreasoning endurance of the Anglo-Saxon race. Sometimes, indeed, these qualities are pushed beyond the mark. The United Colonies of North America could not properly explain their view to England, and England was too stupid to understand such explanations as were given. And so both fell back on endurance, and it may be that neither has lost by the outcome of that struggle. In Canada the triumph of those excelling principles which unconsciously impelled us stood for years upon a razor's edge. And in South Africa, as I have tried to show, we have made love to disaster with all the tactless vehemence of a lusty but insensitive aspirant. But once more that other element of Anglo-Saxons, the sheer quality of luck, has intervened. And with luck the other qualities, once awoke to action, are irresistible.

In the case of the present war, the side of sentiment may be omitted wholly, save on the narrowest personal footing. The

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Boers, it is true, wish to remain independent; the English wish to readjust the social and political conditions of life in South Africa. It cannot be denied that, by both the original Sand River Conventions of 1852 and 1854, England *granted* autonomy to the two Boer States. It cannot be denied that by the acceptance of that grant, *as a grant,* the Boers admitted the paramountcy or suzerainty (the word matters little) of England. It cannot be denied, in the case of the Transvaal, that by the further grant of 1881, modified by the concessions of 1884, which were *appealed for* by the Boer Government, the principle of British paramountcy was again admitted, and that an absolute equality of political and other rights was solemnly promised, not only to the British, but to all immigrating foreigners.

On the other hand, by ignoring utterly and ostentatiously the engagements on which their national existence has depended; by refusing the least of political or even municipal rights to that majority of the inhabitants who paid nine-tenths of the income of the country; by using vast sums of the money so obtained to enlist the enemies of England, and to equip themselves with an arsenal of arms against the Power which created and maintained them; and, lastly, by declaring war against her—by these things the Boers have made South Africa what it is to-day. A thousand voices tell us that it is the land-greed, the gold-greed, the Empire-greed of England that have made the war. England, they scream, is the conquering tyrant of free nations. Yet it is a French-born Government, loyal to England, that sends troops to the front from Canada, and it is a Dutch Government, loyal to England, that is in power at the Cape to-day. Formulas grow meaningless by repetition, but what truth they carry is unchanged. When England claims "equal rights for all white men south of the Zambesi," she says, what generations in practice have proved true, that in Cape Colony, and Natal, and Rhodesia, the Boer stands on exactly the same footing with the English-born; and more, that in no English colony of the world has the proudest, richest Englishman one lonely political or commercial advantage over the humblest and poorest foreign immigrant.

It is to extend this equal freedom that we are fighting now, and, as the world lives longer and judges more wisely than the man, by the world this fight will never be regretted.

HENRY CUST.

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THE AFRIKANDERS IN NATAL.

BY DR. J. C. VOIGT, AUTHOR OF "FIFTY YEARS OF THE HISTORY OF THE REPUBLIC IN SOUTH AFRICA."

In the second week of October, 1837, half a dozen horsemen were riding eastward through the mountain defile now known as the Van Reenen's Pass of the Drakensberg.

Each man carried, suspended over his back by a shoulder strap, or resting across the pummel of his saddle, a long carbine with a large "sight" of bone or ivory on the muzzle—the old-fashioned, flint-lock elephant gun. A bullet pouch, made of soft calfskin and filled with slugs and big six-to-the-pound musket balls, a powder horn and a long-bladed hunter's knife were his other military accoutrements. Bearded faces, browned and tanned by sun and wind and dust; strong limbed frames clad in coats of corduroy or *bafta* and in leather or corduroy breeches; stiff-brimmed felt hats; hard-soled *veldt schoene,** all bespoke the frontiersman.

But this description of the typical, rough South African borderer of 1837 does not quite apply in every detail to each of the six horsemen who rode through Van Reenen's Pass; for there was one among them in whose wearing apparel and equipment evidence of taste for the artistic and the elegant was not altogether wanting.

Broad-shouldered and of medium stature, with dark hair and beard, and with eyes as keen as those of the mountain eagles gyrating in the sky overhead, high above the loftiest peaks of the Berg; animated in speech and gesture, and yet over all his features a quiet dignity and reserve, which marked him out to command and be a leader of men; such was the first Commandant-General of the Emigrant Farmers.

* Skin shoes; the South African moccasins.

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Pieter Maurits Retief was born at Wagenmakers Vallei, in the Paarl district of the Western Province of Cape Colony, in 1797, two years after the proclamation of the first Afrikander Republics of Graaff Reinet and Swellendam. Early in life he had emigrated to the Eastern Province of the Colony, where, in the district of the Winterberg, he had become a very influential man, and held the office of Field Commandant. He had married the widow of Commandant Greyling, a burgher officer who fell in the Kafir war of 1834.

The Republics which had been established, two years before he was born, by his countrymen in the districts of Graaff Reinet and Swellendam, had been suppressed by England. The Republican leaders who attempted a rising in 1799 had been punished with relentless cruelty in the unsanitary cells of the Castle prison of Cape Town, where two of them had died. When Retief was twenty years of age, some of the Graaff Reinet Republicans had again risen in insurrection. By the open grave of a frontiersman named Frederik Bezuidenhout, who had been shot by the British Hottentot soldiery, they had listened to the impassioned words of a brother of the deceased man, and taken an oath to drive the Government's Hottentot troops out of the country. Their chief leader, Hendrik Prinsloo, and several others, had been arrested. Jan Bezuidenhout, his followers dispersed and scattered, his wife and son fighting by his side, had made his last stand, and died. His wife and son, both wounded, had been taken prisoners. On the 16th of December, 1815, a British tribunal for the trial of thirty-nine prisoners concerned in the insurrection had met at Uitenhage. Then had followed the sentences, and, in March of the following year, the execution of five of the Republican leaders on the hill of Slachtersnek.

Retief had frequently heard narrated to him all the details of the cruel execution scene: how the friends and relatives of the condemned men begged in vain for a reprieve; how thirty-two of the other prisoners, many of them condemned to banishment from the country for life, were compelled to witness the execution; how the gallows collapsed and fell to earth when the unfortunate victims were half-strangled; how the bystanders then went down on their knees and pleaded with the British officer for mercy, pointing out to him that God had interceded for the unfortunate sufferers; how the executioners of the Sovereign, who,

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according to the Government proclamation of the day, was "so eminently distinguished for tempering justice with mercy," were implacable; how brave Martha Bezuidenhout, who had been wounded, and whose husband had been killed by the Hottentots, was among those banished for life; how the British Crown refused to surrender the bodies of the executed men to their friends and relatives, who desired to give them Christian burial.

In the Winterberg Mountains, Pieter Retief had brooded over the wrongs of his nation. Like Joan of Arc, he had heard voices. They had called him to lead his people to the north, and then to the sea. He had seen more of South Africa than the other leaders of the emigrants. Born and educated in the west—where the industrial and agricultural pursuits of the people, as well as the climate, scenery, and configuration of the country, are so totally different from what pertains in the eastern district as to make the one a different world from the other—and with a career in the east already not without distinction, Retief was somewhat of a cosmopolitan as well as a patriot. He was going to found a State, not for cattle farmers and stock graziers alone. He meant to build up a free republic for all Afrikanders, where industries and commercial pursuits could thrive; and, therefore, he thought it of the greatest importance to secure an independent seaboard. He had grown up and worked with the evidence of the misrule and stupidity of the Cape Town officials and of Downing Street all round him. The grumbling and the muttered curses of the frontiersmen had told him of the discontent which was spreading through South Africa. He thought he saw the opportunity to raise up a State unfettered by British dominion, and to make his nation free and independent. A harbor on the Indian Ocean would give access to the rest of the world.

Thoroughly understanding his own countrymen and the situation of the country; seeing clearly what made for weakness and what for strength in the popular cause; gifted with a genius for organizing and for commanding, and with a power—far above that of his compeers—for inspiring confidence and trust; impulsive and enthusiastic, and at the same time resolute and determined; characterized by restless activity and untiring energy in the execution of his projects; bold and daring to the verge of rashness in his enterprises; of amiable, frank and generous disposition, and eminently fitted by all these qualities to be a leader

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of men, Retief, moreover, possessed acquirements which were rare accomplishments at a time and in a country where few opportunities existed for obtaining such education as can be derived from schools and from reading. He not only understood his own nation—Eastern as well as Western Province Afrikanders—he also knew something of the literature of Holland, as far as it related to politics and history. He had, besides, a good knowledge of English, which he could speak and write fluently. He was an orator and a keen student of the history of his own times, not only in his own country, but also in the outer world. He was as enlightened and educated a South African as it was possible to find in those days.

Riding through the great clefts between the rock masses of the Drakensberg, Pieter Retief and his companions, in October, 1837, passed on to descend the mountains where the railway line from Ladysmith to Harrismith in the Orange Free State now zigzags up the steep slopes. The plains to the north of the Orange River were dotted with the encampments of those who had undertaken the Great Trek from Cape Colony. North of the Vaal, some of the emigrants—those under Trichard and Van Rensburg—had already passed through the country to Zoutpansberg and then to Delagoa.

All these men and women who left their homes in Cape Colony to go into the wilderness were the pioneers of self-government in South Africa. Self-government was then unobtainable under British rule. The government of Cape Colony was an "unlimited despotism." The Trek began in 1833; and, therefore, it could not have been caused, as British writers say it was, by the emancipation of the slaves, which took place in 1834. Besides, the emigrant farmers, or Trekkers, practically all came from the Eastern Province of Cape Colony, where there were no slaves, or next to none. That the Republic arose again in South Africa because magnanimous England emancipated the slaves—in other words, the Republicans favored slavery—is a pious fiction, a convenient invention of British writers. The Trek was the protest of the frontiersmen against foreign autocratic despotism. As the creation of the Republics of Graaff Reinet and Swellendam, in 1795, had shown his hostility to the misrule of the Dutch East India Company, so his declaration of independence north of the Orange River proved the frontiersman's determination to be free

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from all foreign control. The emigrants were the champions of self-government and of free representative institutions in South Africa, against despotic rule from abroad. They showed continuity of policy in their aspirations, and consistent attachment to the ideals of their fathers; for the cause was exactly the same as that of 1795. To ignore this, and to say, as do the official British chroniclers, that the great emigration northward and the re-establishment of the Republic were caused by England's emancipation of the slaves, is about as absurd, and as historically untrue, as it would be to affirm that the origin of the American War of Independence and of the great Commonwealth of the United States was the attempt on the part of the British Government to suppress a mob in Boston, and to put down anarchy by force of arms.

Retief's mission was to proceed to the Bay of Natal, and from there to Umkungunhlovu, the capital of Zululand. The Zulu King, Dingaan, ruled over Natal by right of conquest. The armies of his predecessor, Chaka, had overrun all the country lying between the mouth of the Tugela River and that of the Umzimvubu. From the coast line between these two rivers, inland to the Drakensberg and the Upper Tugela, the land was waste and relatively uninhabited by native tribes. Some five or six thousand blacks, living mostly in concealment in the forests and mountain ridges, in order to escape Zulu raiding parties, represented the entire population of Natal. The triangular area of country lying northward of the Upper Tugela—which river may be taken as the base of the triangle, the apex being at Laing's Nek, and the two sides being formed by the Drakensberg Range and the Buffalo River—was part of Zululand proper.

In the immediate vicinity of the harbor of Natal some hunters and adventurers from Cape Town and Port Elizabeth had built a small settlement of huts and wigwams. They acknowledged the rule of the Zulu king.

By Government proclamations and despatches, England had repeatedly disclaimed all intention and wish to obtain any territory in Natal.

Such was the political situation of the country when Retief and his companions arrived at Port Natal, obtained the co-operation of the English settlers there in his projects, and then travelled to Dingaan's Kraal on the White Umveloosi.

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He desired to get the Zulu monarch's consent to the settlement of the emigrants in Natal, and to obtain a cession of the territory from the king.

A marauding band of Basuto raiders from the Drakensberg Mountains had previously carried off some Zulu cattle, and Dingaan consented to comply with the emigrant leader's request if the farmers could retake the cattle from the Basutos.

Sikonyella, the Basuto chief, whose raiders had carried off Dingaan's cattle, was compelled by the emigrants to give up his booty. Then Pieter Retief, accompanied by sixty-five armed horsemen, rode back to Zululand. Dingaan ceded to them "the region Port Natal with all the land attached to it—that is to say, from the Tugela as far as the Umzimvubu River to the west, and from the sea to the north as far as the country may be suitable for occupation."

Then a war dance was performed, apparently in honor of the strangers.

The ground trembled with the incessant heavy thump of the feet of two thousand dusky warriors. Accompanying voices intoned the cadences of the battle song. Loud and clear rang out the herald's mimic challenge to the foe. Stalwart captains, whose head circlets were ornamented with heavy plumes, muscular Indunas, whose loins and shoulders were partly covered with massive leopard skin karosses, roared and bellowed their words of command in deep-toned basso; and, from all the line of Zulu soldiers came the answering echo of deep bass voices, as once more the earth seemed to tremble under the heels of the dancers.

Then the vessel containing the maize brew was brought, and as the emigrants sat down to drink the parting cup, Dingaan stepped back toward his hut, and gave the treacherous signal to his warriors. "Kill the wizards!" was the cry, as the doomed men were seized. They were dragged to the hill, Chlooma Amaboota, on the edge of a precipice overlooking the kraal. Here they were murdered by the Zulus.

Ten months later, when the avenging win-commando, under Andries Pretorius, reached this part of Zululand, they found, impaled on a sharp stake, the body of Pieter Retief, half-mummified, half-crumbled to dust, untouched by vultures and wild beasts. From the shoulder hung suspended the little leather despatch bag, in which was safely preserved the deed of cession

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of Natal. Ranged around their dead leader, and, like him, impaled on stakes driven into the ground, stood the other sixty-five faithful sentinels—faithful to the Republic, even in death.

While Retief had been negotiating with Dingaan, a thousand wagons of the emigrants had descended from the Drakensberg by way of Van Reenen's Pass. The massacre at the Zulu kraal took place on the 6th of February, 1838. Soon after that date there were laagers on the Tugela, Blauwkrans, and Bushmans rivers, near where Colenso, Frere and Weenen are now. There were also a few small camps south of the Bushmans River.

Swiftly Dingaan's *impis* swept over the land. Neither man, woman, nor child was spared. Several hundreds were killed.

Reinforcements came from the other side of the mountains. Pieter Uys and Hendrik Potgieter led the burghers into Zululand; but, at Italeni, Uys and his gallant son were slain and the burgher column had to fall back on Natal.

The winter of 1838 was a dark period in the history of the emigrants. Sickness, poverty and distress were in their camps; the graves of their murdered relatives around them. The Zulu army attacked them once more on the Bushmans River. The British Government, in proclamations issued at Cape Town, not only threatened them with all sorts of pains and penalties, but interfered with their supplies of ammunition, prevented their sympathizers in Cape Colony from going to their assistance, and even refused to allow medicines and hospital necessaries to be forwarded to them by their friends.

Their courage, however, did not falter in the time of their adversity. A few waverers among the men were in favor of giving up the enterprise and returning to Cape Colony. But the women unanimously resolved not to abandon Natal. The gallant struggle to defend the land where the lost ones lay buried was continued.

On the death of Gerrit Maritz, the successor of Pieter Retief, Andries Pretorius was appointed Commandant-General. Early in December, a commando of burghers crossed the Upper Tugela and advanced into Zululand. On the 9th, their laager stood on the banks of the Sundays River, about fifteen miles east of the present town of Ladysmith and thirty miles northeast of where General Buller's camp stood on the 9th of December, 1899.

A vow to God was solemnly entered into by the burghers in

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their camp. Andries Pretorius and others of their leaders addressed them and invoked the help of Providence.

On the following Sunday—the 16th of December, 1838—at daybreak, fully 12,000 Zulus, led by Dingaan's two best generals, swept down on the three hundred white men, in their laager on the Bloed River, a tributary of the Buffalo. The battle was over by ten o'clock in the forenoon. Time after time the black columns had hurled themselves against the solid squares of wagons, in vain. The rifle fire of the defenders had strewn the plain with dead Zulu warriors. Then Bart Pretorius, brother of the Commandant-General, had cleft the Zulu army in two by a charge of burgher mounted riflemen. Dingaan's finest regiments had been scattered like chaff before the wind. Three thousand Zulu soldiers lay dead on the veldt.

Into the heart of Zululand rode Andries Pretorius and his three hundred burghers. Dingaan's royal kraals were burnt; the deed of cession of the territory of Natal to the emigrants and their descendants was recovered; the bodies of Retief and the others who had been massacred at Umkungunhlovu were interred. The win-commando returned to Natal.

At the Buffalo River a horse express came to inform Pretorius that a British force had seized the Bay of Natal and all the stores of ammunition belonging to the emigrants.

It was the first British raid on the Republic, the Napier Raid. Governor Sir George Napier, of Cape Town, urged on by colonial merchants and traders jealous of the growing commercial importance of Natal, had seized the harbor of Durban without official sanction from Downing Street.

Such sanction not being forthcoming, the British force subsequently retired.

The Republican colors were hoisted over the fort which had been occupied by the British troops. The townships of Pietermaritzburg, called after Pieter Retief and Gerrit Maritz, Weenen, named in memory of those who had been massacred on the Bushmans and Blauwkrans rivers, and Durban were established.

Another campaign against Dingaan completely shattered the Zulu despot's power. His brother Panda was installed ruler of Zululand in his place. The deposed chief fled across the Pongola River into Swaziland, where he was slain. The new king of Zululand declared himself a vassal of the Republic of Natal.

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The old district of Potchefstroom, the country north of the Vaal River, and the district of Winburg, the region between the Vet and Vaal, together formed the Republic of Winburg. This State, under the rule of a Commandant-General, Andries Hendrik Potgieter, and a Volksraad, now formed a federal union with Natal. There was a Court of Landdrost and Heemraden. Every white inhabitant had the franchise, and all white emigrants who settled in the country received a free grant of land for a farm. There were no taxes, except a land tax, and the officials were unsalaried.

Such was the primitive constitution of the peasant State. Laws and institutions exactly similar to those in the Republic of Winburg prevailed in that of Natal.

The territory under Republican rule thus extended from the Orange River, in the south, to the Zoutpansberg, in the north, and from the Indian Ocean, on the east, to the border of the Kalahari Desert, on the west.

In four years' time the emigrants had transformed the wilderness into what would soon have grown into a flourishing State. The great military despotism which had sought to destroy the pioneers had been humbled and shattered.

Great streams of native immigration then began to pour into the territories of the newly established Republic, where the aborigines found protection and safety. While the missionaries and the Cape newspapers were telling the people of England that Pretorius and Potgieter and their followers were the oppressors and exterminators of the native races, these natives themselves regarded the Voortrekker commandants as deliverers, under whose rule they came to place themselves, in thousands and tens of thousands.

During less than six years of Republican rule in Natal, the native population increased from five or six thousand (the figure given by Theal as that representing the total number when Retief crossed the Drakensberg), to between eighty and one hundred thousand (the figures of British Commissioner Cloete).

The foundation of the Afrikander Republics—Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal—is as unique an example as can be found in the history of the modern world of a small white community, struggling for self-preservation against barbarism, and yet just and humane in its policy toward the savage races. In-

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dividual acts of cruelty there have been, of course; where have they not occurred when the white man meets the black on the frontiers of civilization, when the European builds his dwelling in wild, new lands? But the historian cannot hope to arrive at correct conclusions by judging from individual instances. And yet one British writer after another, in dealing with South Africa, has employed this faulty method of generalizing without sufficient *data*. The Afrikander has been described as cruel to the natives, as being little, if any, better than a robber and a plunderer.

The broad facts of history have been ignored by the mass of British writers on South Africa. The great British public has been led to believe that its own Government is the heaven-appointed protector of the aboriginal races all the world over. As a matter of fact, there is not a single one of the large self-governing British colonies in which whole nations of the aborigines are not dying out, owing to the indirect action of bad laws, in some cases; as the direct result of the cruelty of the State, in others. In every one of the Afrikander Republics the immediate result of the establishment of the government of the emigrants was an enormous increase in the numbers of each individual Kafir nation enjoying the protection of that government.

It was British rule which caused the Hottentots in Cape Colony to die out. It was Afrikander rule, the rule of the despised and maligned "Boer," which saved the natives of Natal, as well as those to the north of the Orange and Vaal rivers, from annihilation.

The great British public is nothing if not imaginative. Can it not put itself in the place of others and judge other nations charitably? Even lyddite shells will not maintain an empire which is built on delusions.

The Republic meant salvation to white as well as black. Thousands of Cape Colonists left the British territories and joined the emigrants, between the years 1836 and 1840.

When, in August, 1841, the harbor of Natal was entered by the American ship, "Levant," with a large cargo of merchandise for the emigrants, there was a flutter in the dovecotes of those enterprising and enthusiastic empire-extenders, the Cape Town shopkeepers. Then, as now, the so-called South African Association was formed—in London. To suppress the Afrikanders

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and to paint the map red, were the objects of that agitation as of to-day's.

The second British raid was the Smith Raid. British troops were marched from Pondoland to seize Natal. In a night attack on the emigrant laager, near Congella, Captain Smith was badly beaten and lost his artillery, May 24, 1842. He was then besieged in his own camp for a month, when strong reinforcements under Lieutenant-Colonel Cloete, together with the sixty-four guns of a British frigate, compelled Pretorius to retire from his position, give up the harbor, and retreat inland.

While Captain Smith was besieged by the farmers, he had sought, but failed to obtain, aid from the Zulus.* Lieutenant-Colonel Cloete was equally unscrupulous. He employed Kafir marauding parties as scouts and looters for his army. They murdered several farmers on isolated farms. They maltreated women and children, stripping them stark naked, and driving them away into the veldt. These helpless victims of England's might were found, and rescued, by a patrol of burghers under Bart Pretorius, after having wandered about for three days without food.†

When Pretorius, whose conduct to the wounded and non-combatants on the British side had been generous and magnanimous, remonstrated by letter with the Queen's military officers and protested against their inhuman method of carrying on the war, the answer was that, as the burghers had caused the condition of affairs in Natal by "rebelling," they "must bear the consequences."

The order for the Kafir marauding expeditions remained in force.

Under these circumstances, the struggle was not resumed. The Volksraad of Natal submitted. The Republic was subdued.

The leaders, Pretorius, Burger, Prinsloo, and the Bredas, father and son, were outlawed. Pretorius was afterward pardoned. Prinsloo and the elder Van Breda died of fever on their journey inland from Delagoa Bay. Burger made his way over the mountains to Lydenburg.

* See Theal; "History of South Africa," Vol. 4. p 347.

† P. 251 *et seq.* of Vol. 2 of the writer's "Fifty Years of the History of the Republic in South Africa." London, T. Fisher Unwin; 1899. The particulars are taken from the oral narrative dictated to the author in 1881, by Senior Commandant J. H. Visser, one of the Voortrekkers who fought under Pretorius against the British.

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The Volksraad and all popular representative institutions were abolished. Thousands of Zulus, cattle thieves and plunderers were allowed to overrun the country. The farms of Republicans were practically confiscated. All this, in direct violation of the terms of the treaty of submission.

Back over the mountains, through the passes of the black Drakensberg, went the Voortrekkers. Men, women and little children again went into the wilderness, in order to retain their flag. In poverty, in suffering, in sorrow, they looked back on the lost land in which their loved ones lay buried. The mists came over the mountains, and the drenching showers descended in torrents. Shoeless, and often hungry, weary, and faint; worn out with hardship, and toil, and battle, and sickness, and distress; their own beloved land, for which they had suffered and bled, in the grasp of that Power which they now regarded as the oppressor and the spoiler; homeless outcasts in misery and exile; with bleak rocks around and the wilds of trackless deserts in front of them: the South African Pilgrim Fathers did not yet lose heart.

The Republic was not dead.

The children of those who had suffered and died for the cause of liberty, the sons of the martyrs of Weenen and Umkungunhlovu, would know how to defend the great heritage entrusted to their care.

> "For Freedom's battle once begun,
> Bequeathed by bleeding Sire to Son,
> Though baffled oft, is ever won."

* * * *

It is the last year of the century which opened with the cruel punishment of the Republicans of Graaf Reinet,* among whom there was one Lucas Meyer—as there were, also, two named Krüger, and two named Botha—in the prison at Cape Town.

It is the 16th of December; the anniversary of the opening ceremony of the court which ordered the execution of the Afrikander leaders at Slachtersnek; the anniversary of the great defeat of Dingaan's armies at the Bloed River; the anniversary of the commencement of the Transvaal War of Independence at

*From June, 1799, to August, 1800, these men were kept imprisoned, without trial, in an overcrowded prison cell—more than eighty prisoners being locked up in one room every night. In September, 1800, two were sentenced to death, one was condemned to be publicly flogged on the scaffold, others to banishment for life, or to imprisonment.

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Potchefstroom; the anniversary of the proclamation at Heidelberg of the restoration of the South African Republic.

The sons have come back over those mountains—the sons of the Voortrekkers. Over the Drakensbergen they have come back, to retake the land of their fathers.

The largest army which England has ever had on the battlefield in South Africa—over twenty thousand men, horse, foot and artillery, with powerful guns from British warships and with lyddite shells to help them—has been hurled back from the Upper Tugela line, losing two thousand men in killed, wounded and prisoners, and, also, eleven guns.

On the Tugela, where the fathers died in 1838, ay, and south of the Tugela, are the sons—now, on the 16th of December, 1899.

They are there with Lucas Meyer; with Louis Botha, whose mother was in the laager on the Bushmans River in 1838; and with Schalk Burger, whose father was outlawed and proscribed by the British Government, and went across Drakensberg, in 1842.

They stand on the Tugela, while, in the background, the great Drakensberg Mountains, where the snow-white everlastings grow, rear their topmost peaks above the clouds.

The British General has asked for an armistice to bury his dead—on the 16th of December—to bury his dead, in the very ground where rest some of the bones of the murdered Voortrekkers.

"Avenge Majuba!" the crowds have shouted, in London and at Durban and Cape Town. God has avenged Slachtersnek, instead.

J. C. Voigt.

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THE DANGER OF PERSONAL RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

BY MONTAGU WHITE, RECENTLY CONSUL-GENERAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC IN LONDON.

VARIOUS motives have been put forward to justify the war which is at present paralyzing the commercial, political and social life of South Africa. "Equal rights for all white men in the Transvaal," "No taxation without representation," "The redress of the Uitlanders' grievances," "The maintenance of British supremacy or paramountcy," are among the more plausible reasons advanced by the war party.

The disclaimer of Lord Salisbury, "We seek no territories, we seek no gold fields," provoked a storm of protest and explanation from the Unionist press, and will no doubt be carefully scrutinized at the conclusion of hostilities.

On the other hand, the war has been proclaimed inevitable on account of the "Great Dutch Conspiracy"—a theory suggested by two facts: first, the open and public arming of the Transvaal on an extensive scale since the Jameson Raid, and secondly, the action of the Orange Free State, unexpected by Great Britain, in joining the Transvaal in order to resist the extinction of the latter Republic by imperial aggression. This theory was eagerly adopted and developed in the interests of political opportunism, in order to cover the retreat of the clumsy diplomacy and the lack of statesmanship which has characterized the British negotiations with the South African Republic during the last four years. An elementary knowledge of South African conditions and sentiment is sufficient to banish this absurd "nightmare" from the area of serious controversy.

It would be impossible to discuss at length the various influ-

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ences and forces all heading straight for this war. It is only necessary to make a brief reference to some of the more important causes. First of all, a discontented and irreconcilable British element in Johannesburg was one of the most potent factors. This element was confronted by an original population of Dutch farmers, whose conservatism was intensified by sixty-five years of bitter experience of Great Britain. The sudden inrush of a mining, commercial and speculative community was a complicated problem which would have taxed the abilities and resources of the best organized administration in the world. Even Great Britain was at first unsuccessful in governing the smaller population of the Diamond Fields, for riots, bloodshed and anarchy characterized the early days of British administration in Griqualand West.

The clumsy diplomacy, to which reference has already been made, must not be lost sight of. Then there was a disappointed capitalistic politician, who had ruined his career as a statesman by an act of mad folly, and who was burning to be revenged on those whom he had bitterly wronged. Last, but not least, there were three immensely powerful but unavowed forces, which may be conveniently described as greed of gold, lust of empire and a thirst for revenge. The first was represented by Capitalism, in its pleas for a change in the administration of the Republic, which would result in higher dividends, based upon cheaper white labor and a modified system of black slavery. The second was voiced by the yellow press of London, and posed as Jingoism pure and simple; it was intoxicated but not satiated by the successes of Omdurman and Fashoda, and shouted loudly for the suppression of the two "nebulous" Republics which marred the symmetry of the South African map. The third was strikingly illustrated by the farewell cry of the crowd, "Remember Majuba!" as the troop-laden trains steamed out of the terminal stations in London.

There is another element, however, in the situation which must be kept steadily in view in apportioning the blame for this deplorable tragedy in South Africa. I refer to the growth of personal rule as embodied in the High Commissioner of South Africa.

For those who are unacquainted with local conditions, it may be necessary to explain that the supreme imperial representative in South Africa is the High Commissioner, who is at the same time Governor of the Cape Colony. In dealing with strictly Colonial matters, the High Commissioner, as Governor of the Cape Colony,

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is bound to act constitutionally with the advice and consent of his Colonial Ministers. His duties as High Commissioner, however, embrace the care of imperial interests in Rhodesia and Basutoland, as well as the conduct of negotiations with the Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State. In the exercise of these duties he would be technically correct in acting autocratically and in ignoring the views and advice of his Colonial Ministers. Whether he would be wise in acting in such a manner is quite another matter. Those who are intimately acquainted with the conditions in South Africa would unhesitatingly answer the question in the negative for the following reasons. It is impossible for the High Commissioner to take any important step in regard to either the Transvaal or the Orange Free State without its having very marked direct or indirect results in the Cape Colony and Natal, because the same racial sentiment and social conditions exist in the Free State and the Transvaal as in the Cape Colony and Natal. The countries are closely connected by the ties of blood and kinship.

The Boer in the Transvaal and in the Free State is almost exactly the same type as his kinsman in Natal and the Cape Colony. Some of the most progressive and liberal-minded Boers in South Africa are to be found in the districts of Ermelo, Wakker-Stroom and Utrecht, in the Transvaal, and in the districts of Winburg and Harrismith, in the Free State, while some of the most backward and uneducated types are subjects of Queen Victoria, living in the districts of Prince Albert, Carnarvon and Beaufort West. The Boers are practically the same throughout all South Africa; they inhabit the country districts; they are inclined to be conservative, averse to high taxation, intensely imbued with local patriotism and unaffected by imperial developments beyond the confines of South Africa. In a word, their political horizon is limited by the boundaries of South Africa. The local English, on the other hand, with the exception of a few farmers in the North-eastern Province of the Cape Colony and in the coast districts of Natal, are dwellers in towns, full of imperial patriotism and somewhat contemptuous of local politics, overflowing with zeal for imperial expansion, and singing "God Save the Queen," in season and out of season, not so much in the spirit of a prayer for the Sovereign as a trumpet-note of defiance to the Dutch.

The Dutch in the Cape Colony are perfectly loyal to and con-

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tent with British rule, and no dissatisfaction is expressed as long as their kinsmen in the Orange Free State and the South African Republic are left unmolested. They have always been opposed to changes in the Constitution, even to the substitution of responsible government for direct imperial rule. It is this very conservatism and contentment with British administration that would be an effective obstacle to any conspiracy for the purpose of introducing a Republican instead of a Colonial form of government. The Cape Colonial Dutch, who form quite three-fifths of the whole population, have seen their kinsmen oppressed, pursued, wronged and unsympathetically treated by Great Britain for nearly a hundred years, and they are extremely sensitive on this point. It is this vigilance and the very natural expression of dissatisfaction at England's constant violation of her pledges to their Republican brethren, which have been adduced as reasons to justify the theory of "Disloyalty" and the "Great Dutch Conspiracy" to which reference has already been made. The Cape Colony is the oldest settlement in South Africa, and the Colonial Ministers, fortified by local knowledge and permanent traditions, are perfectly justified in attempting to influence the High Commissioner, who, no matter how distinguished or able he may be, arrives at Cape Town a stranger, ignorant of local conditions and absolutely inexperienced as to South African politics. It will be readily conceded, therefore, that it is of the utmost importance that the High Commissioner of South Africa, as well as the Governor of Cape Colony, should be guided by the advice and experience of his Colonial Ministers, and should so shape his policy as to harmonize imperial ideals with colonial sentiment. Such a policy would tend toward confederation or union; it would strengthen and deepen the loyalty of the Cape Dutch; and while fully respecting the rights and the independence of the two Republics, would enable the latter to co-operate cordially with the Colonies in promoting the welfare of South Africa.

The history of the relations between the High Commissioners and the successive Cape Ministers since 1877 would yield very instructive results. It is, however, not possible now to do more than roughly sketch the outlines and characteristics of the different policies and attitudes adopted by the four imperial officers who have presided over the destinies of South Africa since 1877.

The following is a list of the High Commissioners, with a

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fairly correct indication of the duration of their successive terms of office: Sir Bartle Frere, 1877 to 1880; Sir Hercules Robinson, 1880 to 1889; Sir Henry Loch, 1889 to 1894; Sir Hercules Robinson, 1895 to 1897; Sir Alfred Milner, 1897.

Sir Bartle Frere was one of the most distinguished officers in the imperial service. His successful career in India entitled him to a far more important position than that of the High Commissionership of South Africa. He was, however, specially solicited by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, to accept the position in order to carry out his policy of confederation. As an inducement he was promised the position of the first Governor-General of United South Africa, with a salary of £10,000 a year. Sir Bartle Frere accepted the position, and in April, 1877, assumed the duties of High Commissioner. It must not be forgotten that he had been trained in the school of Indian administration, which is nothing more or less than a pure military despotism. In January, 1878, Imperialism and Colonialism came into conflict over the conduct of a colonial war with the Gcalekas, a Kafir tribe in the Transkei. He quarreled with his Ministers and took the high-handed course of dismissing them, and requesting Sir Gordon Sprigg, the leader of the opposition, but an untried politician, to form another Ministry. The personal popularity and prestige of Sir Bartle Frere enabled him to obtain from the Cape Parliament an indorsement of this arbitrary proceeding. But it was the first of the many fatal steps in his career of personal rule.

The triumph of personal rule then, as now, was marked by a trail of blood in every part of South Africa. Gcalekas, Gaikas, Tembus, Zulus, Basutos, and, ultimately, Boers, were sacrificed on the altar of autocratic power. The opposition to Sir Bartle Frere's policy spread from South Africa to Great Britain, and ultimately became so overwhelming that the British Government decided upon his recall in 1880, and a distinguished career was ended in disgrace.

His successor, Sir Hercules Robinson, arrived at the Cape at the end of 1880. His term of office was inaugurated by the outbreak of the Boer War of Independence, and he was thus confronted at the outset of his career by difficulties that certainly appeared insurmountable. Peace was concluded shortly after Majuba, and the Convention of 1881 restored to the Boers a very limited instalment of the independence which they had enjoyed under

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the Sand River Convention before the annexation of 1877. Long after the excitement of the war had subsided in the Transvaal and Free State, the reflex action of sympathy with their kinsmen made itself felt in the Cape Colony. The Cape Dutch awoke to political life, and there was much ferment and unrest, the direct outcome of indignation with the imperial Government in annexing and retaining the Transvaal, against the wish of its inhabitants, up to the climax of bloodshed. Sir Hercules Robinson's tenure of office also embraced that very critical period in South African history which culminated in the Bechuanaland Expedition and the settlement of the western border. The foregoing will indicate some of the difficulties which confronted him during his administration. The Dutch, now fully awake, had become a political power, and have controlled the fate of the different Ministries at the Cape from that time until the present moment. The uprising of Dutch sentiment was said to be originally inimical to British interests; under unwise or autocratic administration it might easily have been consolidated into an element of permanent hostility to Great Britain. But Sir Hercules Robinson, by working in harmony with his Ministers on strictly constitutional lines, succeeded in establishing a sane Imperialism on the broad basis of colonial sentiment. He rejected all ideas of personal rule, was sternly intolerant of Jingoism, Empire leagues and all the paraphernalia of a bastard Imperialism. When he arrived in Cape Town he found that Imperialism had been debased and was at its lowest ebb. It is no exaggeration to say that when he left, the prestige of true Imperialism was higher than it ever has been either before or since. The breach between English and Dutch was healed, and harmony and confidence characterized the relations between Great Britain and the Republics.

"Sir Hercules Robinson," President Krüger once exclaimed, "ah! he was a man of his word." His term of office really expired in 1885, but so successful had his administration been that he was asked to remain, and did so until 1889. Before leaving he made an important speech at Cape Town, of which the following extracts sufficiently indicate the lines of his policy:

"There are three competing influences in South Africa. They are Colonialism, Republicanism and Imperialism. As to the last, it is a diminishing quantity, there being now no longer any permanent place in the future of South Africa for direct imperial rule on any large

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scale. . . . The 'Governor-General in embryo,' of whom we have heard who is to administer, as in India, a system of personal as distinguished from Parliamentary rule, and round whom the several Colonies and States are to rally, will, I venture to think, remain permanently 'in embryo.' . . . There being then, as I have shown, no longer any permanent place in South Africa for direct imperial rule, and viewing it simply as an aid to colonial expansion, there remain only the competing influences of Colonialism and Republicanism. Whether these will always retain, as at present, their separate organisms, or whether one will, like Aaron's rod, absorb the other, is a problem which I will not attempt to discuss, but I venture to think that British Colonialism is very heavily handicapped in the race by the well-meant but mistaken interference of irresponsible and ill-informed persons in England. The tendency of such amateur meddling, to my mind, is injurious in the long run to the natives, while it makes every resident in the Republics—English as well as Dutch—rejoice in their independence, and converts many a colonist from an Imperialist into a Republican."

This speech created a sensation in England and was the subject of debates in Parliament and of leading articles in the press.

The *Times*, in its issue of the 6th of June, 1889, while taking exception to certain portions of the foregoing speech, advocated the return of Sir Hercules, and concluded its article as follows:

"No Governor of Cape Colony has as yet ever proved able to give perfect satisfaction to his two masters (the Colonial Office and the Cape Cabinet). Sir Hercules Robinson has completely contented the Colonists, which is, after all, the chief thing needful, and probably no one will reconcile better than he the conflicting duties of the position."

In 1893 Sir Hercules Robinson, in the course of a conversation on the subject of Swaziland and the Transvaal, remarked that experience at the Cape had convinced him that there was only one true way of governing South Africa, and that was through the Dutch. The Dutch were a permanent factor, intensely imbued with local patriotism, loyal to the Crown when their racial sentiments were not outraged, and perfectly easy to reconcile with a legitimate Imperialism. The English were, for the most part, townspeople; some of them rather deficient in local patriotism, but surcharged at times with inconvenient loyalty to England, which left them at the mercy of every irresponsible agitator who might appeal to racial passions. The High Commissioner should sternly discourage anything like racial cleavage and attain Imperialism by shaping it in accordance with local and Dutch sentiment. Such a policy might necessitate ignoring, if not repressing, the ultra-Loyalists of the English party. Sir Hercules Robinson

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concluded by saying that no one had strengthened his convictions in this direction more than Mr. Rhodes, whom he termed a "sound Afrikander." After his return to England this most important position in the British Empire was said to have been hawked about and cheapened before it was finally accepted by Sir Henry Loch, the Governor of Victoria. He entered upon his duties toward the end of 1889. Unlike Sir Hercules Robinson, who was cold and reserved in manner and somewhat indifferent to general social functions, Sir Henry Loch, like Sir Bartle Frere, possessed great personal charm and affability, while Government House soon became noted as a delightful social centre. But the influence of social charm does not extend much beyond Cape Town and its suburbs, whereas the policy of a High Commissioner makes itself felt in the remotest corners of South Africa. Sir Henry Loch had only been in Cape Town a short time when the impression, rightly or wrongly, got abroad that the new High Commissioner was hostile to President Krüger and to the Dutch Republic. In Johannesburg there was a certain amount of discontent owing to the depression, caused by the inevitable reaction after the great gold boom of 1889. Disappointed speculators, however, generally vent their spleen upon the administration, which in the Transvaal has always been a convenient scapegoat, especially during a slump in the market. But the dissatisfaction had hitherto been expressed within strictly constitutional limits. An event happened, in the early part of 1890, which caused a great deal of excitement. President Krüger was on a visit to Johannesburg, when a riot took place, the President being hissed and hooted, amid shouts of "God Save the Queen," and the Transvaal flag was hauled down and torn to shreds. The beginning of Sir Henry Loch's career may be said to have been marked in Johannesburg by a riot in 1890, and to have terminated by what was very nearly a serious disturbance at Pretoria in 1894. Sir Henry Loch, who had an insatiable appetite for conferences, proceeded to Pretoria to discuss Swaziland and other questions with the Republican Government. On his arrival at the station he was met by President Krüger and the members of the Executive. There was considerable excitement among the crowd and a disturbance took place. To quote Sir Henry Loch's description:

"When I entered the carriage with President Krüger, two men got on to the box with a Union Jack, and the crowd, notwithstanding the

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President's remonstrances, took the horses out and dragged the carriage to the hotel, a distance of nearly a mile, singing all the way, 'God Save the Queen' and 'Rule, Britannia.'"

It is not for an instant suggested that Sir Henry Loch was cognizant of or approved of these riotous proceedings. On the contrary, the latter incident must have been as embarrassing to him as it was annoying to President Krüger, but the impression prevailed, rightly or wrongly, that he was antagonistic to the Republic. Sir Hercules Robinson visited Pretoria at a far more critical time, in January, 1896, but his arrival and stay in Pretoria were not characterized by any untoward incident.

The relations of Sir Henry Loch with the Pretoria Government were not satisfactory; he was constantly sending impressive warnings to President Krüger, coupled with professions of the most friendly feelings. The same warnings and remonstrances were urged upon officials and friends of the Government during visits to Cape Town. Swaziland, in the meantime, which the Transvaal wished to absorb, was kept dangling before the Republic as a sort of bait to induce it to enter the customs union and to make concessions to the British. The result of this policy, however well meant, was deplorable, for Sir Henry Loch became profoundly distrusted in Pretoria, and his great charm of manner simply created an impression of duplicity. Notwithstanding the demonstration in Pretoria, Sir Henry Loch did not enjoy the entire confidence of the English population in the Transvaal, for the *Star,* an irreconcilable Uitlander and "anti-Boer" organ, characterized his administration as "feeble and fussy," an indorsement of what was said to be the verdict passed upon his tenure of office in Australia. But he was not only a victim of misunderstanding as far as the Boers were concerned; he appears to have been entirely misunderstood by so able and intelligent a representative of the Uitlanders as Mr. Lionel Phillips, by whom he was visited during his stay in Pretoria, in 1894. To quote from Mr. Phillips's letter to Mr. Wernher, of the firm of Wernher, Beit & Co., London:

"Sir Henry Loch (with whom I had two long private interviews alone) asked me some very pointed questions, such as what arms we had in Johannesburg; whether the population could hold the place for six days, etc., etc., and stated plainly that if there had been 3,000 rifles and ammunition here he would certainly have come over. He further informed me in a significant way that they had prolonged

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the Swazi agreement of six months, and said he supposed in that time Johannesburg would be better prepared, as much as to say, 'If things are safer then we shall actively intervene.' "

A peerage had been bestowed on Sir Henry Loch, and on the 1st of May, 1896, the date on which the foregoing letter from Mr. Lionel Phillips was first made public in Europe, he, as Lord Loch, made a statement in the House of Lords, in reference to the arming of Johannesburg, of which the following is an extract:

"To strengthen my position with the Deputation, I asked them what amount of arms they had at that time in Johannesburg. They informed me that they had 1,000 rifles, and that at the outside they did not believe they had ten rounds of ammunition per rifle. I then pointed out to them the situation, not as an encouragement to resist, but to show them what a futile measure it would be if any action on their part brought about disturbances and a consequent attack."

In the same statement Lord Loch admitted that he had taken steps to place certain imperial police on that fatal spot, the Bechuanaland border, in case disturbances arose in Johannesburg. In other words, preparations were made for an imperial raid into the Transvaal, to be justified as protection for British interests. With regard to Sir Henry Loch's relations with his Cape Ministers, it is no secret that there was constant friction on the very question of the conflicting interests involved in the two positions of High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony. Sir Henry Loch's tendencies were all in the direction of personal rule, but he was fortunately not a strong man, and his autocratic aims were qualified by prudence. To do him justice he was equally watchful of Mr. Rhodes, who exemplified at this stage of his career certain aspects of personal rule. Sir Henry Loch retired at the end of 1894, or beginning of 1895, and the choice of Lord Ripon, the Colonial Secretary, fell upon Sir Hercules Robinson as his successor.

The political conditions of South Africa had, however, sadly changed since 1889—the relations between the South African Republic and Great Britain were unsatisfactory; the racial cleavage in the Transvaal was very marked; the power and prestige of Mr. Rhodes had increased enormously; while the attitude of the Cape Dutch was one of renewed vigilance as to imperial designs upon the Transvaal. Sir Hercules Robinson was, moreover, an old man, and his health began to fail shortly after his arrival at the Cape. Had he been induced by Lord Knutsford to remain as High Commissioner after 1889 it would have been an act of the highest

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political wisdom and would no doubt have brought about marked and beneficial results upon the development of South Africa. But in 1895 matters had gone too far and he was powerless to avert the catastrophe of the Raid. He was deceived and kept in absolute ignorance of what was going on. Immediately after the Raid he proceeded to Pretoria, damped the revolutionary movement in Johannesburg and was the only imperial official who satisfied the Government at Pretoria of absolute *bona fides* in repudiating the action of the Raiders and Reformers. On the 4th of January, 1896, he telegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain: "I take this early opportunity of testifying in the strongest manner to the great moderation and forbearance of the Government of the South African Republic under the exceptionally trying circumstances." Sir Hercules Robinson left Pretoria on the 15th of January, having received the thanks of the Executive and Volksraad for his services. He had averted bloodshed in Johannesburg, for a collision at that time between the Boers and Uitlanders would have been an awful catastrophe. "I have been confronted by many difficulties," he once said, "but I have one formula which I have never known to fail, and that is, Do what is right." Imperial prestige, imperial honor and imperial dignity had been lowered and dragged in the mire by Dr. Jameson, Mr. Rhodes, and afterward by Mr. Chamberlain. It is safe to assert that if any shred of imperial dignity and honor was preserved in South Africa, it was due to the integrity and high-mindedness of Sir Hercules Robinson. He successfully withstood Mr. Chamberlain's efforts at inopportune interference and his wish to use force as a remedy in South Africa, but his health completely broke down, and after a visit to England in 1896, when he was raised to the Peerage as Lord Rosmead, he retired from the position early in 1897. Mr. Chamberlain selected Sir Alfred Milner as the new High Commissioner.

The latter had enjoyed the distinction of a brilliant university career at Oxford; he had served on the staff of a well-known newspaper; he had been an unsuccessful candidate for Parliamentary honors; but he first came into prominence as Mr. Goschen's secretary, and cemented his success by the ability with which he had discharged the duties of Under Secretary of Finance in Egypt.

His appointment was greeted by a perfect chorus of approval. The Unionist press vied with the Radical journals in extolling his moderation, his tact, his impartiality, his patience, and his

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personal charm. The newspapers and society united in attributing to him just those qualities which were needed to deal with the delicate situation which had arisen in South Africa. Here and there, however, a doubtful note was sounded as to the wisdom of Mr. Chamberlain's choice. One view—that of a Conservative—was that Sir Alfred Milner's success in life lay in the fact of his being a courtier, who placed his abilities and entire energies at the service of his chiefs, and that he had thereby gained their affection, esteem and support. He had proved a most capable official and administrator in a subordinate position, but it was doubted whether he was fitted for a position of such responsibility and power as that involved in the High Commissionership.

A Radical view of Sir Alfred Milner, expressed immediately after the appointment was made, was to the effect that, although he possessed all the good qualities which had been enumerated by an appreciative press, yet these were neutralized and even rendered dangerous by the fact that he was a Jingo of the most pronounced type. It was feared that he might easily be led to the conviction that force was the only remedy for the distracting conditions of the South African problem. If he did adopt that conclusion, nothing would stop him, and his reputation for moderation and patience would make him all the more dangerous in influencing public opinion.

Sir Alfred Milner's experiences in Egypt, which are set forth in his work, "England in Egypt," were hardly a happy omen to South Africa. The influence of British domination may have proved distinctly beneficent in Egypt, but the administration is a military despotism. The coercion of the fellaheen, the intimidation of the Khédive and the Egyptian pashas by threats and a display of military force are hardly the methods necessary for governing the descendants of the Dutch who had successfully withstood the might of Spanish Philip, or of the Huguenot emigrants who had refused to bow to the imperious will of Louis XIV. An experience of military despotism in India had not produced happy results in the case of Sir Bartle Frere. When Sir Alfred Milner arrived at the Cape in June, 1897, Sir Gordon Sprigg—who had proved to be such a passive instrument in the hands of Sir Bartle Frere—happened to be Prime Minister. It is interesting to observe that Sir Gordon Sprigg was among the first, if not the very first, to raise publicly, as an electioneering cry, the question of

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British supremacy in South Africa. For this, curiously enough, he was roundly rebuked by the *Times,* which afterward adopted this shibboleth as one of its favorite battle cries. To return to Sir Alfred Milner. A speech made by him at Graaff Reinet in the Cape Colony clearly indicated his anti-Transvaal bias, and a subsequent speech at Swellendam foreshadowed the exercise of personal rule by the importance which the speaker attached to the High Commissionership as distinguished from the Governorship of the Cape Colony. Much to the consternation of Sir Alfred Milner, the elections of 1898 resulted in the defeat of the Progressives and in the triumph of the Afrikander Bond under Mr. Schreiner. It is probable that the relations between Mr. Schreiner and the High Commissioner were unsatisfactory from the very first, and that the personal rule of the latter began from that moment to make itself felt in South Africa. Sir Alfred Milner paid a short visit to England in the beginning of 1899 for the purpose, it has been stated, of urging a policy of force upon the British Government. During his absence the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape, Sir William Butler, acted as High Commissioner, and, following the example of Sir Hercules Robinson, worked harmoniously with the Cape Ministry on constitutional lines. His short tenure of office was marked by three important incidents. First of all, he refused to receive a petition to the Queen, organized by the South African League at Johannesburg. Secondly, he warned the Imperial Government against accepting the statements of this mischievous body, and, thirdly, he made a speech at Grahamstown in which he declared that South Africa was in need of rest, and did not require a surgical operation. Upon Sir Alfred Milner's return, Sir William Butler's policy was immediately reversed. The South African League got up another petition, this time ostensibly containing 21,000 signatures. It was unreservedly accepted by Sir Alfred Milner and forwarded to the Imperial Government. He co-operated with the South African League, and every one will admit that a very serious surgical operation is now being performed in South Africa as the outcome of his policy. Sir William Butler was recalled.

Space does not permit any discussion about the abortive Bloemfontein conference, which, in Sir Alfred Milner's spirit of no compromise and "irreducible minimums," was doomed to failure from the very first. Compromise is the essence of South African

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politics, and, with the exception of the annexation in 1877, had characterized all the transactions between the Imperial Government and the South African Republic since 1852. Sir Alfred Milner's astounding dispatch of May 5, 1899, with its reference to "helots" and "festering sores," and its cravings for a "striking proof" of imperial power, must also be passed over. His career was now nothing else but a triumphant development of personal rule. He absolutely ignored his Colonial Ministers, and treated them as traitors; the clergymen of the Dutch Reformed Church and the majority of the Cape Parliament, in their efforts for peace, suffered the same fate. "I am determined to break the power of Afrikanderdom," he arrogantly informed Mr. Molteno, the delegate of the Cape members. It was this spirit which induced him to cable over *in extenso* all the inflammatory resolutions of reactionary associations, and to suppress information as to the pacific endeavors of President Steyn, satisfying his official conscience by a meaningless summary of important communications. A further incident will illustrate the arbitrary nature of his rule. Endeavors were made by a section of the Cape people to induce Sir Alfred Milner to petition Queen Victoria to send one of her characteristic messages to the Cape Dutch, who were placed in a position of agonizing difficulty. The person of the Queen is held in the highest veneration by the Dutch throughout all South Africa. Her qualities as a noble woman, leading a simple life, and as a pattern mother, appeal strongly to the Dutch, and it was felt that a kindly message from the Queen would have the most beneficial effect upon the Cape Dutch. It is reported that Sir Alfred Milner haughtily refused, and concluded by saying that he had made up his mind that there was no room for two white races in South Africa. Such a statement would be incredible were it not that Sir Alfred Milner's proceedings during the six months before the war have been characterized by the maddest folly. His acts have been an eloquent falsification of the attributes of tact, moderation, prudence, patience and impartiality, which were so abundantly postulated at the time of his appointment.

At Bloemfontein he was advocating democratic constitutionalism to President Krüger in order to assure British ascendency in the Transvaal. At the Cape, on the other hand, in the interests of the same ascendency, he was using all means in his power to

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override and crush constitutionalism by contemptuously ignoring the Dutch majority in Parliament, and treating their Ministers as traitors. It seems as if the Dutch had to be ground between the lower and the nether millstones. What a commentary on the cry of equal rights! What an outcome of the policy of reconciling the two races! The irony would be ludicrous if it were not overshadowed by the grim tragedy of suffering. Constitutionalism has once more been defied, and personal rule is again triumphant, and, just as in the time of Sir Bartle Frere, its success is marked by bloodshed and carnage.

The various forces and influences which have been allowed to flow unchecked in the direction of this deplorable war have been briefly touched upon. But there are three persons—Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Alfred Milner, and Mr. Rhodes, each in himself an exemplification of the danger of autocratic power—who have a large and direct responsibility for this calamity.

The power of the High Commissioner, if unchecked by constitutionalism, is almost supreme in South Africa, while the prestige of the position and the paramount importance attached to the office in England are sufficiently great to impose a salutary check upon the dangerous interference of the Imperial Parliament, as well as upon autocratic or inopportune intervention on the part of the British Colonial Secretary.

Sir Alfred Milner has had magnificent opportunities for doing beneficent imperial work in South Africa. But instead of using his great influence in removing the distrust and unrest in South Africa, which were intensified by the clumsy diplomacy of Mr. Chamberlain after the Raid; instead of checking and sternly repressing mischievous and reactionary organizations like the South African League, of which Mr. Rhodes is the President; instead of ignoring and discountenancing the frenzied efforts of the local newspapers, which are largely controlled by Mr. Rhodes, he appears to have utilized all these baneful forces for the purpose of bringing about this disastrous war in South Africa, the far-reaching consequences of which no man is able to foresee.

MONTAGU WHITE.

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GERMAN FEELING TOWARD ENGLAND AND AMERICA.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SIDNEY WHITMAN, F. R. G. S., AND PROFESSOR THEODOR MOMMSEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BERLIN.

[In response to a request of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, Mr. Sidney Whitman, the well-known authority upon German affairs, submitted the following questions to Professor Theodor Mommsen, eliciting from the famous historian the cogent communication published herewith, which is accompanied, in accordance with Professor Mommsen's express desire, by Mr. Whitman's letter.—EDITOR.]

December 12, 1899.

HONORED SIR: There is no historian living whose judgment on great political questions commands such universal respect as your own. This is due not only to an amount of erudition which even in Germany is unrivalled, but also to the unflinching fearlessness you have ever shown in the formation and upholding of your opinions.

During a long and distinguished life devoted to study, after pursuing your researches into the remotest detail in the life of nations in byegone ages, you have been able to draw broad conclusions of inestimable value concerning the rise and fall of civilization. May I, therefore, venture to appeal to you, on behalf of all those who seek enlightenment from a dispassionate source, to favor me with your views upon the following pressing questions of the hour:

(1.) What is the feeling of academic Germany toward the United States, and what ulterior effect upon the future relations between the United States and Germany do you anticipate from the colonial expansion of the former?

(2.) What is your opinion of the present feeling in Germany toward England—more especially in connection with South Afri-

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can troubles? What effect, in a broad, historical sense, is the present war, in your estimation, likely to exercise upon the political future of England and the British Empire?

With deep respect,

Your faithful servant,

SIDNEY WHITMAN.

Professor Theodor Mommsen, Berlin.

DEAR SIR: It is but too true that the relations, or let me say the sympathies, between Englishmen and Germans have undergone a great and a sad change in the half-century upon which I look back.

When I was a young man, England appeared to us as the asylum of progress, the land of political and intellectual liberty, of well-earned prosperity. We thought the English unwritten Constitution a model one. We rejoiced when Settembrini and Kinkel were able to put their feet on British soil. We sneered with Byron, we laughed with Dickens. We did not quite overlook the reign of King Cant, the commercial egotism; the officers buying their commissions and the privates bought; there was plenty of ignorance and illusion in our English feelings; many a London tailor has been admired in Germany as a living lord. But the horizon, especially in politics, was very dark in every other corner; we held on to the small blue spot ruling the waves. The general feeling in Germany was that Englishmen were happier than Germans, and certainly in politics our betters; and if they were not overcourteous, the which we were not blind to, they had some right to despise their Continental cousins.

Now the tables are turned, the illusions have vanished. The radical defects of the English system, the trampling on nations subjugated and despised, and the prevalence of money interests, the leaving of the defense of the country to the billows and to the tars, all this has become too evident. We begin to doubt if Britain, even Greater Britain, may in the long run be able to cope with the great nations of Europe and America. But it is not only that judgment has changed; Englishmen themselves have done much to change the German feeling.

Bismarck is a witness you will admit. He writes in a private letter, "To the question whether I am Russian or Western European, I have always answered that I am Prussian. Concern-

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ing foreign countries I have only felt sympathy for England and its inhabitants; and even now I am at times not free from it; but they will not allow us to like them." This is but too true. The English have done their best to get hated in Germany, and they have been successful.

No German caring for politics can forget the English meddling during the question of the Elbe Duchies* and the Franco-German war. I am not recriminating, but stating a fact. No political necessity obliged Great Britain to side with our adversaries. Denmark is regarded as an English dependency, and Paris as the summer residence of the rich English. It is easier to forget the battles than your diplomacy.

Our commerce and our industry are increasing. It is not easy for the English to bear with equanimity a competitor fifty years ago unheard of; we acknowledge also that still in the present time England, true to its ancient and honorable traditions, opens to the stranger every harbor it obtains. But with the remains of the old system is combined a series of petty annoyances which the upstart resents. Is it true or not that the old contempt of Germans and Germany has been not changed to envy, but coupled with it? We are not likely to forget the taunt of "Made in Germany."

If we could forget, every day your public press would remind us: it has got to be a public nuisance, like its Parisian sister. Have you read the article in your *Navy and Army Illustrated*, published a fortnight ago, and holding forth—in these days of the South African War—about the German mercenaries and their military capacity? Regarding German Africa, every day brings us treacherous fiction and hateful innuendoes from the London papers; an English notice about a disaster in our African colonies has become a byword for a lie.

I have not the pretension either to lay down the results of our Colonial system, which certainly are extremely shadowy and full of very loyal, but also very unsolid, fancies; nor to be spokesman for the academic public in Germany, and still less for my country. But as far as I know, every German is at heart with the Boers, and that not because their cousinship is a little closer than the English, but partly because the hate against your countrymen has reached fearful and, I must add, unjust dimensions; partly be-

* The conflict between Denmark and the combined forces of Germany and Austria concerning the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein is here referred to.

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cause this war is not only, as every war is, a calamity, but also an infamy. The repetition of Jameson's Raid by the English Government (I won't say by the English nation) dictated by banking and mining speculations, is the revelation of your moral and political corruption, and of your military and political weakness. If there remains still in England some wisdom and some patriotism, it would send Mr. Chamberlain to Coventry to elaborate there his three-cousin system, and accord to a wronged people not only the peace, but the full sovereignty they have a right to. This is certainly not business-like, but it would be a moral victory, effacing every military defeat.

Regarding the relations between the United States of America and Germany, certainly we have not forgotten the glorious time of the great Frederick and of General Steuben. We do not at all look upon the powerful Republican Confederation as an appendix of the British nation. The millions of Germans who have found a German home across the ocean form a link between Americans and Germans which is absolutely wanting with the English. There is no name more popular in Germany than that of Carl Schurz, as good a German patriot as he is an American one. But as far as I can see, the Monroe Doctrine holds good not only in America, but also in Europe. I mean to say, that in politics the two parts of the world are not intimately connected. This, however, will probably be changed by the new state of things created by the breaking up of China and the consequences of the Spanish-American war. A change of internal American politics, involving a revolution in military and naval matters, is imminent. May it bring to the States not only greater extension, but also greater force and good luck. I am certainly a well-wisher, but as certainly no prophet.

Yours truly,

MOMMSEN.

Sidney Whitman, Esq.

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THE TRUST IN POLITICS.

BY W. A. PEFFER, FORMERLY UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR KANSAS.

I.

INDUSTRY is now so greatly diversified, commerce so widely spread, and trade so active, that all the people are interested in what concerns any portion of them. It is well, therefore, that the trust question is to be taken up by the voters as a political issue in the approaching Presidential campaign.

The main contention is this: That no profession, trade, occupation, business or calling shall be permitted to operate to the public injury; and it is fortunate that upon this principle men and women of all parties and creeds are agreed. It gives us reason for hope that the discussion will be conducted on higher and broader ground than is usually occupied by disputants in the consideration of partisan issues. It is not to be expected that party feeling will be wholly eliminated from the debate; it will appear, doubtless, when the parties cross one another's tracks in their search for remedies to remove or check the evils complained of.

Not to be technical, but taking the common understanding of the people, a trust may be defined as "an organization formed mainly for the purpose of regulating the supply and price of commodities."

The force of the objection to trusts lies in the danger to be apprehended from an improper use of their power. They may interfere with commerce, through their ability to corner the market or to secure advantages in transportation; they may operate in politics through pecuniary aid to party committees and candidates; they may influence legislation through hired lobbyists; they may affect the decisions of courts through the influence of learned lawyers.

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We have with us, at the same time, another great power to be reckoned with, a power possessed by the working people, the greatest of all human powers, commercially speaking. It is the power to quit work. The Bricklayers' Union, for example, or the Carpenters' Union, by stopping the work of building in a large city, may occasion more trouble there than the Sugar Trust could do by levying tribute on the people through an advance in the sugar market; and a general strike among railway men would be more hurtful to trade than anything that the Standard Oil Company has ever done.

The complaint of working people against trusts is not that they oppress labor, but that they lessen the demand for it. Travelling men, for instance, complain that many of their number have been relieved from duty since the trust epoch appeared. This operates hardly on the unfortunate men who are put out of employment, but the public—the people at large, who have to pass upon the trust question—have suffered no injury on that account. This is just what has been going on all the time wherever invention and enterprise have displaced old methods and substituted new and better ones. Much as we may feel for the people who have lost their places by reason of the formation of these gigantic trade organizations, are we justified in regarding their cases as outside the ordinary rules of business? Is anybody bound to employ help that he does not need? If a farmer, after purchasing a gang plough, a seed drill and a self-binding reaper, discharges a hand or two that he does not need longer, is he culpable? If the relations of these people were reversed, would not the travelling men and the farm hands do just what the trust manager and the farmer did?

Whatever injury has resulted from displacement of labor and the closing of shops by the trusts thus far has been of a private character. It has not affected the public credit injuriously, nor has it diminished the volume of our trade either at home or abroad. We are now doing a larger business among ourselves than ever before, and the value of our exports of manufactured goods has increased 110 per cent. during the last ten years.

II.

An important element in the trust problem is the consumer's interest in trade. We are, each and all of us, consumers, and as

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such we are interested in the wages and profits of other people just as we are in our own calling and income. We are working for other people, whether we are hired or conducting business of our own; and other people are working for us, whether they are hired or doing business on their own account. No man liveth unto himself. No man makes everything he uses and no one uses everything he makes. The farmer sells all he raises excepting what is required for his home supply; the manufacturer retains but little of the wares he makes; and that is true of all producers—they get their income out of their output. About five of every one hundred persons of the adult population of the United States are engaged in collecting and distributing the surplus productions of the people. The world is fast coming under the dominion of trade, the great conqueror, and wages and prices are steadily approaching a common level. The laborer is worthy of his hire, and the consumer is entitled to procure his supplies at reasonable prices. When this rule prevails in practice, we shall have found the level of justice and the trust problem will have been solved.

Through the methods in vogue a hundred years ago, the wants of the people of the present time could not be supplied at all. We are outgrowing old ways in almost everything. The railway, the big factory and the department store are reducing prices to consumers and multiplying comforts to the multitude. Although selfish to the last degree, they are pioneers in a commercial reform which is to make living easier and life more lovable. They are teachers, too, demonstrating the truth of the axiom that in union there is strength. And the people are learning. If the amalgamation of a hundred little shops into one large establishment reduces the cost and improves the quality of watches and wagons and shoes and sugar, why not gather a hundred little banks into one and thus reduce the cost of borrowed money? Why not concentrate the business of merchandizing and reduce the cost of store goods in general? Why should not the farmers combine, throwing a hundred or a thousand farms under one management, dispensing with needless machinery and labor, reducing cost of production, while easing the burdens of toil and adding to the comforts of life? Look at the daily newspaper, a compendium of the world's passing history, collected in twenty-four hours by an association of news-gatherers—a feat impossible of accomplishment by individual effort. The constantly increasing wants of consumers

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stimulate invention. Note the evolution of machines and implements. Through the development of the barrow and the canoe, the oar and the wheel, we have the railway train and the ocean steamer. A modern locomotive will draw twenty thousand bushels of wheat, and fifteen such train-loads can be easily carried in one of our largest steamers. The mowing machine cuts more grass than five men could do with scythes; the self-binding reaper does the work of a dozen men with cradles and rakes; and the combined harvester, in ten hours, cuts, threshes and bags the wheat grown on twenty-five to forty acres of ground. The old wagon maker who, with his axes, saws, rasps, drawing-knife and plane, fashioned the woodwork of three or four wagons in a year, has given way to the big company that employs a thousand hands with machines capable of turning out a complete wagon every hour. The sewing machine makes stitches more neatly and speedily than ten of the nimblest hands with needles. One man on the linotype is equal to five average hands at the printer's case, and a sextuple printing machine with three attendants runs off papers faster than a thousand men and boys could do it with Washington hand presses. On the general average, one hand accomplishes as much now as five did under the old hand system. And in addition to the improvement in the efficiency of labor, we are now saving of what formerly went to waste—enough to furnish employment to many thousands of people, in working it into useful commodities that are distributed in all parts of the world.

This concentration of energy, from which the world is receiving so much benefit, is but the operation of the law of progress. The wrecks which have been strewn in its wake indicate the cost of the world's betterment.

The travelling man is employed by the house he works for, but his wages are paid by the people that the house trades with. Loss of this employment falls heavily on the victim, but the public sustains no injury by reason of the change, and will probably so report during the campaign. The trusts are proper subjects for study and criticism, and the fact that they are to be made an issue in politics is proof conclusive that their business is looked upon by the people as being of a public character and in need of public oversight and supervision. But abuse of the trusts will not drive them out of business; it will not determine the questions involved in their existence, nor will it open the way to work. Denuncia-

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tion may add to the vigor of arraignment, but a verdict without evidence will not stand. If the trusts do nothing worse than relieve from duty some persons whose salaries have been paid by the public, there is no case against them that the people will care to meddle with.

However, these travelling men, if they are idle and unable to find work to do, have a case, as have all other idle people who want to earn their living by honorable toil. Every man has the right to live, and he ought to have an opportunity to earn his subsistence. The man with energy and brains is resourceful and will work his way, rising as he goes. But the average man is timid and will push only in company with others; if he is dropped out he is lost. The way of the poor man now is beset with difficulties.

III.

The individual counts for little in the great aggregate. The man is merged in the mass, and the mass moves with commercial tides as waves are moved by the tides of the sea. At high tide in business, all willing hands may be employed; at low tide, some must be idle, and these changes will probably be more marked in the future than they have been in the past, because of the massing of trade forces in these great commercial aggregations.

The people at large are very much interested in this phase of the trust question; for, after all, the public, in one way or another, has to take care of such as cannot help themselves. Trades unions have been and are a refuge to many of the unfortunate idle; but members of the unions are themselves in other people's employ, and they cannot afford to throw out the life line to every poor castaway left adrift by receding business waves. The great, big-hearted and full-handed public, in the end, gathers in the waifs and feeds them, clothes them and keeps them warm.

Combination is not, of itself, an offense, nor is it a crime to favor such a regulation of commerce as will ensure fair returns for labor and capital. Farmers, proverbially the most conservative class, are studying the art of combination. The Patrons of Husbandry (commonly called "The Grange") began their organization in 1867. The Farmers' Alliance and several other similar bodies were formed within the next ten years. Live stock companies with large capital operated during the eighties, and now we read of proposed combinations of cotton planters, wheat

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growers and stockmen. These farmers are seeking, and will eventually find, the sort of union they need—an organization large and strong enough to help its members over the hard places, so that, together, they shall be able to hold their products at pleasure and feed the market as it needs.

It is the essential purpose of labor organizations to regulate the supply and wages of labor. The principle involved is exactly the same as that which is urged by railway companies and other powerful commercial bodies—to regulate supply and price. The principle is right, it is basic, fundamental, and must be recognized in law and jurisprudence before we shall have peace in the commercial world. But who shall have charge of the regulating processes? To whom shall we entrust this beneficent work? Surely not to a half-dozen interested men, but to representatives of the great body of the people. The founders of the Republic, in their third grant of power to the National Congress, specifically mentioned "commerce among the several States." If this does not include power to prevent private persons, companies and corporations from regulating supply and prices, the Constitution of the United States ought to be so amended that it would.

It will not be disputed that, up to certain stages in the evolution of trade, private agencies for doing work are to be preferred before those of the State. But, in many instances, a time comes when the public interests require a change from private to public management. Banking was once a mere agency for the safe keeping of depositors' moneys or other valuables. The postal system originated in the private carriage and distribution of personal communications. Railroads were first constructed for purely private uses. Government itself was begun in the family. But now all the great nations exercise supervision over banking institutions. In the United States we have national banks, issuing notes printed only at the Treasury Department and based on the public credit. The Government carries letters a thousand miles or more at two cents apiece; railroads have become great public highways, and the Government extends over millions of people.

And the time may come, forced forward by the cupidity of manufacturers, merchants and traders, when, in order to secure justice to labor and capital alike, to producer, carrier and consumer—to the whole people, that is to say—it shall be necessary to

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reorganize some of the leading industries, to the extent at least that they shall be subject to Governmental surveillance, as banks and railways now are.

IV.

Combination is in many instances necessary, not only in private but in public affairs as well. As farmers combine at a barn-raising or a log-rolling, so do citizens of all occupations and from all parts of the country go together in response to a call from the President for volunteers. The most complete and powerful of all combinations—amounting, in fact, to an absolute monopoly—is the National Government. It illustrates the trust principle when carried to its extreme limit. Government makes laws for people's guidance, it interprets the laws and executes them. It may, and does, take private property for public use; it may draft a citizen into the public service; it may imprison for violation of law; and it may sell property for the satisfaction of private debts. The Government assumes to settle, in its own way, disputes between citizens of different States. The Government is supreme in its power over all people and property within its jurisdiction.

This giant among monopolies, however, did not grow of itself; nor is it the creature of avarice brought into being for purposes of pecuniary gain at the expense of the purchasing public. It is a great political machine, made up of congruous parts skilfully designed by proficient architects, fashioned and put together by master builders, according to plans and specifications approved by the people of the United States for their own especial use and benefit. This ponderous instrument, now operating for seventy-five million people, at a yearly cost of half a billion dollars, is the people's agent for expressing, interpreting and executing their will. It is moved according to rules and regulations which they, through their regularly appointed representatives, have provided; and these are all written in the Constitution of the United States, which every officer, before he enters upon the discharge of his official duties, solemnly swears to support. Query: If the people can handle their own immense business thus easily, is there any reason to doubt their ability to provide such rules and regulations for the government of trusts and other trade machines as will keep them within lawful and reasonable limits?

The fact that the power of wealth in the hands of strong men

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may be used for doing evil is not sufficient reason why they should be shorn of their power for doing good. The proper thing to do is, as far as possible, to prevent them from doing harm.

As to the matter of regulating prices, justice demands it; but it must be done by authority of the people and through their agents. Trade is a public matter, and its regulation is a function to be exercised only by public functionaries.

Regulating price does not mean fixing price. It is not contended that the National Congress or a State Legislature may prescribe the prices at which commodities shall be sold or bought, excepting, of course, articles made or owned by the General or State Government; but they can at least provide for the enforcement of the common law rule that prices shall not be exorbitant or unreasonable. Congress is explicitly empowered to regulate commerce among the several States, and the power has been frequently exercised. The Interstate Commerce law and the Anti-Trust law have both been held good by the Supreme Court. But they do not cover the whole ground. They are only the first and second steps in an advance movement, and they will be followed by others as the way is made clear by discussion. Producers want a lean market and high prices, while consumers would have a full market and low prices. The workingman asks for steady work and honest wages, and the capitalist demands a fair profit on his investment. The merchant is after business, the carrier wants trade; the speculator, being no respecter of persons, wants victims. We all want a comfortable living, and if we are temperate, industrious and honest, we are entitled to it. There is enough for all, both of labor and supplies, when we secure an equitable adjustment of industrial forces.

States, within their spheres, can do much toward a settlement of the pending difficulties, but the greater work will have to be done by the Congress of the United States under its authority to "regulate commerce," and under the additional authority granted in Clause 18, of Section 8, of Article 1, of the Constitution, which empowers Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof."

Any and all articles produced, manufactured or prepared any-

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where within the jurisdiction of the United States for general consumption here or elsewhere, or to be transported beyond the limits of the State or Territory where made, produced, manufactured or prepared, ought to be declared by law to be an article of interstate commerce and within the jurisdiction of Congress. If this is not held to be within the constitutional power of Congress, the remedy is by amendment to the Constitution.

A new executive department is needed—the Department of Commerce, with a Cabinet Secretary or a commission at its head, supplied with necessary administrative machinery, specially charged with the execution of laws enacted to secure freedom for commerce and justice in trade.

Senators and Representatives will have to deal with these various phases of the commercial situation and provide a national system, which, under direction of a Governmental department, will gradually bring the conflicting elements into a harmoniously working whole.

W. A. PEFFER.

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SOME NOVELS OF 1899.

BY W. E. HENLEY.

A NATION has its day-dreams, even as men and women have theirs; and when it takes, in Balzac's phrase, to smoking enchanted cigarettes, as, if it means to go on being a nation, it must and will, then the enchanted cigarettes it smokes are inevitably common in make and of a general flavor. When Elizabeth was King, for instance, we English sought and found relief in blank-verse plays, and sugared sonnets, and lyrics amatorious and vain. Under the blessed Restoration, we imported much tobacco from France (with some from Spain), and were greatly addicted to "satyr" and the comedy of manners. Then, Messrs. Pope and Addison aiding, our humor changed, and we were all for didactic verse, the amiable essay, the stately yet insufferable five-act tragedy. Meanwhile Defoe had come, and Mrs. Behn, and Manley of "The New Atlantis;" and hard on their heels came Richardson with "Pamela" and "Clarissa," and a new view of *das Ewig Weiblich*; came Henry Fielding, with such inventions in art, such achievements in observation, such masterpieces of execution, as "Jonathan Wild," as "Tom Jones," as "Joseph Andrews" and "Amelia;" came Smollett, with his excellent eye for new material, his capacity for comic narrative, his brilliant and taking gift of farce; and with these masters came the mob of imitators of whom you read in Mr. Raleigh's learned and admirable "Short Sketch of the English Novel;" and Sir Walter arose, and Miss Austen, Miss Edgeworth and Miss Burney; and only the "Fiction" brand of enchanted cigarettes has had a lasting vogue in England for a hundred years.*

* Since Scott, too, who says the English Novel says Dickens and Thackeray, says Marryatt and Lever, says Bulwer and G. P. R. James, says Irving and Hawthorne and the incomparable Edgar Allen Poe, says Trollope and Ainsworth, and the Brontés and Mrs. Gaskell and Mrs. Oliphant, and James Payn, and the Kingsleys, and R. L. Stevenson: to name but these among the dead. I think there is no such list of names in the literature

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And now the English novel is upon us like a visitation from the sea: obliterating districts, changing the face of provinces. To none, save perchance the Author of Evil, has it been revealed how many are written in a year. The disconcerting and amazing thing is in the number that get into print. There are half a hundred publics for novels—that is the fact; so that this immense and ever-waxing output is, when one thinks of it, not so wonderful after all. There are scores of publics, I take it, between Mr. Meredith's, on the one level, and Mr. Hocking's or Miss Annie Swan's on the other; and under these latter there are subterranities! The mind reels from the vision. No Dante has ever made the journey; and if a Dante should be ever found, who would, who could, do duty as his Virgil? In truth, there is nothing to be said about these uncharted, undistinguished Circles. *Non ragionam di lor,* but, without even looking, pass with the inevitable, incontrovertible reflection that there is never an English-speaking subject of the Queen—nor, it may truthfully be asserted, an English-speaking elector of the President of the United States—who, whatever his age, and his calling, and his type of sentiment, has not his enchanted cigarette, in a hundred varieties, ready to his hand; to be smoked at any hour of the day or night, in such circumstances as he, being a man and master of his fate, may be able to control.

The public then is by no means one and indivisible—like the Republic. On the contrary, it is one and manifold. It is figured as a great organism which buys (or borrows) and reads; but it should rather be figured as a multiform "globe of continents;" as one of these Japanese boxes, which seem to be singular, and are plural; being composed of a more or less imposing shell, which contains a sequence of boxes made in its image, but each one smaller than the last; the essential difference consisting, of course, in the fact that the public is a live thing, while the box is a dead one. And to this difference is due the circumstance that a good writer and good novelist is very often felt to some extent a great way outside the limits of the particular public which happens to be his. As thus—and here I must fall into my anecdotage, and tell a tale once told to me. The late R. L. Stevenson began, as we all remember, as a kind of literary cherub; he wrote delightful

of any country in the world; and if I began upon the living, Meredith, Barrie, Kipling . . . But, no! The Intelligent Reader may compile *that* list for himself.

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essays on morals; he was responsible for books of sentimental travel, which were a joy to the memory and to the mind; he had a public of his own, which believed and rejoiced in him, and said so. But he felt that he was, as I have said, a literary cherub—a head and a pair of wings, with nothing to sit down upon; he hated the idea; he longed to be something more than the darling of a literary set; and in the end—a good genius appearing in the person of Dr. Jack—he got his chance, and he planted "Treasure Island" on a journal called (if I mistake not) "Young Folks' Paper." 'Twas a capital print of its kind, and its editor and proprietor* was a very able and intelligent man; but the public to which it was addressed was inconceivably larger and less lettered than any to which Stevenson had hitherto appealed. But it suited him—so he thought—to a nicety; he did his best for it; and when Billy Bones, and Pew, and Captain Silver had "done their pitch," he wrote "The Black Arrow" for it; and when that had gone the way of all serials, he gave to it the first of David Balfour and Alan Breck. The result was at once illuminating and strange. I do not know that Stevenson, the story-teller, ever did better than he did in at least two of these three tales. Yet his public would none of him; his public, drenched and drugged with imitations of Marryatt and Mayne Reid—with "Jack Harkaway the Mid," and "Miguel the Marksman," "The Gitano of Puerto del Sol"—received his advances with a chastened air of doubt, and considered his effects with a most "austere regard of control." In brief, he was but a *succès d'estime;* and you would have thought that he had worked in vain. But he had not. The masters who wrought for "Young Folks' Paper" were (so Stevenson told me) in no wise model citizens; they had their weaknesses, and (on his editor's report) were addicted to the use of strong waters, so that they had to be literally hunted for their copy. But, being writers, they were a level or two above the public for which they wrote. That public had seen little or nothing in Stevenson; they saw a great deal, and in his imitators Stevenson had, I believe, a very considerable success with a circle of readers which began by politely disdaining him. He had paid in gold, and his gold was not recognized as current coin until it was turned into copper. The currency was debased? Of course

* His name was Henderson: A Scotchman and a radical. I rather think that he is dead; but, dead or alive, he is a person for whom I have a very great respect.

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it was; and if it had not been—here is my point—it would never have passed with that public which Stevenson tried, and failed, to win. And this is the way in which publics are, not made but, effected and influenced by talent. In Stevenson's case, the provocation was unusually direct, the effects were unusually gross. But the same sort of thing has ever been, and is ever being, done all over the novel-reading world: so that many thousands have rejoiced in the gift of Ainsworth and Marryatt, of Kipling and Barrie and Scott, who have never so much as heard their names.

And the Book of the Year?* So far, I believe, the honors are with Miss Fowler's "A Double Thread," of whose copies it has been my privilege to peruse one of the "Fortieth Thousand." But "A Double Thread" was published, if I mistake not, early in '99; and in the late autumn thereof there arose and "overtook us like a flood" the glory and the wonder and the fame of Miss Mary Cholmondeley's "Red Pottage," which, at the time of writing, is going so strong—there are cases in which, as I blush to acknowledge, nothing but slang will serve—that there seems no reason why, if the rate of production be justified, the younger book should not supplant the older. It is so much the better of the two that I can scarce believe it will. Miss Fowler is pleasant, ingenious, incredible; she writes neatly, and has a trick of what looks like epigram,† which, to the cultured, seems to be entertaining—even fascinating—to the *nth* degree. Also, Miss Fowler has a good enough eye for absurdities in speech and character and conduct; therein, as it appears to me, is her saving grace. If she reported them less literally, she would be less "skippable" than she is, and her results would have a greater authority than they have, for that they would come nearer to being creations than they are. I can see that, to enjoy her, the great thing is to be

* By which is meant, of course, not the year's best book, but the book whose sales are heaviest, and whose readers are most numerous. It is again a question of publics; and I fancy that Mr. Silas Hocking (say) would give most of those whose quotations run highest in recognized markets, an indefinite number of "pounds and a beating."

†Here are specimens culled with a fleeting finger: "I can't make jokes before I've finished my lunch, my wit is all of the P. M. variety, and never scintillates in the morning. Making jokes before lunch is as bad as making love before lunch; and they are both as bad as going to the play in the afternoon." Thus the *sémillante* Lady Silverhampton. And again:—"Oh! don't waste your time in doing your duty; it is as reckless" (as "reckless!" Why "reckless?")—"as wasting your money in paying your debts." And, yet again: "The Art of forgetting is a vulgar accomplishment. Well-bred people remember everything, and are ashamed of nothing." This, to be sure, is Miss Camilla, and one is vaguely reminded of literature. And for the last time:—"I used to hate olives myself, but now I like them; they taste of hair oil, and remind one of kissing the top of Silverhampton's head." Thus Miss Fowler, coruscating, endlessly coruscating to the Cultured; and the Uncultured tire.

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Cultured, at once, and Smart (pseudo-Smart). It is nothing to the purpose that in no world of man's making, whether Smart (pseudo-Smart) or Cultured, did anybody ever talk as her people talk: the same reproach might well have been, and doubtless was, addressed to the author of "Love for Love" and "The Way of the World," though essentially on very different grounds. What is really important is that "A Double Thread" is at once clever and crude, at once ambitious and raw.

Miss Cholmondeley carries far heavier metal. She also has an eye for the absurd; but her absurdities are realized. Moreover, her absurdities have something dignified and decent about them. I do not know that I am particularly taken by her Hester (though her Rachel, as the phrase is, gets me); but her Mr. and Mrs. Gresley, her Pratts, her Sybell Loftus, her Hugh Scarlett, her Lady Newhaven—these, I say, are caught and figured in the act of life. Also I like her Bishop, I like her Australian, I like her quiet yet affecting touches about animals and children. Also, she does not try to say good things *à tort et à travers*: she says them when she can; she does not sparkle viciously; she uses her means to an end. Her duel, I confess it, finds and leaves me cold; but even here I must be with her, because, as I see it, the "business" between Newhaven and Hugh Scarlett is largely, if not wholly, a preparation for the "business," which is altogether excellent, between Rachel and Lady Newhaven. On the whole, though, I see no reason why Miss Cholmondeley should be popular, except it be that she starts her story from an adultery. 'Tis a safe card with the Cultured; but, in the sequel, her book will, I fancy, resolve itself into her portraits of Lady Newhaven and Mrs. Loftus, together with her admirable picture of Middleshire, the Zealous Fool and his adoring helpmeet, the Fraulein Boulou, the children, the excellent Pratts, the Village Independent, and the Village Doctor.

Another novel that was by way of being the Novel of the Year, but, somehow, hopped short of the distinction, was Mr. Richard Whiteing's "No. 5 John Street." That this was so is explicable enough. Mr. Whiteing, an amiable and expert journalist, has many friends upon the press; he had written no book for years; and those who knew him were glad to meet him in a higher capacity than the mere pressman's—and to tell the public how vastly good they found him. That, as I think, was much;

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but it was not all—not all by any means. Mr. Whiteing's style is bright and alert and cheerful—even gay; he has a pleasant gift of narrative, a still more pleasant gift of commentary; above all, he is much of a sentimentalist, with illusions which he is eager to communicate in his light, amiable way. Again, the public and the critics both had been dismayed, a little before, by the deadly calm, the murderous artfulness, the easy and complete assurance of mastery, displayed in a book by Mr. Arthur Morrison—"A Child of the Jago," to wit; and they turned with rejoicing to an authority who could and would "tickle othergates" than the author of that dreadful work. So Mr. Whiteing's fairy-tale went home, as your fairy-tale does always; and his Virgin Pugilist, his Thalestris of the Kerb, was thought to be—no impossible monster, no mere debauch in sentiment, but—a refined and moving expression of reality, and the story of her valiant life and her untimely though quite decorative death, was extolled through edition after edition, until it almost seemed as though the laurel were growing for other brows than those of the authoress of "A Double Thread." I have heard nothing of the book—which I read with wonder—of late, but that is rather the way with all these Books of the Year: to-day they are, and there is none like them, none; and to-morrow they are not, and 'tis hard to discover if they have ever been. This, however, is by the way.

In '99, as if to keep the good public right in its attitude to the immense congeries of interests and societies which is vaguely described as "the East End," Mr. Arthur Morrison published "To London Town;" and this was so obviously a book, so unmistakably an accomplished piece of art, that, from the outset, its chances of getting itself considered as a Novel of the Year were seen to be small. Yet the reviewers did their best. In "To London Town," as in "A Child of the Jago," Mr. Morrison is but an artist—discreet, passionless, expert, serene; yet his critics hailed his conversion to optimism in "To London Town" as fluently as they had bewailed his plunge into pessimism in "A Child of the Jago." The fact is, that in the one book he set forth a hopeless state of things in the terms of art; that in the other he set forth in the terms of art a state of things in which there is room for hope; and that he has done both with equal artistry and with a single regard for both the essential truths—truth in art and truth to life. I know how much has been omitted from both books;

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but then, I can give a guess how much was omitted from (say) Mrs. Gamp and Sir John Falstaff, and, without placing Mr. Morrison's achievement on the same plane with these, I can see how notably good it is, and remain convinced that to these books, and to "Tales of Mean Streets," we must still turn if we would know aught of the East End. We get, it is true, no Virgin Scrapper; but we do get as much of the truth about things—of *la vérité vraie*—as can be conveyed in English art.

Very nearly as interesting (I will not say convincing) as Mr. Morrison is Mr. Zangwill, when he writes about his own people, whether in the East End or out of it. He "fluffs" a little, perhaps: he is too much bent on the romantic presentation of molehills as first-class mountains; he has a pen, but he has also an ink-pot; and ink is cheap—cheap! Yet have I read much—I have not read all—of "They That Walk in Darkness" with a regard which I cannot develop in "The Colossus," let me say, though "The Colossus" is, so far as I know, its author's best work; nor even (I blench as I record it) in "No. 5 John Street" and "A Double Thread."

Is "Stalky & Co." a novel? I fear it is not. But it is a book; that much must be conceded by its worst enemies. It is a little hard, I think; for one of Mr. Kipling's innumerable merits is that of never leaving you in doubt as to his meaning. It is a merit, "like another;" but I think that in "Stalky & Co." it is possibly a little too meritorious. Be this as it may, the book is alive from beginning to end; and Stalky and Beetle and McTurk are the living things that make it so. I was not in a public-school, so that I cannot sympathize with them that say that Stalky and Beetle and McTurk are in no wise typical public school boys. I am prepared to believe that they are not; and I am also prepared to assert that the author of their being does not anywhere declare they are.* If I be not mistaken, Mr. Kipling pictures not the British schoolboy in the lump, but the three uncommon and peculiar British schoolboys who did business as the firm of Stalky. England, he says, is full of Stalkys; and with all my heart I hope that what he says is true. With all my heart, too, I wish it were just as full of Beetles; though three Kiplings at a time were, per-

* It is to be noted that in this book Mr. Kipling's other boys are pretty much the boys we know: they might—and herein, I think, consists the fault—have gone in with Tom Brown and Scud East and Madman Martin, or even have joined hands with the heroes of *Eric*. But, in truth, the British boy is none of these; and his living picture as (within limits) a resourceful, valiant, and unscrupulous young scoundrel, has yet to be done.

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haps, as much as the world could stand, while for any number of Corkrans there is even room and to spare. On the whole, though, to get back to my point, the Messrs. Stalky are too diabolishly clever for the schoolboy as I knew him, and as he is extant in me; and, to refresh my memory, I turn to "The Human Boy" of Mr. Eden Phillpotts, in which I get some aspect of the wretch as I remember him—romantical, desperate, for the most part futile; and all the better for that touch of "the true Dickens," which reconciles to every page in which it is found shining.

This reminds me that Devon is fortunate in a novelist. I do not know whether "Lorna Doone" is a great book or not; but I am assured that it is by way of becoming one of the "glories of our blood and state;" and I can see for myself that in Mr. Eden Phillpotts aforesaid and in the lady who calls herself "Zack," Mr. Blackmore's tradition is, to say the least, to be worthily upheld. In "Children of the Mist" Mr. Phillpotts walks with the old, leisurely gait; he rejoices in temptations to describe that coign of England which he knows and loves beyond the rest of our common Isle; he lingers on her beauties, and her oddities are, like her speech, of an absorbing interest to him; so that her Will Blanchard, her Sam Bonus, her Lyddon, her Billy Blee are by his contrivance brought as near to us—almost—as Dugald Dalgetty and Newman Noggs. And if he should fail his county, there would still be "Zack;" and of "Zack" we have the right to expect something distinguished—it may be, something great. Her first book was absurdly over-praised. Her second, "On Trial," shows, albeit a little skimped and breathless, that she has a great talent. The person who "lays out" seems to me something overwrought; but her Ostler and her Ostler's woman are at once fantastical and real, her heroine is undeniable, while in her hero she sets forth such a story of cowardice, moral and physical, as one must go far—and possibly fail in the end—to parallel.

And now must come my Catalogue of the Ships. It is not that I like the items in it less than these free and independent subjects on which I have spoken at a certain length; 'tis simply that I have said so much about the others that I must cut short whatever I might have to say about them that are left. To begin then: There is some excellent story-telling, with a capital Villain (Mr. Townshend) in Mr. J. Maclaren Cobban's "Pursued by the Law," and there is a capital villain (Major Wilbrahan), with some ex-

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cellent story-telling, in Mr. W. A. Mason's "Miranda of the Balcony." Mr. H. G. Wells sets forth a merely admirable *donnée* in "When the Sleeper Wakes," and invents a number of most plausible and most devilish forecasts of the future; but he fails, as it seems to me, to make his hero possible or his heroine even probable; and I turn with joy from the "Sleeper" to his "Tales of Space and Time"—which could have been written by nobody else alive, and in which there is one thing—*The Star* is what he calls it—which seems to me quite his finest achievement since *The Time-Machine*. To contrast with this is Harold Frederic's posthumous novel, "The Market-Place," a careful and capital study in reality—not so good as "Illumination," but good enough, at least, to make us regret that 'tis the last we shall get from Harold Frederic's hand; is Mr. Henry James's "The Turn of the Screw," an achievement in the Real-Unreal, in which the writer invents a shudder; are Mr. Bernard Capes's "Our Lady of Darkness" and "At a Winter's Fire." Now, Mr. Capes has made himself notorious as the writer of a more than Meredithian variety of Meredithese. If I had room, I might lecture Mr. Capes upon the merits and demerits of his style. But I have none; so I shall content myself with saying that "Our Lady of Darkness," if you can leave the style alone, is crammed full of invention and character, and that in "At a Winter's Fire" there is at least one story—"The Eddy on the Floor"—which made me think I was a boy again, when my flesh would creep with the best.

And to conclude: I have read Mr. Neil Munro's "Gilian the Dreamer" with great satisfaction. It is a good thing, so good a thing that I do not know why it is not a better. I thought, as I read, that I'd rather have written "*Jus Primæ Noctis*" and "The Lost Pibroch;" but I relented as I read, and in the end I settled that here, perhaps, was Mr. Munro's best work. It is, in truth, most personal, most persuasive—in places merely exquisite—yet, somehow, the Saxon pock-pudden is not passionately interested. Gilian is a study of the Celt, as notable as and much more completely phrased than John Splendid; and yet . . . and yet . . . I, for one, would rather that the book had ended with Part I.; I want no Part II. I love the old soldiers, and Miss Mary, and the rest; but, for Gilian, excepting in so far as he—not exists but—reflects the life about him, for Gilian and his loves I own I do not care a fig. And, with this declaration, I turn from

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"Gilian the Dreamer" to "The Princess Xenia." It is to Seaboard Bohemia, to the Bohemia of Florizel and Perdita and Autolycus, that Mr. Marriott Watson has turned for inspiration: as Mr. Anthony Hope in "The Prisoner of Zenda," as the late R. L. Stevenson in "Prince Otto." And the inspiration has served him well. His heroine is, in the beginning, at all events, a little shadowy; but throughout his hero is impudent, alert, delightful. And I counsel everyone to read the story of his attempt at playing Providence and its romantic yet most human sequel.

W. E. HENLEY.

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THE POWER OF MR. MOODY'S MINISTRY.

BY THE REV. LYMAN ABBOTT, D. D.

THE death of Mr. Moody naturally suggests the question, What was the secret of his extraordinary power? Without office in Church or State; without theological, collegiate or even the better Sunday-school education; without a church or society behind him to support him, or a constituency, except such as he himself created, to afford him moral support; without any of the recognized graces of oratory, and without any ambition to form a new ecclesiastical organization or a new school of theological thought, and perhaps without the ability to do so; nevertheless, Dwight L. Moody probably spoke to a greater number of auditors than any man of his time in either Europe or America, unless possibly John B. Gough may be an exception, and he spoke on spiritual themes to audiences which were less prepared therefor by any previous spiritual culture than those addressed on such themes by any preacher since Wesley and Whitfield. In this paper I do not propose to attempt any analysis of Mr. Moody's character, or any sketch of his extraordinary career, with the main facts of which it is safe to assume that all readers of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW are familiar, but simply to use that career to elucidate a truth to the affirmation of which he gave his life, and which needs constant reiteration in press, pulpit and platform.

The question is much discussed in the press, Are the churches losing their power? More fundamental is the question, What is the secret of such power as they possess? The question is much discussed in ministerial circles, Why do not more people go to church? More fundamental is the question, What is the secret of the attraction which draws to the churches, with such regularity, so many men and women, of different stations and of varying degrees of moral and intellectual culture? From the

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point of view of a pure secularist, the phenomenon is an extraordinary if not an insoluble one. To the markets the people go to procure the food required to support physical life; to the dry goods stores for clothing necessary for comfort or contributing to luxury; to the theatres, wearied with their work, they go to forget their toil in an hour of amusement; to the art galleries and the concert rooms, attracted by esthetic desires; to the schools, that in their youth they may obtain the results of the experience of the past, and so may live more intelligently, avoiding the blunders of their fathers. But why do they go to church? What in their nature prompts them? Not for food, or protection from weather, or amusement, or instruction in the art of present-day living. What do they expect? What have they a right to expect? What must the churches give to them, if the congregations are not to go away disappointed? These questions Mr. Moody's character and career help at once to emphasize and to answer.

It is not enough to reply that a habit of church-going has been formed and is kept up from mere tradition. A habit does not exist in all classes of society, during a period of many centuries, in different localities and even in different countries, without some ultimate reason behind this habit which has induced it. It is not enough to say that the people are attracted by the oratory, the music or the art. The minister is rarely an orator; the music rarely equals that of the concert room; the art does not compare with that of the art galleries, and, though generally in better taste, is rarely as popular as that of the theatres. At best, oratory, music and art are but incidental and subsidiary attractions to the church. The answer can only be found in the declaration of Sabatier, that "man is incurably religious," in the affirmation of Jesus Christ that "man does not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." The market-place is not a more sure witness that man has a physical appetite, the concert room and the art gallery that he has esthetic appetites, than are the churches and the Sunday congregations that he has a spiritual hunger. That the churches often fail to satisfy this hunger, and even sometimes pretend to satisfy it by methods which injure instead of benefiting the attendant, no more militate against the witness which the existence of the churches bears to man's spiritual needs than does bad music or bad art indicate that man has no esthetic nature.

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I shall not undertake here to analyze this spiritual hunger, or to describe all the elements which enter into it, or all the occasions which especially and notably excite it. It must suffice for my present purpose to indicate two elements, neither of which is ever wholly wanting from any man who is not himself wholly lacking in some of the elements essential to a normal manhood: the first relates to his past, the second to his future.

Every healthful man sometimes—some men at all times—looks back regretfully upon his past. He is conscious of blunders in judgment, conscious of aberrations of will, conscious of deliberate acts of wrong-doing which have brought injury upon himself and upon others. He wishes that he could live again his life, or some particular crisis in his life. His experience answers more or less consciously to the expression in the General Confession in the Book of Common Prayer: "We have done the things which we ought not to have done, and we have left undone the things which we ought to have done," even if his self-dissatisfaction does not lead him to add, "And there is no health in us." Sometimes this is a keen sense of shame for some specific deed done or duty neglected; sometimes it is a vague feeling of self-condemnation, without clearly defined specific cause. Sometimes it is a passing shadow, evanescent and uninfluential; sometimes it is a morbid self-condemnation, depressing the spirits and tending toward despair. But he who has never felt this sense of remorse in some one of its various forms is singularly lacking, either in his memory, his ideals, or his power of sitting in judgment upon his own conduct and character. It is doubtful whether any desire which the human soul ever possessed is keener or more overmastering than the desire which sometimes possesses it, in certain phases of experience, to be rid of its ineradicable past and to be permitted to begin life anew, unclogged and unburdened.

The other spiritual hunger of the soul relates to the future. The soul is conscious of undeveloped possibilities in itself; it is spurred on to it knows not what future, by unsatisfied aspirations. It longs to do and to be more, and rather to be than to do. It suffers what I may call "growing pains." It has in the sphere of moral experience aspirations which may be compared to those which have summoned the greatest musicians and the greatest artists to their careers. This sense of unsatisfied aspiration differs from the sense of remorse in that it relates to the future, not to

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the past; the one is a consciousness of wrong committed or duty left undone, the other of life incomplete. The cry of the soul in the one experience is that of Paul, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" The cry of the other is like that of Tennyson:

> "Oh for a man to arise in me
> That the man that I am, may cease to be."

The one is a craving for peace, the other for achievement. The one belongs to a nature which dwells in the past, the other to a nature which lives in the future. Not only are different temperaments differently affected, the one being more conscious of regret, the other of unsatisfied aspiration; but the same person sometimes experiences the one, sometimes the other. One age of the world is more prone to the former, another age to the latter. In our time, there is comparatively little experience of regret for the past. There is, to use the phrase current in theological circles, very little "conviction of sin." The age has its face set toward the future. Its ideals lie before it, not behind. It is eager, expectant, hopeful, aspiring. It takes no time to look back, not even time enough to learn the lessons which the past can teach. But it is full of eager expectations for a nobler civilization, greater wealth, more harmonious relations between employer and employed, juster government, better social and industrial conditions, a nearer approximation to brotherhood. In the Middle Ages, humanity was burdened by the consciousness of past wrong-doing, and it sought relief from its burden by seclusion from the world in monastic retreats. In the present age, humanity is feverish with unsatisfied aspirations, and is driven by its fever into the world, there to engage in ceaseless and excessive activities. Like a mettlesome steed cruelly rowelled with spurs, yet held in by a curb bit, is the present age, spurred on by aspiration to even greater achievements, yet held back by prudential self-interest from the great endeavor and the greater self-sacrifices without which the noblest achievements are always impossible.

It is because the Christian religion professes to be able to satisfy these two passionate desires of the human soul—the desire for peace and the desire for achievement—that it possesses the attraction which the failures and the folly of its adherents may diminish, but cannot destroy.

Christianity is not a system of ethics—though it has revolutionized ethics; nor a method of worship—though it has furnished

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a new inspiration to worship and given it a new character; nor a philosophy—though a great many divergent philosophies have been attempted to account for it. It is a life founded on a historic fact; take that fact away and it is difficult to see how the life could survive. The belief of the universal Christian Church in that fact is expressed with incomparable simplicity in the words of one of the more ancient Christian creeds: "I believe in one Lord Jesus Christ. . . . Who for us men and our salvation came down from heaven." What is the relation of this Lord Jesus Christ to the Eternal Father from whom He came, and how He accomplishes our salvation are questions to which Christian philosophers give different answers. But all Christian believers accept the historic fact that there is one Lord Jesus Christ, and that He came down from Heaven for us men and our salvation. In its possession of this faith and its interest in this fact lies the secret of the power of the Christian Church. Rob it of this faith, take from it this fact, and its peculiar power would be gone; it would only be a teacher of ethics, or a school of philosophy, or a conductor of religious mysteries in an unintelligible worship of an unknown God. For in its possession of this fact lies its power to take from men the two burdens which so sorely oppress them—that of a remorse for a wrongful past, that of unsatisfied aspiration in the present and for the future.

Empowered by this fact, the Church declares to men burdened that their sins are forgiven them. This is not a philosophical statement founded on a general faith that God is good and therefore will forgive sins; still less is it the enunciation of a general belief that He is merciful and therefore will not be very exacting of His children, but will let them off from deserved punishment if they appeal to Him with adequate signs of repentance, in penances or otherwise. It is the statement of the historic fact that God forgave men their sins before they repented; that He bears no ill will and sometimes no wrath against them; that He only desires for them that they shall be good men and true; and that, to accomplish this, His good-will toward them, Jesus Christ has come for His Father and our Father into the world. Empowered by this fact, the Church acts as the official and authoritative promulgator of a divine forgiveness, an authoritative and historically re-enforced interpreter of the divine disposition; empowered by this fact, the Christian teacher repeats of

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himself what Jesus Christ said of Himself: "The Son of Man hath power on earth to remit sins." He reiterates Christ's message and with the same authority: "Go in peace and sin no more." He re-declares, not as a theory, but as an historically established fact: "Almighty God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ . . . hath given power and commandment to His ministers, to declare and pronounce to His people, being penitent, the absolution and remission of their sins. He pardoneth and absolveth all those who truly repent and unfeignedly believe His holy Gospel."

While the Church thus with authority unloosens the burden of the past from those on whom a remorseful memory has bound that past, it also inspires with a hope for the future which turns the anxious and sometimes despairing aspirations into eager and gladly expectant ones. For it tells the story of a Man Who in Himself fulfilled the spiritual desires which are in all noble men, and then, departing, left as His legacy the command, which is also a promise: "Follow me." It answers the question, What is human nature? by pointing to the character of Jesus of Nazareth, with the assurance, What He was every man can become. It answers the question, Is life worth living? by pointing to that life and declaring that, as He laid down His life for us, so can we lay down our lives for one another. It presents to humanity not an ideal merely, but a realized ideal, and in this realization of the highest ideal of character gives assurance that our aspirations are not doomed to disappointment, unless we ourselves so doom them. That they are intended by our Father to be realized and that we can realize them, is historically attested by the life of Him Who was the Son of Man, and Who experiencing our battles has pointed out to us the possibility of and the way to victory.

This is the secret of the power of the Church: not the excellence of its ethical instruction, not the wisdom of its religious philosophy, not the esthetic beauty of its buildings or its services, and certainly not the oratory of its preachers: but this, that it is charged with a double message to men burdened by a sense of wrong-doing in the past, tormented by unfulfilled aspirations for the future; a message to the first, "Thy sins are forgiven thee;" a message to the second, "You can do all things through Him that strengtheneth you." Poorly as the Church understands its mission, poorly as it delivers its message, it nevertheless has this as

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its mission, this as its message. And when it fulfills the one and delivers the other with the power that comes from the conscious possession of divine authority, men gather to its services to receive its gift. This is not the only message of Christianity; it teaches a purer ethics, it proffers a more sacred consolation, it incites to a more joyous and inspiring worship than any other religion; but no other religion has attempted to proclaim with authority pardon for the past or to give as from God Himself power for the future.

Of the principles which I am here trying to interpret, two illustrations are afforded in the very recent life of the Church—illustrations which are all the more significant because they come from quarters so dissimilar theologically and ecclesiastically that to many persons they seem to have nothing in common. The first illustration is afforded by the High Church movement in England—the second by the life and work of Dwight L. Moody.

It can hardly be necessary to say that I have no ecclesiastical or theological sympathy with the High Church movement. I do not believe that Jesus Christ organized a Church, or appointed bishops, or gave directly or by remote implication any special authority to the bishops thereafter to be appointed in the Church, or conferred special grace, or intended that special grace should be conferred, by the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, or made either of them means of conveying supernatural grace, except in so far as they became the expressions of a mood or spirit of mind receptive of grace. I do not believe in the perpetuity of a priesthood, or an altar, or the kind of sacrificial system which a priesthood and an altar seem to typify. And yet it is impossible for any student of current events to doubt that the High Church party in the Anglican Church is really exerting a notable spiritual influence in England; that it is attracting in many cases large congregations to before sparsely attended churches; that it is felt as a power in many hearts and homes. To think that this is because Protestant England is going back to its old-time allegiance to the Pope of Rome, or because a generation which has departed in its social standards from the severer simplicity of Puritan England wants elaborate ritualism in its churches, or because it is easier to conduct an orderly ritual than to preach a tolerable sermon, and easier to go through the first without attention than to give attention to the second, is to misread the signs of the times, and, in judging a movement, to esti-

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mate it by the mere incidents which happen to accompany it and not by the essential spirit which characterizes it. The essential spirit which characterizes the High Church party is its sacerdotal spirit; its exaltation of the priesthood and the altar; its conversion of the memorial supper into a bloodless sacrifice of the mass; and its use of priesthood, altar, and mass to emphasize the right of the priest to declare *authoritatively* the absolution and remission of sins. It is because the High Church priesthood assume power on earth to forgive sins, and so to relieve men and women of the first of the two burdens of which I have spoken, that it has its power over the hearts of its adherents. It is for this reason, also, that its power is mainly seen among women. Women's morbid consciences make them susceptible to painful and sometimes needless regrets, and a Church which offers to remove this burden of the past appeals to them more than it does to men, who are more inclined to let the dead bury their dead and ask for a religion which will help them to a better future. High Church theology has no special efficacy in equipping the soul for the future, and it has therefore no special attraction for virile men. But so long as men and women feel the burden of the irreparable past, so long they will come to that Church, and that alone, which declares with authority that the past is forgiven; and they will not always be critical in inquiring whether all the grounds on which that authority is claimed can stand historical investigation.

At the other extreme, ecclesiastically, are the evangelists of our time, chief among them all, and type of them all, Dwight L. Moody. If I speak of him peculiarly, it is because he affords so striking an illustration of the principle which I wish to elucidate. Mr. Moody belonged to a denomination which discards all notion of the priesthood, whose ministry are only laymen performing a special function in a church without orders. In this church he never had such ordination as is generally required of those who desire to exercise ministerial functions. His services were attended neither by Baptism nor by the Lord's Supper. He believed that the latter was a memorial service, not a bloodless sacrifice; that any Christian, whether lay or clerical, was equally a priest; to him the church was a meeting-house and the altar a communion table or table of meeting; and most of his services were held in unconsecrated halls. But never did a High Church priest of the Anglican Church believe more profoundly that to him had been given

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authority to promise the absolution and remission of sins, than did Mr. Moody believe that he possessed such authority. Rarely, if ever, did priest, Anglican or Catholic, hear more vital confessions or pronounce absolution with greater assurance. The High Churchman thinks that he derives such power through a long ecclesiastical line; Mr. Moody believed that he derived it through the declarations of the Bibe; but both in the last analysis obtained it by their faith in "one Lord Jesus Christ, . . Who for us men and for our salvation came down from Heaven," The one no less than the other spoke, or claimed to speak, by authority; both derived their authority from the same great historic fact; and the attractive power which drew unnumbered thousands to the preaching of Mr. Moody, was in its essence the same as that which draws unnumbered thousands to the Altar and the Eucharist.

For myself I believe neither in the authority of the ecclesiastical organization with the Churchman, nor in the infallibility of the Book with Mr. Moody. The authority to pronounce absolution and remission for the sins that are past and to proffer this gift of life to fulfill the aspirations of the soul for the future, I take to be spiritual, not ecclesiastical nor traditional, and to belong equally to every one who has received such absolution and remission, and such gift of spiritual life. But I am sure that if we of the so-called liberal faith hope to retain in these more liberal days the attractive power of the Church, we can do it only by holding fast to the great historic facts of the birth, life, passion and death of Jesus Christ essentially as they are narrated in the Four Gospels, and to the great spiritual fact that in the God whom He has declared to us, there is abundant forgiveness for all the past, and abundant life for all the future; and we must declare this, not as a theological opinion, to be defended by philosophical arguments as a rational hypothesis, but as an assured fact, historically certified by the life and death of Jesus Christ and confirmed out of the mouth of many witnesses by the experience of Christ's disciples and followers in all Churches and in every age. If we fail to do this, men will desert our ministry for Romanism, Anglicanism and Evangelism, or, in despair of spiritual life in any quarter, will desert all that ministers to the higher life, and live a wholly material life, alternating between restless, unsatisfied desire and stolid self-content. And the fault and the folly will be ours more even than theirs.

LYMAN ABBOTT.

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OUR RULE IN THE PHILIPPINES.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS M. ANDERSON, U. S. A., LATE MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V., IN COMMAND OF THE FIRST EXPEDITIONARY LAND FORCE FROM THE UNITED STATES TO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

BEFORE Admiral Dewey left Hong Kong to attack the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, Prince Henry of Prussia went to the "Olympia" to bid him farewell. At parting, the Prince said: "Good-bye, Commodore; I fear I shall never see you again;" and he added, "You are going on a desperate undertaking."

So low an estimate was at that time placed upon our war power, that Prince Henry was not alone in the belief that our contest with Spain would prove disastrous to us. In no part of the world were we held so cheap as in the Orient. Even then the collapse of the Chinese Empire was thought inevitable, and the stronger European Powers were preparing to seize upon the fragments. Northward from the Straits, the Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, French, British and Russians had their dependencies. The United States alone had no foothold along the Asiatic coast, nor any port at which in time of war its naval vessels could remain over forty-eight hours. One old side-wheeled, wooden gunboat represented our naval power in Shanghai or Canton. Dewey had, in the harbor of Hong Kong, the strongest fleet we had ever sent to the China coast, but it was inferior in number and armament to the British, Russian, French, German and Japanese squadrons in those waters. And, strange as it may seem, nearly everybody on the coast, Asiatic and Europeans, believed it to be inferior even to the Manila fleet of Spain. The low estimation in which we were held is almost beyond belief. One reason for this is that Orientals are powerfully impressed by ostentatious display and arrogant pretension. As a rule, our diplomacy in the

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East has been colorless and our representatives unpretentious gentlemen, living in rented houses so inferior to those occupied by other embassies that the contrast was humiliating. Our consuls also in those parts were constantly assuming that they had some diplomatic functions which made them very unpopular with the consular representatives of other nations.

It happened, therefore, that when Dewey started for Manila the officers of all the naval squadrons at Hong Kong, except the British, thought and hoped that he was going to certain destruction. I learned afterward from these prophets of evil that they thought our fleet would be brought to grief by the Krupp guns of the shore batteries, rather than by the Spanish squadron. It was probable that, if any of our unprotected cruisers had been struck near the water-line by a nine-inch projectile, it would have gone to the bottom.

As soon as the report of Dewey's May-day victory reached Hong Kong, the British, French, German and Japanese squadrons followed him to Manila. Soon, as is usual under like conditions, questions arose as to the rights of neutrals and the efficiency of the blockade. Manila Bay is thirty-five miles long and twenty miles wide. It is not one harbor, but embraces a number of harbors. Our squadron did not take station at the entrance of the bay, but anchored at Cavite, seven miles from Manila, and intercepted vessels passing that point. War vessels of neutral States are not forbidden by the *lex non scripta* of international law to enter blockaded ports, but it is an understanding that they are to hold no communication with the shore, except through ministers or consuls of their respective Governments. The Germans were suspected of violating this understanding. Their officers were bumptious and brusque in manner. Their sympathy for Spain was openly expressed and plainly shown. Their conduct all through was in striking contrast with the cordiality of the English, the good-natured affability of the Japanese, and the studied and formal courtesy of the French. On the other hand, our squadron apparently did not attempt to enforce a very strict blockade. Small native boats with fish and fruits ran into Manila constantly. On the land side, supplies were gotten in by bribing the insurgent leaders. The garrison and people of Manila during the siege, although reduced to rather unpalatable fare, were never in danger of starvation.

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Our first expeditionary land force entered the Bay of Manila on the 30th of June, 1898, under the convoy of the "Baltimore" and the "Charleston." As we passed the quarantine station at Marivelis the German protected cruiser, "Kaiserin Augusta," the most formidable war ship in the bay, steamed out, and, running close to the "Australia," on which the writer had his head-quarters, followed us up to Cavite. I did not suspect at the time that any discourtesy was intended; but I found afterward that our naval officers thought it was a discourteous bit of bravado. Many of them expressed the opinion that the Germans intended to interfere to prevent the bombardment of Manila. I never believed, however, that their squadron would go as far as overt acts. War is too expensive a luxury to be waged on a matter of sentiment, and the commercial interests of their nation in the Philippines were too small to warrant a war in that behalf.* I believed, moreover, that the Berlin Government would be deterred by the fact that there are eight millions of Germans in America and by the importance of the trade relations between Germany and the United States. It may have been as a matter of abundant caution that Admiral Dewey insisted on waiting for the monitors before opening his guns on Manila in August, 1898. Considering his responsibility, his prudence was commendable. We had another proof of it. When he heard that a Spanish fleet, with a land force of 3,000 men, had passed through the Suez Canal on its way to Manila, he came to me and proposed that I should re-embark the soldiers we had landed at Cavite and take them to Subig Bay. He explained that he could not prudently fight such vessels as the "Pelayo" and other formidable ships in the close waters of the bay, where they would have the support of the heavy Krupp guns on the Lunetta, and that, on the approach of the Cadiz squadron, he would have to leave me and go to the open sea. My attention was also called to the fact that the position of our land forces at Cavite would be untenable under the guns of the Spanish fleet. After thinking over the situation, I told him not to hesitate to adopt any course he deemed advisable, without regard to our land forces, as we would take care of ourselves. "But what will you do?" he asked. I answered that we would take to the woods. He seemed much pleased with this answer when I explained to him that we had subsistence supplies for six

* It is not generally known, yet it is a fact, that many of the reputed German merchants in Luzon are not German, but Swiss.

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weeks, and that we could move to a good position on the mainland beyond the range of the enemy's guns.

At that time the insurgent Filipinos had driven the Spanish soldiers within the defenses of Manila, and had them completely invested on the land side by light field works, which they held with about fourteen thousand men. They were poorly armed and equipped, yet, as they had defeated the Spaniards in a number of fights in the field and had taken four thousand prisoners, it may be asserted in the vernacular of the camp that "they had the morale on them." The Manila garrison was so demoralized at that time, and so incomplete was their line of defense, that I believe it would have been possible, by coming to an understanding with Aguinaldo, to have carried their advance works by storm and to have captured all of the city, except the walled city or the old Spanish town. Under existing orders, we could not have struck a bargain with the Filipinos, as our Government did not recognize the authority of Aguinaldo as constituting a *de facto* government; and, if Manila had been taken with his co-operation, it would have been his capture as much as ours. We could not have held so large a city with so small a force, and it would therefore have been practically under Filipino control.

On the 1st of July, 1898, I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey. He asked me at once whether "the United States of the North" either had recognized or would recognize his government—I am not quite sure as to the form of his question, whether it was "had" or "would." In either form it was embarrassing. My orders were, in substance, to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go beyond the zone of naval co-operation, to consult Admiral Dewey and to wait for Merritt. Aguinaldo had proclaimed his government only a few days before (June 28), and Admiral Dewey had no instructions as to that assumption. The facts as to the situation at that time I believe to be these: Consul Williams states in one of his letters to the State Department that several thousand Tagals were in open insurrection before our declaration of war with Spain. I do not know as to the number, yet I believe the statement has foundation in fact. Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their statements. If an in-

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cipient rebellion was already in progress, what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval vessel and landed in Cavite? Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently, at his request. They were permitted to gather up a lot of arms which the Spaniards had thrown into the bay; and, with the four thousand rifles taken from Spanish prisoners and two thousand purchased in Hong Kong, they proceeded to organize three brigades and also to arm a small steamer they had captured. I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were captured. The current of opinion was setting that way when the first expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had had no reason to surmise. But to return to our interview with Aguinaldo.

I told him I was acting only in a military capacity; that I had no authority to recognize his government; that we had come to whip the Spaniards, and that, if we were successful, the indirect effect would be to free them from Spanish tyranny. I added that, as we were fighting a common enemy, I hoped we would get along amicably together. He did not seem pleased with this answer. The fact is, he hoped and expected to take Manila with Admiral Dewey's assistance, and he was bitterly disappointed when our soldiers landed at Cavite. In a few hours after our interview, two of my staff officers, Major Cloman and Lieutenant Clark, who were walking through the streets of the town, were arrested and taken before Aguinaldo. They were told by him that strangers could only visit the town by his permission, but that in their case he was pleased to give them permission to proceed. We at once landed our forces, and on the 4th of July Aguinaldo was invited to witness a parade and review in honor of our national holiday. He did not come, because he was invited not as President but as General Aguinaldo. This led me to write him a letter stating that, while we hoped to have amicable relations with him, I would have to take Cavite as a base of operations, and closing with this sentence:

"I have therefore the honor to ask Your Excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that officers or men cannot visit Cavite without your permission." *

*Sen. Doc. 62, p. 1, 52 Cong.

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A few days thereafter, he made an official call, coming with cabinet and staff and a band of music. On that occasion, he handed me an elaborate schedule for an autonomous government which he had received from some Filipinos in Manila, with a statement that they had reason to believe that Spain would grant them such a form of government. With this was an open letter addressed to the Filipino people from Pedro Alexandre Paterno, advising them to put their trust in Spain rather than America. The day before, two German officers had called on Aguinaldo and I believed they had brought him these papers. I asked him if the scheme was agreeable to him. He did not answer, but asked if we, the North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that, but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no colonies. He then made this remarkable statement:

"I have studied attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find in it no authority for colonies and I have no fear."

It may seem that my answer was somewhat evasive, but I was at the time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, carts, fuel and forage. We soon found that Aguinaldo had forbidden his people to sell us anything without his permission. We then informed him that we would have to revert to requisitions. This brought him to terms, and he sent his brother-in-law to us with the assurance that he would give us all possible assistance in obtaining supplies. The depot quartermaster then employed the brother-in-law, and after that we had no further trouble on that score.

The prevailing sentiment of the Filipinos toward us can be shown by one incident.

About the middle of July the insurgent leaders in Cavite invited a number of our army and navy officers to a banquet. There was some postprandial speech-making, the substance of the Filipino talk being that they wished to be annexed, but not conquered. One of our officers in reply assured them that we had come not to make them slaves, but to make them free men. A singular scene followed. All the Filipinos rose to their feet, and Buencomeno, taking his wine-glass in his hand, said: "We wish to be baptized in that sentiment." Then he and the rest poured the wine from their glasses over their heads.

Statements have been made to the effect that Manila was taken

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by agreement, and that, if our agreement with the Spanish authorities had been intelligently carried out, there need not have been the loss of a single life. Much of our intelligence in regard to Philippine matters has come from the Epistle and not from the Gospel side of the altar. I do not know that I can give the absolute gospel truth as to the so-called capitulation agreement, yet I can say that, if there was any agreement that Manila was to surrender with only a semblance of a fight, it was not communicated to the Army. I was directed to draw up and submit what is known as the tactical plan of attack. I drew it up on the theory that there was to be *bona fide* resistance, and it was adopted by the Commanding General. I was directed not to press the land attack until it was seen whether the Spaniards raised the white flag after the navy opened fire. We had twelve field pieces of artillery bearing on the Spanish line, and four in reserve. I waited twenty minutes after the naval guns began firing, and then directed the land batteries to open. As the white flag was not raised, the infantry advanced, carried the Spanish works and entered the city, and then, and not before, the white flag was raised. Even then, the Spanish authorities forgot or neglected to notify their troops on the Singalon front, for they gave MacArthur quite a stiff fight at that point.

The negotiations by which it was attempted to secure a surrender without resistance were carried on through Mr. André, the Belgian consul. His method was to go to the Governor-General and get a statement, which he wrote down in a memorandum book; then he would go to General Merritt and Admiral Dewey and get a statement from them, which he would carry back to the Governor-General. This was apart from some formal correspondence. After the surrender, André translated to me the notes in his memorandum book, for they were written in Spanish. The substance of the agreement seemed to be that if the fleet did not throw shells into the walled city or the Spanish part of Manila the Spanish artillery would not open on the fleet. There was no agreement, as the memorandum was read to me, that our land forces would not be fired on. On the contrary, there was a statement that the honor of Spain required that there should be resistance, and that, under the Spanish army code, their officers surrendering without resistance or giving a parole would subject themselves to trial by court-martial. Accordingly, we were fired on from the trenches and back through the streets of the city.

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So far as the land forces were concerned, they took the place by storm. And it has never been made apparent why the Spaniards were allowed the honors of war, and why the return of all captured property upon the signing of a treaty of peace was assured to them. The Filipinos assumed that it was because we intended to turn the Spanish loose on them as soon as we had made satisfactory terms with the Spanish Government.

The origin of our controversies and conflicts with the Filipinos can, as already explained, be traced back to our refusal to recognize the political authority of Aguinaldo. Our first serious break with them arose from our refusal to let them co-operate with us. About nine o'clock on the evening of August 12, I received from General Merritt an order to notify Aguinaldo to forbid the Filipino insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This notification was delivered to him at twenty minutes past ten that night. The Filipinos had made every preparation to assail the Spanish lines in their front. Certainly, they would not have given up part of their line to us unless they thought they were to fight with us. They, therefore, received General Merritt's interdict with anger and indignation. They considered the war as their war, and Manila as their capital, and Luzon as their country. Knowing that they would disregard any remonstrance on our part, I sent a battalion of North Dakota Volunteers to hold a bridge they would have to cross if they followed us into Manila when we made our assault on the next morning, but when the battle began they broke in by way of Santana and got into the city as soon as we did. After the white flag was raised and the firing ceased, it was found that fully four thousand armed insurgents had taken possession of Paco and part of Malata, two important suburbs on the south of the Pasig. To hold them within these limits and stop any attempt at looting, a cordon of troops was thrown around them. The situation was exceedingly critical. Our soldiers believed that the Filipinos had fired on them, and the Filipinos were almost beside themselves with rage and disappointment. The friendly relations we had with Generals Recati and Morial alone prevented a conflict then and there.

At seven o'clock I received an order from General Merritt to remove the Filipinos from the city. Had we attempted to use force, we would have had to fight to carry out our orders. In that event, we would certainly have had a serious complication.

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With ten thousand men, we would have had to guard thirteen thousand three hundred Spanish prisoners and to fight fourteen thousand Filipinos. I therefore took the responsibility of telegraphing Aguinaldo, who was at Bacoor, ten miles below, requesting him to withdraw his troops and intimating that serious consequences would follow if he did not do so. I received his answer at eleven, saying that a Commission would come to me the next morning with full powers. Accordingly the next day Señors Buencomeno, Lagarde, Araneto and Sandeco came to Division Headquarters in Manila and stated that they were authorized to order the withdrawal of their troops, if we would promise to reinstate them in their present positions on our making peace with Spain. Thereupon I took them over to General Merritt. Upon their repeating their demands, he told them he could not give such a pledge, but that they could rely on the honor of the American people. The General then read to them the proclamation he intended to issue to the Filipino people. The Commission then went back to Aguinaldo for further instructions. A member of the Commission had brought me a letter from Aguinaldo, complaining that he had been harshly treated, and that his army had given up a part of their lines to us on the understanding that there was to be a co-operation between us in future military movements. I showed this letter to General Merritt after the Commission had withdrawn. He directed me to reply that, if Aguinaldo had been apparently harshly treated, it was from a military necessity, and that while we might recognize the justice of their insurrection, it was thought judicious to have only one army in Manila at one time.

On the 15th the Commission returned with a paper containing ten unreasonable demands. There was an astonishing change, from one very reasonable condition one day to ten aggressive demands the next. The change can only be accounted for on the theory that Aguinaldo and his counsellors plainly perceived, from General Merritt's proclamation, that we intended to hold the Philippines under military rule. Upon this they determined to obtain the best conditions for themselves at once. There was subsequently ample confirmation of this, from the fact that General Otis suppressed that part of the President's letter (December 24, 1898) to the Secretary of War, which directed our military forces to take possession of all the Philippine Islands by

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right of transfer from Spain and by right of conquest. Upon receiving their demands, I told them that their propositions could not be considered until their troops withdrew from the city limits, and a map was given them with a line of delimination traced upon it. I had the demands translated and laid them before General Merritt. What action he would have taken I do not know, but just at the time he received the cable message announcing the signing of the peace preliminaries in Washington. He took the message and the Filipino propositions to the flagship in the harbor for a consultation with Admiral Dewey. On his return, he directed me to return to Cavite and assume command of a district south of the Pasig.

There is a great diversity of opinion as to whether a conflict with the Filipinos could not have been avoided if a more conciliatory course had been followed in dealing with them. I believe we came to a parting of the ways when we refused their request to leave their military force in a good strategic position on the contingency of our making peace with Spain without a guarantee of their independence. From what was known of the situation, our Government was justified in not recognizing Aguinaldo's authority as a *de facto* government. For, even if it had been determined to recognize an independent Filipino government, it did not follow that we should recognize a self-appointed *junta* as constituting a government. On the other hand, the *dicta* of international law that, in war, the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants—which the President made the basis of his instructions to General Merritt—could only be made to apply to the Philippines by a very liberal construction.

Was Luzon a conquered country? We held Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island was held not by the Spaniards but by the Filipinos. On the other islands, the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns. At the time referred to, we could not claim to hold by purchase, for we had not then received Spain's quit-claim deed to the Archipelago. Making allowance for difference of time, we took Manila, almost to the hour when the peace preliminaries were signed in Washington. But, no matter when Manila was taken, it was unfortunate for us that we felt so bound by the meshes of diplomatic amenities as to permit Spain's insurgent subjects to levy war against us, and attack

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us when they felt fully prepared—a philanthropic policy which has cost us many valuable lives.

To return to the question of conciliation, one of Aguinaldo's Commission, who was subsequently a member of his cabinet, said to me: "Either we have a *de facto* government or we have not. If we have, why not recognize the fact? If not, why have you recognized us at all?" This last remark referred to General Merritt's conceding them the control of the Manila water-works, and to General Otis's attempts to negotiate with them without committing himself.

There were other causes of antagonism. Our soldiers, to get what they considered trophies, did a good deal of what the Filipinos considered looting. A number made debts which they did not find it convenient to pay. They called the natives "niggers," and often treated them with a good-natured condescension which exasperated the natives all the more because they feared to resent it.

Thus it happened that the common people, from at first hailing us as deliverers, got to regarding us as enemies. After the assembling of a Filipino congress at Malolos with representatives from the other islands, there was but little hope of a peaceful solution. Restrained by diplomatic and philanthropic considerations, we had given them time to organize their revolutionary government and to consolidate their power. Naturally, they did not wish to stultify themselves by making terms with us, when the only terms offered involved the absolute abrogation of their authority. The leaders were influenced by another consideration. All the religious orders, except the Jesuits, held valuable properties and concessions. The Dominicans, for instance, held large areas of rice lands south of the Pasig. A number of civil corporations held concessions—or charters, as we call them—for railways, tramways, electric plants, water-works, etc. The leaders wished to enrich themselves by confiscating all these properties. In our treaty with Spain, we were pleased to recognize all private and corporate rights. It was, therefore, evident to them that under our administration they could not carry out that project. The common people had been made to believe that in accepting our rule they would simply exchange one set of oppression for another. Yet there was a possibility of breaking the power of the Malolos government by conciliating the common people and

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winning over certain friendly military leaders. This was done in Negros, but never attempted in Luzon; yet this was the method by which British power was established in India. We know how to fight, but we do not know how to conquer, if the accepted principle of dividing to conquer is to be rejected.

As to our ability to establish a stable government in the Philippines, we have certain things in our favor. The people of those islands have no other traditional allegiance and no other governmental traditions. They wish to break all connection between Church and State and to try a representative form of government. As Mabini says in his so-called "appeal" to the people of the United States, they look upon our Government as the best example of republican government.

The dangerous element is a spirit of faction begotten of generations of oppression and misrule, yet education and good government may in time regenerate a race not without good qualities and not without ambition.

This task, imposed upon us by a combination of circumstances, we must now carry out to its logical and legitimate conclusion. It is a part of "the white man's burden" which we can not now lay down.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON.

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AMERICAN MISGOVERNMENT OF CUBA.

BY MAJOR J. E. RUNCIE.

THE United States expelled Spain from Cuba because the island, under Spanish rule, had become an intolerable neighbor, and because it had been sufficiently demonstrated that Spain was incompetent to restore and maintain peace and order. The sufficient and justifying motive for American intervention was the desire to remove what had long been a source of danger to the peace and welfare of our own country. There was, to be sure, in addition to this, a deep and widespread sympathy for the oppressed Cubans; but this feeling, by itself, would never, probably, have brought on, even if it could have justified, a war with Spain for the sole purpose of liberating the Cubans from Spanish rule. We forcibly abated a nuisance which had long been maintained in our neighborhood. We did this for our own advantage primarily. Necessarily, but only incidentally, our neighbors, the Cubans, should derive from American intervention even greater advantages than the Americans themselves. But, whether the war with Spain be considered as a merely utilitarian undertaking or as having in addition a humanitarian motive, its purposes can only be regarded as accomplished when we shall have effected in Cuba a complete and permanent reformation of the condition of things which made necessary the forcible expulsion of Spain. Not only must the house be swept and garnished, but care must be taken that no other devils shall enter, and that the last state of the island shall not be worse than the first. For almost a year now the United States has been in complete control, and it may be interesting to take account of how much, or how little, has been accomplished of the enormous task involved in the regeneration of Cuba.

In estimating what has been accomplished under American

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control, it must be remembered that the region surrendered when the Spanish forces capitulated at Santiago has been in American hands ever since the date of the surrender, July 17, 1898, while the rest of the island remained under Spanish rule until the first day of January, 1899. The territory surrendered when Santiago fell included, approximately, the eastern half of Santiago Province, the scene of repeated insurrections against Spanish rule, and the home of the most ignorant, turbulent and lawless people of Cuba. The task of establishing order in this distracted region and maintaining peace among the inhabitants devolved on the American military commander and his subordinates. These officers were not specially chosen for such duty, and they had no time for preliminary studies of the situation which confronted them. They had no instructions from higher authority other than those contained in an order issued by the President, which wisely directed that, for the time being, the laws of the land should continue in force, but only so far as they were not inconsistent with "the new order of things." The general in command governed the surrendered region with commendable disregard of such provisions of the Spanish codes as were in his judgment incompatible with the objects of the American occupation. Courts were promptly established, the judges being appointed only after careful inquiry and upon the express recommendation of the best citizens. The demoralized municipalities were reorganized, the municipal officials being appointed in the same way as the judges. Forces of police were organized for the towns and rural districts. Cities and towns were cleaned of the accumulated filth which had made them for ages plague-spots and centres of infection for the most dreaded diseases of the tropics. Sanitary regulations were enforced among people who had never before known what such regulations were or were intended for. All available funds were devoted to the prosecution of public works, affording employment and relief to the destitute laboring element of the population. A system of internal taxation was devised, which, though crude and far from satisfactory even to its authors, was probably the best that could have been arranged in the existing emergency, and was certainly more reasonable and equitable than any that had ever been known under Spanish domination. As soon as possible, free public schools were established, and no other measure of the military government for the

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benefit of the governed met with such prompt and cordial recognition and support as the attempt to establish public instruction in a land in which four centuries of Spanish civilization had failed to produce so much as a single schoolhouse. In addition to all this, the sick, the helpless and the destitute were relieved and cared for till they could be put in a position to care for themselves. Public order was restored and maintained in the most turbulent section of Cuba. None but Cubans were appointed to office, but every Cuban official was subject to the supervision of the military authorities. Dismissal and, if necessary, punishment were promptly and summarily dealt out to those who were found guilty of neglect or malfeasance. The surrendered district was quiet, contented, and, if not prosperous, it was at least self-sustaining. In less than six months, substantial progress had been made toward the accomplishment of the purposes for which the United States had intervened in Cuba, when, on January 1, 1899, it lost its identity, becoming thereafter only a part of the Military Division of Cuba, subject, in all respects, to the Military Governor at Havana.

The history of the American occupation since the day when the entire island passed into American hands is simply the story of what has been done at Havana. It is a record of error and neglect, of folly, ending necessarily in failure, and, possibly, in shame and disgrace.

Some preliminary mistakes and omissions seem to have been made at Washington. During all the period between the fall of Santiago and the occupation of Havana, nobody seems to have thought it worth while to study the problems involved in the transfer of the island, or to arrange a scheme for administering the government with a view to accomplishing economically, quickly and effectively the ultimate purposes of the intervention. Those purposes seem to have been lost sight of. A garrison was sent into the island, just as would have been done if the surrender had been arranged the previous day. So far as can be discovered, no general policy was prescribed and no specific instructions were given by the Government at Washington to guide the Military Governor in the performance of his difficult duty. The occupation of Cuba being of a purely military character, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, was invested with legislative, executive and judicial powers over the island. He could prescribe

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the methods by which those powers were to be used to accomplish the purposes for which the war had been waged, and he could select, with those ends in view, competent subordinates to whom to delegate their exercise.

If the President deemed it wise, as it seems he did, to commit the exercise of his vast powers in Cuba to the absolute discretion of the Military Governor, his next mistake was in the selection of an officer for that trust who had no qualifications for the position, and no claim upon it except such as might be due to his high rank in the army. If the duties to be performed had been of a purely military character, the selection made would have been natural and proper; and there is no reason to doubt that the results would have been satisfactory. But there were no military problems to be solved in Cuba. The military duties of a Military Governor were certain to be only those of ordinary routine. It was equally certain that whoever might be appointed would find his real work in dealing with problems of a civil nature, the successful solution of which would call for the exercise of the highest and most exceptional ability, or, in its absence, for the results of special training and long experience in similar duties. High rank and long and honorable service in the army are not evidences of qualification for a task of such difficulty. When the name of the first Military Governor was announced, there was dismay in the hearts of all intelligent Cubans. They knew nothing of his long and honorable record as an officer, but they knew all about his brief career as Governor of Puerto Rico, and of his deplorable failure as an administrator of civil affairs. Neither by ability nor experience was he fitted for the duties entrusted to him, and it was inevitable that when he found himself unable to exercise the great powers conferred upon him those powers should fall into other hands.

Before this occurred, however, the Governor made two fatal blunders, apparently of his own motion. On assuming his office he proclaimed the restoration of the Spanish law *in its entirety*. Of what the Spanish law was, of its defects and its enormities, he probably knew nothing at all. Of the scandalous judicial system and the more scandalous methods of procedure, in both civil and criminal cases, which that law provides, he must have been totally ignorant. The effect of this was to revoke all the modifications of the law which, under the saving clause of the President's order re-

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ferred to, had been enacted in the surrendered region of Santiago, and to restore to life every iniquitous practice against which Cuba had rebelled. It remained then only to find subordinates to whom to confide the application of unmitigated Spanish law, under American responsibility, to the government of the people who abhorred that law and all that it represented, for the purposes for which the intervention had been made. If the trust had been passed on by the Governor to American subordinates, or to Cubans carefully selected and carefully and constantly supervised in the discharge of their duties, the result might have been favorable; but in selecting his counsellors for civil affairs the Military Governor made another blunder, as serious as the first. The administrative duties of his government were distributed among four departments, each with a secretary at its head. The four secretaries formed the Governor's "Cabinet." Nominally, the Governor retained absolute control of the government, but really, without a formal delegation of his authority, he allowed to lapse into the hands of the four secretaries the great powers which he was himself too weak to wield. It was not long until the facts became known in Havana, and from there the knowledge spread over all the island. The expression of it took the form: "The American Governor reigns, but the Cuban secretaries govern." With this second blunder, the Military Governor practically disappears from the record. From this point, the government becomes practically a Cuban government, without responsibility on the part of the Cubans. That responsibility is all that is left to the American who is nominally the Governor and the Government.

It may be interesting, as throwing some light on the question as to what the Cubans would do if left to govern themselves without even nominal control, to follow the course and to point out the results of Cuban government so far.

If the secretaries, when they found themselves in possession of the Governor's powers, had exercised those powers to relieve their countrymen as soon as possible from the burdens and afflictions imposed by Spanish law and Spanish rule, the accomplishment of the ends for which the Cubans revolted and those for which the Americans intervened would have been equally promoted. If, without any regard whatever for American interests, they had laid out and pursued a wise and patriotic policy in the

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interest of their own country, they would necessarily have been promoting the real and ultimate purpose of the intervention, from the American point of view, the turning of the island from a serious and standing nuisance into a good and quiet neighbor. But no such course has been taken. The folly of the Military Governor in proclaiming the complete re-establishment of the Spanish laws had the effect of preserving, in working order, every weapon and device for the purposes of fraud, corruption and oppression that Spain had perfected after four centuries of misrule, and the use and control of this arsenal and magazine of iniquities was weakly handed over to men who, though they had rebelled against the system when Spaniards were the oppressors and they themselves were the victims, have shown since they came into power, not only their desire to preserve the same system with no material modifications, but their willingness to employ it for the oppression of their own countrymen. After almost a year of American supremacy, Cuba is governed by Spanish methods. The only change has been in the substitution of Cubans for Spaniards as the administrators of the machinery of government.

No American who is not familiar with the Spanish language and the Spanish laws, and who has not lived in a country subject to Spanish rule long enough to become familiar with the methods by which those laws are administered, can have any adequate conception of the enormities which can be, and are, as a matter of course, perpetrated by due process of law and in the name of justice, under the Spanish system. It would take too long to describe here, in anything like detail, the deformities of the Spanish codes, the barbarities of Spanish procedure and the defects of the Spanish organization of the judiciary. It must suffice to say, briefly, that the body of Spanish law is not a growth upward from the needs and the customs of the people who are subject to it, like the common law and the statutes in the United States. It is a rule imposed from above by an authority higher than the people, and framed without much regard to the people's welfare. If it does not fit the people, they must fit themselves to it as well as they may. And for the application of the law to litigated cases, for the prosecution of persons accused of public offenses and for the accomplishment of the purposes of the Government, worthy or unworthy, there have been devised a sys-

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tem of courts and a method of procedure differing radically from anything of the sort that any English-speaking people have known for the last three hundred years. Americans have never thought of their courts of justice as anything less than co-ordinate parts of the mechanism of their Government, not to be interfered with or restricted in the exercise of their judicial powers by any other branch of the same Government. No Spaniard or Cuban has ever risen to such a conception of a court. In Cuba to-day, as in Spain, the courts are subordinate, not co-ordinate, parts of the Government. They are merely instruments in the hands of higher powers by which those powers may accomplish their purposes indirectly whenever, for any reason, they do not care to do so openly. To this end, the tribunals are so organized and their procedure so arranged that the guilty may be shielded and the innocent persecuted to destruction, as may suit the whims, caprices or corrupt interests of the persons in possession of the powers of government. Since the Cuban secretaries took possession of the American Government at Havana, nothing has been done by them, or by any person under their authority, to introduce any reform, in the furtherance of common justice, in the laws, the courts or the modes of procedure. They have carefully preserved the entire iniquitous system, showing every desire to make it permanent, merely substituting themselves for the Spaniards who were formerly masters of the same powers for evil. The result is that the Cuban people have no more confidence in the courts of justice to-day than they had when the domination of Spain was unchallenged. Corruption exists everywhere. Justice and injustice are commodities disposed of, more or less openly, in the forum as in a market. When the Cubans cry out against the continuance of a condition of things against which they repeatedly rebelled, and which they believed could not exist under the American flag, they are told, by the Cuban secretaries, that the American Governor is responsible and that he declines to take any steps in the direction of reform. When, on the other hand, indignant Americans, scandalized at a state of affairs for which the whole American people will be held morally responsible, ask the Military Governor for an explanation of his tranquil inertness, they learn that such or such a secretary has the matter in hand, that it requires careful consideration; that much time is necessary, but that, ultimately, something will be done. Substantially

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nothing has been done, and there is no prospect whatever that any material improvement can ever be effected under the present system of Cuban government, with American responsibility for the results of Cuban incompetence and corruption. As stated above, the result is valuable only as showing what will infallibly result whenever the destinies of Cuba are turned over without reserve to the hands of Cubans, as Cubans are now.

Aside from the administration of justice, no other public duty was more grossly neglected or perverted under Spanish rule in Cuba than the duty of public instruction. There were laws in abundance relating to the subject—as, indeed, there are voluminous laws relating to almost every conceivable subject; but there was not a school in the island worthy of the name it bore. The end and purpose of the public schools, as they existed, was not to educate the young, but to pay salaries to the teaching body. Nobody could teach school, or pretend to teach, who was not possessed of an official license. The possession of any degree of learning, or of the capacity to impart knowledge to others, was not at all indispensable in the candidate for such a license. Other considerations, of a pecuniary character, seem to have been much more weighty in securing the coveted *"titulo"* for those who were anxious, not to teach, but to hold the office and receive the salaries of teachers. One of the first things the Cubans looked and prayed for, when the Americans took possession of their island, was the establishment of public schools, in which their children might be redeemed from the bondage of ignorance in which they themselves had been held. About the clearest idea that the ordinary Cuban peasant has of the United States is that it is a land where all children go to school and everybody can read and write. He looked for the advent of some such delightful condition in Cuba soon after the Americans came; and his hopes were greatly strengthened when the military government in the surrendered region in Santiago set to work, immediately after the capitulation, to organize public schools everywhere within its jurisdiction. The schools so organized were but poor affairs, if judged by any American standard, and the resources for sustaining them were scanty and precarious; but they were the best schools that country had ever known, and for the first time in the history of the island the instruction of children was made of greater importance than the emoluments of teachers. The system

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was developing, extending and improving, with results that were highly satisfactory, when, at a blow, it was destroyed, by the mandate of a Cuban secretary, because it had not been organized and administered in strict accordance with the discredited Spanish law of public instruction. To Americans this may seem to be incredible, but it is deplorably true; and it was done in the name and by the authority of the highest representative of American authority in the island. The Cubans promptly lost faith in America as a land of light and leading. They believe, and with some reason, that Americans are just as anxious to keep them in ignorance as ever their Spanish masters were. The revolutionary element takes pains to explain that the American Governor is again responsible for this failure, while the Governor explains to inquiring Americans that some secretary, as usual, has the matter "under careful consideration"—so careful, in fact, that it will never get beyond his consideration.

Another of the grievous complaints which the Cubans made against Spain was that the whole government of the island, even in its smallest details, was centralized at Havana. It has remained for the Cuban ministers of an American Governor to prove that the Spaniards were mere amateurs in the art of centralizing power. As soon as the secretaries at Havana became the real masters of the island, they began a system of appointments and removals in all the offices, from the highest judicial and administrative posts down to the third and fourth assistant mayors of little hamlets in the remote wilderness. Every one of these appointments was made with due consideration of its effect on the political future of the small *junta* in control. Many of these appointments were made in spite of the earnest and repeated protests of the American generals in command of subordinate departments, but the generals soon learned that they too were practically subject to the secretaries, and that a demonstration of the fact that a candidate for any important position was unfitted for it by personal character, attainments, antecedents or for any other reason, had no weight with the American Governor as against the recommendation of a Cuban secretary. Appointments were confined almost exclusively to those who had served in the Cuban army. That force never represented ten per cent. of the Cuban people, and its general character was such that high rank or long service in it might better be regarded as disqualifica-

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tions for office, rather than as claims to consideration. As a body, it is avowedly hostile to the continuance of the American occupation, even for a day, and equally hostile to the exertion of any American influence in determining the final settlement and reconstruction of the country. Yet from this body have been appointed judges of all grades, civil governors in every province, the mayors and other municipal officers in all cities and towns—almost every Cuban officeholder, in short, every one of whom is dependent, for his continuance in office, on the secretaries who gave it to him. The result is a political machine which covers the entire island, which has been constructed under cover of American authority, but is bitterly hostile to every American influence, and the aim of which is to obstruct and to defeat, if possible, the very purposes for which the Americans intervened and expelled Spain from Cuba.

Another effective device of the *junta* at Havana for increasing their power has been to make every municipality in the island directly dependent on the general treasury at the capital for the means with which to pay its way. No municipality is allowed to raise sufficient revenues out of its own resources and expend them for its own benefit. The custom house receipts and the greater part of the internal revenues are sent to the capital, there to be doled out to the cities and towns, for their local expenses, in sums deemed suitable for the purpose by functionaries who have no local knowledge whatever, and who may give or withhold as may suit their discretion or their personal or political interest. If the municipal affairs of Seattle were subject to the dictation of the Cabinet at Washington the conditions would be parallel.

It may be stated, in brief, that wherever Cubans, under nominal American control, have been trusted to exercise the functions of government, the result has been worse than failure. The courts are corrupt and incompetent; the police forces are hopelessly inefficient; the public schools are unorganized; the municipalities are all bankrupt dependents on a political machine; the offices of government, high and low, are filled, very largely, with unworthy and incompetent officials; the laws, the courts and the methods of procedure are unreformed; and, finally, almost every abuse against which Cubans rebelled and to remedy which the United States intervened is in operation to-day under American authority. There exists throughout the island a condition

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of tame anarchy, which awaits only the withdrawal of the American forces to burst out into anarchy of another type.

In two branches only of the public service has there been great and highly satisfactory advance from the previously existing conditions. The receipts from the custom houses have greatly increased, in spite of the reduction in trade due to the exhausted condition of the island, and the reductions made in the tariff rates. This will be understood when it is remembered that an American, an officer of the regular army, collects and accounts for the receipts in every custom house in Cuba, and that a regular officer is treasurer and another is auditor for the whole island. In the department of sanitation and public health, also, the American control has been absolute, and no Cuban has been permitted to interfere with the operations of that important branch. The result is seen in the lowest death-rate ever known in the island. In other words, where Americans have been allowed to work, with American methods, the result has been distinguished success. On the other hand, wherever Cubans have been allowed to proceed, by any methods of their own choice, they have invariably clung to the methods of Spain, which they have employed for their own ends, not for the public good; and the result is disastrous failure, for which Americans are responsible. Not one step has been taken toward a realization of the purposes of the intervention. The problem has become, by reason of neglect and incompetency, more difficult to-day than it was a year ago. The house was swept and garnished, but the door was left open and the seven other devils seem to have taken advantage of the opportunity. If no change occurs soon the last state of Cuba bids fair to be far worse than the first.

J. E. RUNCIE.

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EASTERN COMMERCE: WHAT IS IT WORTH?

BY EDWARD ATKINSON, LL.D.

THE main object of the people of the United States now is to find a market for their surplus product of the field, the factory, the mine and the workshop. That market will be greater or less according to the relative needs of the people of different parts of the world for the products which we have to spare, and according to their ability to buy and pay for them. Their ability to buy what we have to spare will depend upon two factors: first, their own purchasing power, which will depend on their greater or less use of the labor-saving inventions of modern times; second, upon our willingness to accept in payment for our sales equivalent quantities of such goods as each country or State may have to sell. We may buy more from some States than we sell to them; but, if we still obstruct the import of many articles which other nations might supply, especially Eastern and Latin-American States, we thereby limit their power of purchasing from us.

The valuation of our exports in the last fiscal year was $1,227,203,088. Our largest customers are found among the English-speaking people of the United Kingdom, and of such of her colonies as are mainly occupied by her own people. Therefore, omitting for the present the British dependencies in Asia and Africa, we get the following facts: The people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, numbering in round figures, according to the latest census, forty million persons, bought from us in the last fiscal year food, fibres and fabrics to the value of $511,816,475, making 41.71 per cent. of our total exports. The people of British North America, Australasia, the British West Indies, Bermuda, British Guiana and Honduras,

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numbering in round figures, according to the latest *data,* eleven million five hundred thousand persons, chiefly of English blood, bought our goods to the amount of $122,129,368; that is, 12.17 per cent. of our total exports. The purchases of the English-speaking people thus amounted to $633,945,843, or 53.88 per cent. of our total exports.

We purchased from them a far less quantity and value of goods, but we supplied them with the crude or partly manufactured materials, and with the food which enabled them to convert our supplies into manufactured goods and to export finished products to other parts of the world, to which they open the largest market free of duties on crude or partly manufactured products. The British, German and French manufacturers are enabled to displace many classes of our goods which might otherwise be exported by us in the finished form, by their free import of wool, dyestuffs, chemicals and other materials which are necessary in the processes of their domestic manufactures. We have restricted the import of similar materials and have thus increased the cost of our own supply of wool, hides, chemicals and other crude or partly manufactured materials which are necessary in the processes of our own domestic industry by imposing heavy duties upon their import. We thereby increase the cost of many branches of our domestic manufactures, while excluding from our own markets large quantities of goods derived from Asia, Africa, Australasia and South America, which, if entered free, would enable the inhabitants of these continents to purchase of us many of the finished goods they now get from European countries. Our very large export of the manufactures of metal, of wool, of cotton and other fabrics, made almost wholly from crude materials of domestic origin, has proved conclusively that, when our manufacturers who use foreign wool, leather, chemicals, etc., can secure supplies of crude materials, either domestic or foreign, on even terms with their European competitors, they can successfully compete with them in every market in the world, in every branch of finished goods.

Our next largest customers were the people of Germany, probably numbering at the present time about fifty-five millions, whose purchases amounted to $155,772,279. The next largest customer for her own domestic consumption was France, with a population of forty millions, whose purchases represented $60,596,899. The

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Netherlands and Belgium, with a population of about eleven and one-half millions, imported from us goods to the value of $123,605,237. But Antwerp and the Dutch ports are mainly distributing points, through which goods pass to the rest of Europe, their duties being few in number and very low in amount, many of the goods passing to any point free of duty.

The remaining European countries, comprising a population of two hundred and forty millions with Russia in Europe added, bought goods to the amount of only $84,278,238.

The total purchases of Europe and the British English-speaking colonies, on a computed population of somewhat under four hundred millions, amounted, therefore, to $1,058,198,496.

It appears, accordingly, that, in proportion to their relative ability to purchase and consume, the people of Europe and of the English-speaking colonies of Great Britain—mainly the inhabitants of Great Britain, France, Germany and the Low Countries—bought from us seven-eighths of our total exports in the last fiscal year.

In the same year we sold to the British dependencies in Asia and Africa goods to the amount of $27,230,071, which will hereafter be treated.

Our next largest customers were to be found in the Latin-American States: South and Central America, Mexico, Cuba, Hayti, Porto Rico and a few other islands aside from the British, containing a population probably approximating sixty-five millions. Their purchases of our goods in the last fiscal year amounted to $91,952,143. It will be observed that these sixty-five million people, whose purchasing power has been but in small measure developed by the application of science and invention, were able to consume but a trifle more than our kith and kin in the neighboring Dominion of Canada, numbering a little over five millions, whose exchanges with us might be doubled by a removal of the heavy duties which now obstruct our mutual service. As yet we have not reached the commerce of the East; yet we have designated the markets for ninety-four per cent. of our total exports. The British dependencies in Asia and Africa bought a fraction over two per cent. of our total exports, or $27,230,071 worth.

The figures of our Eastern commerce elsewhere were as follows, and represent only four per cent. of our total exports:

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Japan	$17,264,688
China, not British	14,493,440
Russia in Asia	1,543,126
All other Asiatic countries	2,984,446
Oceanica, omitting the Philippine Islands and British Australasia	9,693,693
Africa, not British	3,438,814
Philippine Islands	404,171
Total	$49,822,378

Mark, again, the singular fact that, omitting the Australian contingent of less than five million persons, the people of Asia, Africa and Oceanica—comprising, at least, two-thirds of the population of the globe, about 800,000,000 in number—were able to purchase from us goods and wares at the rate of less than ten cents per head, to the value of only $77,000,000; that is less by ten million dollars than the purchases of our neighbors in Canada, about five millions in number, with whom, at our own will, we might double our traffic, which is now at the rate of eighteen dollars per head.

Again, the entire traffic with Asia, Africa and Oceanica, aside from the British possessions, was only one-tenth of the demand of our kith and kin in the United Kingdom, numbering only forty millions. Forty million English-speaking people, whose purchasing and consuming power has been developed by science and invention, consumed over five hundred million dollars' worth of the food, fibres and fabrics produced in the United States in a single year; while a population living on the edge of want, undeveloped by modern science and invention, in Asia, Africa and Oceanica, numbering approximately eight hundred million people, were able to buy and consume less than eighty million dollars' worth of American fabrics.

Is it not very plain that if our ports were as free from the obstructions of heavy duties on the crude products of these continents as are London, Antwerp and other European ports, we might diminish the cost of our manufactures which depend in part upon materials of foreign origin, and thus compete successfully with European manufacturers in meeting the increasing demands, especially in South America, where railways, steamships and other modern appliances are being most rapidly extended? If we thus increase our purchases, may we not also of necessity increase our exports? Trade follows the price and consists in an exchange of products, balances only being settled in money.

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But now suppose that our present efforts to develop the commerce of the East should be successful, at what rate would it increase? Only in ratio to the increased purchasing power of the people. What have we to expect in the immediate future? China, torn with intestine troubles, more and more subject to foreign domination, may develop a demand for railway material and for a few more cotton fabrics, especially in the northern Province of Manchuria, since the stable Government of Russia has taken control from the unstable Government of China. But where masses of the people are on the edge of starvation all the time, and where we already buy all the tea, raw silk and a few other commodities that China can produce and that we want, what is the measure of the possibility of an increase of traffic?

The same question may be put in regard to India. Indian ports are open to us on the same terms as to all other nations, and India has the benefit of the stable control of the British Government, but the great mass of the people are constantly on the verge of starvation. The wealth of India is in a very few hands and consists mainly of hoards of precious metals and other property of that kind.

If we subjugate the Philippine Islands, what will be the possible increase in their purchasing power? Although we have been the largest buyers of Manila hemp and Philippine sugar for many years, purchasing from four to seven million dollars' worth every year, yet the wants of the people enabled them to buy from us four years ago only one hundred thousand dollars' worth of goods, and last year four hundred thousand dollars' worth, the increase consisting largely in liquors and other supplies chiefly consumed by the American troops.

It may be remarked that the fallacy in regard to the possibility of an immediate and very great increase in our sales to Eastern countries is due to a delusion regarding what used to be called the "wealth of the Indies." The masses of the people of Asia and Africa are the poorest in the world; that is to say, they barely derive from the soil and other sources the means of a very wretched existence. We often hear their low wages quoted. All wages are a reflex of the product of the country. They are and must be very small measured in money when the whole product is very small in ratio to the population. There is, of course, a small class of very wealthy men in Asia in whose hands the

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"wealth of the Indies" is concentrated, largely in hoards and in very small measure in reproductive enterprise. This phrase originated in the earlier times of modern commerce, when the exchanges of the world consisted mainly in articles of luxury or of comfort, rather than in articles of necessary use.

It would be interesting to compute, if it were possible, the proportions of the imports of foreign goods into Europe, especially from the East, from 1650 to 1850. They consisted in large measure of tea, coffee, spices, silks, gums, tropical wood, fine pottery, fine metal-work and other articles of like kind; while the exports, although in larger measure of useful goods rather than comforts and luxuries, were of such purchasing power that a very small export of the product of labor sufficed to bring back a very large import in return.

I have had put before me the accounts of the early adventurers to the Northwestern coast in the early days of the trade. A small ship or brig would be loaded in Boston, Salem or New York with red flannel, muskets, gunpowder, beads and a few common tools. These would be broken up on the voyage into parcels, each containing a few yards of flannel, one gun, a certain proportion of powder and bullets and so many beads, altogether of very small cost; but that parcel exchanged for a bale of beaver-skins of very high value. This exchange being completed, the ship or brig would start for China, there exchanging the beaver-skins in about the same proportion for tea, silks and other products of China; thus bringing back an excessive amount of the "wealth of the Indies" for a very small product of the factories and workshops of this country. All these conditions have been changed. The vast proportion of the commerce of the world, especially of this country, consists in the exchange of the necessaries of life, of food, fuel and metals, or of the articles of foreign origin which enter into the processes of modern manufacture in each importing country. A few comparative figures will make this plain.

The population of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is, in round figures, forty millions. Their imports, less re-exports, are fifty dollars per head; their exports of British merchandise twenty-nine dollars per head. The more they import of the materials which enter into the processes of manufacture, the more they are enabled to export. Without import and export on a very large scale, the present forms of society and

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the distribution of wealth and welfare in the United Kingdom could not be maintained.

The computed population of this country for the last fiscal year was seventy-six millions. Our imports were sixteen dollars per head; our exports nine dollars per head. With us, import and export are more a matter of choice than of necessity. But we may not only develop the home consumption of our own products by increasing our commerce; we may also greatly increase that commerce, both import and export, whenever we choose. We might add at least three dollars per head to our imports, or two hundred and twenty-eight million dollars' worth of the products of other countries which may be used in our processes of domestic industry, by removing obstructive duties, and we might add, as a result of that import, four to five dollars per head, or three to four hundred million dollars to our exports every year. All that is necessary to compass this change is the removal of the obstructions which we have by legislation placed in the way both of the import and the export traffic.

If any question should arise about the rate of wages in this and other countries, it will be manifest, from the fact that we last year exported over twelve hundred million dollars' worth of goods, that the rate of wages does not govern the cost of labor. The highest rates of wages to be found anywhere in the world were recovered and distributed among the workmen of this country last year from the sale of this twelve hundred million dollars' worth of products. If the cost of labor were governed by the rate of wages, we could not export a dollar's worth of anything. We are now seeking to increase our exports and to develop our commerce with the East. To that end we are conducting a war in the Philippine Islands at a cost of at least three dollars per head of our population. That is to say, the normal cost of this Government for all purposes, for twenty years prior to the Spanish war, was five dollars per head, tending to diminish with the falling in of pensions and the increase of population. It is now nearly eight dollars per head, and may be more. The difference of three dollars per head comes to over two hundred million dollars a year, all of which must be distributed in the taxes, increasing the cost of production and diminishing our power to compete with other countries. In fact, it would very seriously impair our power of competition with England, France and

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Germany, were they not committing greater folly than ourselves by increasing their destructive military expenditures even in greater measure than we are.

Is there not something grotesquely absurd in the commercial support which is given to this Philippine war? It will not in any measure help to increase our commerce with Japan, with British India, with Borneo or Sumatra. The only argument in its favor consists in its advocates holding up a brilliant expectation of the development of commerce with the Philippine Islands, where white men cannot live and work, and as a stepping-stone to getting a larger share of the commerce with China. Our commerce with the Province of Manchuria has already increased very greatly since Russia obtained a sphere of influence. Our commerce with every part of China that comes under British influence must greatly increase, so far as her supervision gives stability and maintains order. Any expenditure of our own for warlike purposes only diminishes our power to sell more goods and to buy more in return from the Philippine Islands and from China. Our exports for the last fiscal year to both amounted to fifteen million dollars' worth outside the British possessions, on which it may be assumed that there was a profit of ten per cent.—call it twenty. Admit that some merchants in this country made a profit of a million and a half to three million dollars in the export of fifteen million dollars' worth of goods in this branch of Eastern trade, China outside British possessions and the Philippines, which the advocates of military expansion and control hold up as a magnificent example of the possibility of expansion. It cost the taxpayers two hundred million dollars to get whatever increase of traffic has been or may be secured by this method. Could anything be more foolish?

There is another aspect of the case. Since the beginning of the war with Spain we have spent about five hundred million dollars in excess of what we should have spent except for the war; half of which may be charged to the liberation of Cuba, the other half to the effort to extend commerce by military aggression. We shall spend about as much more next year. The contest in the Philippines will cost the taxpayers of this country from four to five hundred million dollars, even if it is stopped within the next year. What could we have done with five hundred million dollars in order to promote commerce, had such an expenditure by the

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central Government been warranted for constructive purposes at the cost of the taxpayers?

(1.) We could either have finished the Panama Canal, or we could have constructed the Nicaragua Canal at the highest estimate of its cost.

(2.) We could have developed every river and harbor of this country up to its maximum capacity, and we might have added cross-cut canals to bring Philadelphia and Baltimore closer to the sea, a short canal on Cape Cod, and other enterprises of the like kind. Which expenditure would best promote commerce, the destructive expenditure of military aggression or the constructive expenditure in developing the ways of trade and commerce?

(3.) If it were right and suitable to spend great sums of money for the special development of particular parts of the country at the cost of the taxpayers, a single hundred million dollars, or six months of our present waste on the warfare that we are conducting, would probably suffice to irrigate the entire arid lands of the middle section of our country.

(4.) The central mountain section of the eastern part of the country, eastern Kentucky and Tennessee, western North and South Carolina, northern Georgia and Alabama—an area nearly as large as France, twice as large as Great Britain, containing mineral and timber equal to both combined, and a potential in agriculture equal to either—has hardly been entered upon in the progress of development. There is more individual wealth and more common welfare waiting for brains and industry combined, either in the development of the arid lands or in the development of this middle section of the Southland, than could be gained by commerce with the East in half a century, even if we were not wasting annually in the effort to gain commerce by aggressive warfare more than the whole commerce can be worth if it were all profit in the next twenty years.

Another almost ludicrous block to the Administration policy has appeared in this matter. The Chinaman is representative of the only race which maintains habits of industry, economy and honesty in the tropics. Skilful according to their methods, and earnest in their efforts, they are doing a vital and essential part of the work of preparing crops for export from the Philippine Islands. They number there about one hundred thousand; yet, under the existing prejudice against Chinese labor in this country,

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the Administration has been obliged to prohibit the further entry of the Chinese into the Philippine Islands. Thus, while excluding the Chinese from one of the few places open to them for relief from their excess of population, the advocates of expansion are at the same time pretending that the Philippine Islands will be a great stepping-stone toward our traffic with China. Could the force of folly go any further ?

I would by no means undervalue the development of Eastern commerce. It is of importance even at its present measure. We are but witnessing the beginning of the process of development of Asia, Africa and South America by the railway and steamship. With that development, commerce will increase by leaps and bounds, provided it is not interrupted by war and by criminal aggression. If we only stand and wait, that commerce is at our feet. It must come to us in very large measure, because we hold the paramount control of the iron and steel products and manufactures of the world, and these give us the control of shipping and commerce whenever we choose to free the natural course of trade from obstructive taxes and repeal our obsolete navigation laws, which only keep our flag from the sea. Every step that we take in criminal aggression, or in warfare of any kind, for the control of commerce only adds to our burden, destroys the power of those with whom we would trade to buy our goods, while working a possible profit to the few promoters and contractors who desire to get the first plunder out of ignorant people in the construction of their railways, but at the cost of the mass of the taxpayers of this country.

"A fool and his money are soon parted." The typical Uncle Sam is held in international repute to be rather shrewd and to comprehend his own interest, and yet he is now a most conspicuous example of that aphorism. How other nations must laugh in their sleeves while witnessing what a fool Uncle Sam is making of himself at the present time, in the matter of military aggression under the pretext of expansion of commerce. Uncle Sam may be fooled for a short time by specious and delusive arguments based on pretexts of piety, profits and patriotism. He cannot be long misled by false pretenses, and he will presently take measures to expose them and to stop the course of criminal aggression.

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